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Preface 
 
This compilation contains the nine background papers that have been drafted by members of 
the European Commission's Expert Group 'Strategic Foresight for R&I Policy in Horizon 2020' 
(SFRI) between June 2015 and November 2016. All papers have been finally endorsed by the 
entire group. They are the basis for the group's final report entitled 'Strategic Foresight in EU 
R&I Policy: Wider Use – More Impact'. 
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Background Paper 1 
 
Forward-looking Rapid Response (FRR) as a support 
for R&I policy-making 
 
Authors: Marguerite Grandjean (editor), Robby Berloznik, Blaz Golob, Luis Valadares Tavares 
 
1. The need for a Forward-looking Rapid Response mechanism  
1.1 Background 
The concept of rapid response relates to providing timely intelligence and resources for addressing 
urgent (or fast emerging) threats, risks and opportunities. Foresight is an open, anticipatory and 
participatory process aimed at distilling relevant knowledge on future trends, disruptions and 
emerging developments into effective and realistic policy options. Over the years, a range of tools 
has been developed, including horizon scanning, scenario development, Delphi and visioning 
among others, to explore such future developments in a systematic manner.  
Over the years, and as evidenced by long-standing practices in many Member States of the EU, 
foresight has become increasingly embedded in the policy process to the extent that it dovetails 
with other policy support tools. This has meant that foresight has been useful as a tool tailored to 
the policy context and its needs, helping respond to the challenges of an increasingly dynamic 
policy environment.  
However, the policy context has changed. Policy makers are increasingly faced by sudden events 
sparked by social and other media which may quickly turn a relatively calm policy area into a 
disruptive arena requiring fast but calculated and effective policy responses. In this context, most 
foresight activities tend to be too slow in providing the required forward-looking inputs to policy 
making in a timely fashion, while new questions are arising quickly and unexpectedly. For this 
reason, new tools are needed that can handle this demand for quicker inputs, while 
drawing on the best available foresight knowledge.  
The forward-looking dimension of policy challenges has become increasingly acute in the following 
cases in particular: 
 Opportunities and risks facing a particular sector or domain that arise suddenly or require 
urgent attention in order to be factored quickly into current policy design.  
 A policy issue or concern (relating to a scientific, technology, industry and/or societal domain, 
political pressures) which reaches a point where paradigm change or transition is urgently 
required.  
 A decision taken quickly now which has significant long-term repercussions on policy 
programming and design. 
Against this backdrop, Forward-looking Rapid Response is aimed at offering European policy 
makers with timely and effective support in addressing decisions related to urgent crisis situations 
and emerging risks, as well as windows of opportunities for resolving ongoing policy challenges and 
concerns.    
Forward-looking activities range from the exploratory to the more normative which cater for 
particular client needs. Forward-looking Rapid Response (FRR) falls in the latter category. While 
foresight usually entails a systematic process over several months, the speed of emergent policy 
needs requires a trade-off between more lengthy reflection processes and prompt intelligence-
gathering and sense-making. This is what FRR aims to offer. It does not claim to replicate the in-
depth quality of longer-term reflection, study and consultation. Instead, according to the time 
windows available, it can adjust to provide the response required, when it is required (i.e. within a 
10-day to six-month timeframe, with the best resources and intelligence available at the time. 
1.2 FRR definition & characteristics 
Forward-looking Rapid Response can be defined as a process that enables a network of relevant 
external experts to provide forward-oriented input in a short timeframe to the European 
Commission (EC), more particularly to DG RTD, with two aims: (i) to provide input to a high-stake 
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policy issue that has emerged as a priority and that requires urgent responses; and (ii) to help 
validate and complement research priorities of DG RTD services. 
A 'short' timeframe would typically vary between 10 days to six months, depending on the nature 
and urgency of the Commission's needs. The three FRR pilots conducted by the SFRI expert group, 
on scientific advice, migration, and security, have typically required three months. One can expect 
faster responses once FRR processes become more rooted within DG RTD, particularly if experts 
are asked in advance to set aside time for a very fast response. 
Beneficiaries of FRR may include:  
 decision-makers within DG RTD and beyond;  
 research staff in thematic Directorates within DG RTD who are in charge of producing the 
content side of Work Programmes, Strategic Programmes, and the next Framework 
Programme, as well as other R&I documents;  
 as well as other stakeholders such as the RTD Foresight Correspondence Network. 
1.3 The added value of forward-looking rapid response   
Forward-oriented perspectives and tools provide value in high-impact policy development, research 
programming, and general sense-making1. The aim of approaches and tools used in the artful 
discipline of foresight is to provide knowledge and out-of-the-box thinking to the issues at stake. 
Foresight thus enables policy-makers and policy advisors to look forward into potential 
consequences for Europe of upcoming developments in the scientific-technological as well as the 
societal realms, and to highlight implications these developments may raise for European 
policy decision. As an interdisciplinary approach, it also helps point out linkages and connections. 
And finally, by looking beyond what is obvious, foresight considers surprises, provoking thought 
and highlighting non-business-as-usual possibilities. 
In practice, in the R&I context, an FFR  mechanism offers:  
 Input in a short timescale, in order to fit within decision-making urgencies. These can 
be either political urgencies such as sudden event outbreaks, or procedural urgencies such as 
deadlines on a thematic input.  
 Input to context-specific demands that may emerge in framing R&I priorities. Value 
added comes with a deep understanding of the political or research context in which the 
request emerges as well as a focus on asking the right questions.  
 A validation process for the questions that are planned to be addressed in R&I 
programmes and policies. By reformulating the questions asked or supplementing them with 
broader perspectives, FRR proposes a valid frame to those issues, providing a means of 
qualifying ex ante the domain-specific expert research that is then done by advising groups or 
EC staff. 
1.4 Methodology 
FRR may use a range of available foresight methods for producing content and facilitating collective 
reflections. Horizon scanning, trend selection, weak signal identification, or rapid scenario building, 
may be used in order to frame or collect knowledge. 
In order to ensure that high-quality foresight input can be delivered in a timely fashion, the 
following approaches can be used: 
- The drawing on and scanning of existing sources (e.g. data-mining and advanced analytics of 
existing FS databases); 
- The application of rapid data collection techniques, such as online enquiries, social media analysis 
and workshops; 
                                                 
1  EFFLA.'Policy Brief 11.Sense-Making for DG Research and Innovation (DG RTD).' DG RTD: 2014. 
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- A long-developed ability to synthesise a broad spectrum of knowledge, and to connect it to 
current policy agendas.  
2. Literature and experience review of FRRs inside and outside EU 
policy-making bodies 
The need for rapid-response consultation at the EC is not entirely new, and has been expressed by 
experts. For example, writing about the general public consultations undertaken for FP7, Dan 
Andrée points out that one of the problems that arose was the lack of 'more targeted/systematic 
(and possibly more useful) processes' that would complement broad, open consultations.2 
However, the need for it was reinvigorated three years ago by EFFLA, in the context of 'sense-
making' for Horizon 2020 and European research science and innovation policies. Upon 
recommending to use sense-making during the preparation of European research strategies, EFFLA 
mentions that 'A need … may arise [in any sense-making task] for in-depth investigation of specific 
topics. Often a study of 3-4 weeks duration is sufficient, but without this the ongoing work may be 
based on assumptions which, either now or going forward, may be unfounded.'3 Although effective 
expert consultation mechanisms are in place, such as advisory groups for Work Programmes, the 
specific, in-depth expertise provided by these groups is not always a good fit for policy-tailored 
inputs. Moreover, the time required to provide high-quality research may exceed the window open 
for timely evidence-based decision-making.  
However, in practice, there are few instances of experimentation in the EU context with rapid 
response mechanisms by external experts in general to our knowledge, and none involving 
foresight in particular. 
As regards FP-preparation processes in particular, it seems that the main ways that the EC has 
resorted to external consultation (for FP7 and H2020) have been (i) large-scale formal public 
consultations, (ii) formal advisory groups (High Level Groups, European Research Area Boards, 
expert groups) and (iii) 'informal consultations … more targeted at the interested scientific and 
technical community and not necessarily open, or at least not widely publicised.'4 
A rapid response mechanism using external input has been experimented with in the past at the 
Joint Research Centre’s Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS), although it was not 
geared specifically towards FP preparation. 
Rapid response systems of knowledge production have been proposed or experimented in other 
domains such as health or policy-making. Foresight companies such as Shaping Tomorrow and 
TechCast also have experience in gathering input in a rapid and standardized way from a network 
of experts.  
A Forward-looking Rapid Response at ESTO 
The European Science & Technology Observatory (ESTO) 'was the first project of the Joint 
Research Centre’s Institute for Prospective Technological Studies (IPTS) based in Seville, Spain. It 
was set up in an attempt to “create a platform of experts engaged in monitoring and analysing 
scientific and technological developments and their relation and interaction with society.'5 
ESTO relied on an external network of research institutes and related experts which ESTO staff 
resorted to when the European Commission asked specific, content-related questions. It was 
considered quite revolutionary at the time, especially given the lack of a collaborative culture within 
EU institutions. A specific process was developed, involving a multi-step workflow, which enabled 
iterations between the experts and the Commission.  
                                                 
2  Dan Andrée (Swedish Ministry for Education and Research). 'Priority-setting in the European Research 
Framework Programmes.' VINNOVA (Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems): 2009. (p. 
51) 
3  EFFLA.'Policy Brief 11.Sense-Making for DG Research and Innovation (DG RTD).' DG RTD: 2014. (p. 4) 
4  Dan Andrée (Swedish Ministry for Education and Research). 'Priority-setting in the European Research 
Framework Programmes.' VINNOVA (Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems): 2009. (p. 
35) 
5  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Science_and_Technology_Observatory 
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What was key was the form given to the expert network. It consisted of different disciplinary 
networks, organized in a concentric way with different levels of direct access from IPTS and 
different functions. Experts within the first circle were addressed first. When they did not feel able 
to answer the questions, they could redirect their questions to further circles. Alternatively, 
depending on the access level, a member of the IPTS staff could ask a Circle 1 expert, and turn to 
Circle 2 if that expert could not give an answer.  
One issue was the incentive system to encourage participation, whose design resulted in a level of 
competition among the partner organisations in the network to deliver content to the Commission.  
RAR: Rapid Assessment and Response 
RAR is a methodology originally developed by the WHO and widely used in the public health field 
(drug use, epidemics, tobacco use…). According to the WHO, “it is a means for undertaking a 
comprehensive assessment of a public health issue, including the characteristics of the health 
problem, population groups affected, settings and contexts, health and risk behaviours, and social 
consequences. It identifies existing resources and opportunities for intervention, and helps plan, 
develop, and implement interventions.”6 
Although RARs are not as rapid as our timeline (they take several weeks), it is interesting to keep 
in mind the key aspects of the methodology. The idea of RAR is to resort to social sciences 
methods to acquire a view of what is going on in a particular area. There is no fixed process. 
Rather, each time, the RAR team must define an objective and determine a course of action 
(including methodologies) that is best suited to the objective (realism principle). RAR includes both 
diagnosis and intervention.  
Usually, after reviewing secondary data, surveys and interviews are conducted on the field. From 
this knowledge base, a practical plan of action is then deployed. There is a focus on documenting 
the process and its results so that it can be used for subsequent studies and interventions. 
RRR: Rapid Realist Review7 
RRR was developed by a group of health researchers in North America 'as a tool for applying a 
realist approach to a knowledge synthesis process in order to produce a product that is useful to 
policy makers in responding to time-sensitive and/or emerging issues, while preserving the core 
elements of realist methodology.' 'They have emerged in response to the incompatibility between 
information needs of policy makers and the time requirements to complete systematic reviews. 
Rapid reviews provide a way to generate similar types of knowledge synthesis as more 
comprehensive systematic reviews do, but in a much shorter time period. While some have 
questioned the validity of rapid reviews, there remains a need to achieve a balance between 
comprehensiveness and timeliness for many policy-relevant decisions.' 
'All aspects of an RRR are guided by both a local reference group, and a group of content experts. 
Involvement of knowledge users and external experts ensures both the usability of the review 
products, as well as their links to current practice. … RRRs have proven useful in providing 
evidence for and making explicit what is known on a given topic, as well as articulating where 
knowledge gaps may exist. From the RRRs completed to date, findings broadly adhere to four 
(often overlapping) classifications:  
 guiding rules for policy-making; 
 knowledge quantification (i.e., the amount of literature available that identifies context, 
mechanisms, and outcomes for a given topic);  
 understanding tensions/ paradoxes in the evidence base;  
 reinforcing or refuting beliefs and decisions taken.'8 
                                                 
6 http://www.who.int/hiv/pub/prev_care/en/youngpeoplerar.pdf 
7 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3844485/pdf/1748-5908-8-103.pdf 
8 http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3844485/pdf/1748-5908-8-103.pdf 
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3. FRR in practice: pilot experiments for DG RTD 
In responding to ad-hoc demands in a timely way, it is not recommended to accommodate all 
requests through a one-size-fits-all process (although the generic guidelines outlined below in Part 
4 are necessary to address ways of recruiting and managing a relevant FRR expert circle and 
coordinating their contributions). Experimentations are essential to test out the process in 
real conditions. 
SFRI has conducted two pilot experiments and one co-creation workshop, in which two 'mock' 
experiments were run. This section outlines the observations and lessons learned. 
3.1 Pilot 1: Foresight for Scientific Advice (July-September 2015) 
In early July 2015, the Commission sent to the SFRI Chair a reflection paper on 'The Use of 
Foresight for Scientific Advice', along with three related questions (presented below). The objective 
of the Commission was to receive rapid input from the SFRI group on a Commission priority. The 
Chair was tasked with providing a consolidated response with a deadline set at the end of August. 
Two of the three questions addressed specific sections of the note. They asked for additional 
examples and whether the examples already given were still relevant. The last question was 
broader, asking for general advice on the topic of the paper (foresight for scientific advice).  
 
After the three Chairs convened in a Skype meeting and decided how to proceed, the Chair 
circulated the request to the SFRI members, with a deadline for input set one week later. By the 
end of July, the Chair drafted a preliminary response which was sent to the two Vice-Chairs and to 
the Commission for comments. 
By 20 August, the Commission sent written comments to the Chair. The Chair and the Commission 
met up shortly afterwards to discuss the draft response. The meeting allowed for further 
clarification of the request for rapid response. 
Based on the results of this meeting, by the end of August the Chair sent to SFRI members a 
request for additional input (good practice examples), again with a one-week deadline. 
Five days later, in early September, the Chair submitted a final rapid response paper. This 6-page 
paper stated that “the relationship between foresight and scientific advice cannot be regarded as 
the former simply feeding into the latter. Due to the inherent future- and action-orientation, 
scientific input rather feeds into foresight and afterwards these results frame new scientific advice 
procedures.” The major benefit of foresight for scientific advice is therefore to provide a reframing 
of problem definitions, based on sound scientific input, in order to support the formal advice 
The Questions 
1. Could you please verify and correct or complete where necessary 
section 3 "Approaches to foresight for government". Are the examples 
still pertinent or do you know of any significant changes? 
 
2. Could you please verify and correct or complete where necessary 
section 4 "Examples for the use of foresight by scientific advisory 
structures". Do you know any other important examples from national 
administrations or international organisations which can give insight into 
ways in which foresight can be used for scientific advice? 
 
3. Based on your knowledge and experience what ways of organising the 
use of foresight in scientific advice would increase the chances that 
foresight is actually taken into account for policy-making (i.e. how could 
foresight be effectively used for scientific advice?)? 
 
Please feel free to add any other comment you would find important to 
improve the document! 
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practice. It does so by 'embedding advice in a context of pluralistic world views, stakeholder 
participation and open planning, by exploring multiple future states.' 
3.2 Pilot 2: The Migration Issue in a Forward-looking Perspective – Migration in 
relation with research, education, technology and innovation (September-
December 2015) 
During an SFRI plenary meeting, in late September 2015, an informal need for urgent expert input 
on the issue of migrations was raised. 
Ten days later, in early October, the SFRI Chair communicated the request by email to SFRI 
members. The request was to share ideas on the relationship between migration and research, 
education, technology, and innovation. It was requested that the input should be brief and concise, 
and provided within a week. 
Experts then exchanged their input by email, looking at the issue from different angles, expressing 
novel ideas, and synthesizing the ideas already provided. 
Five days after the deadline (20 October), the three Chairs met to discuss the streams of input that 
emerged out of the email exchanges. 
In this rapid response, SFRI experts opted for a rather informal approach, due to the particular 
high-emergency context of the 'migration crisis' that was going on at the time. Therefore, the 
group’s input was sent directly via email to the head of unit who formulated the request, including 
a summary of the conclusions along with a mindmap displaying the issues that SFRI experts 
considered relevant for the current and next framework programs. Experts also recommended a 
feasibility study for a multidisciplinary research program exploring the drivers for migration and the 
mechanisms involved. 
During the next SFRI plenary meeting, in December 2015, upon request by SFRI members, the 
Commission confirmed that some of the ideas provided in the email exchanges had been taken into 
account. 
3.3 Pilot 3: Security Aspects in Future R&I Policy: Instability and Resilience 
(April-June 2016) 
On the SFRI plenary of 15 March 2016, a request was formulated for a forward-looking rapid 
response on security. The scope of the request was to focus on how the new security landscape will 
impact on the EU research and innovation policy. 
A dedicated Task Force of 6 people was appointed within the SFRI group, responsible for 
coordinating the production and delivery of the answer as well as ensuring the communication and 
interaction with the Commission services. The deadline for submitting the answer to the request 
was set at 30 June 2016. 
A workplan was agreed by 22 March 2016. 
The Task Force worked on the RR paper over the months of April and May. On 10 June 2016, they 
circulated a first draft to the other SFRI experts for input. Experts reacted by email and the draft 
was also discussed collectively at the SFRI plenary of 21 June 2016. 
The final paper, made available by 7 July 2016, contains 20 pages and include a number of key 
recommendations. These outline the policy consequences of a 'changing security landscape', both 
for European and R&I policy in general and specifically for Horizon 2020 and FP9. The paper puts a 
strong focus on security end-users, both in its framing of the security problem and in the policy 
priorities it highlights. It is recommended that security be framed as 'societal security', addressing 
the full range of security dimensions (which are depicted in a summary table). Different areas of 
research and policy should be bridged to address interconnected threats, risks and opportunities. 
Specific attention should be given to the interrelatedness of security dimensions, social innovation 
solutions, and the potential of participatory processes in early detection of emerging risks. 
Along with policy recommendations and reframing of security questions, the paper provides high-
quality content on potential alternative futures for security. This foresight content includes a review 
of scenario literature on different security topics; an outline of 'structural features of the new 
security landscape in flux'; and a more specific outline of threats, risks and opportunities at 
present, in the short term and in the longer run. 
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This work on security challenges in a forward-looking manner was used as an input for a lunchtime 
discussion session organized by DG RTD for Commission staff to launch the World Economic Forum 
Report on Global Risks. The WEF Report provides an important analysis of key emerging risks at 
global level based on different stakeholder views including young people. The SFRI contribution, in 
contrast, focused on proactive responses, societal security, research priorities and the need to 
focus on opportunities in this respect. The presentation by DG Home outlined their approach to 
security and the ten projects underway and the constraints of working within the rules of H2020, in 
particular its time horizon. In the two rounds of question and answer, the discussion included the 
involvement of young people and local communities, how to address externalities, and how to 
exploit FP results. 
3.4 Additional experiment: FRR workshop at the Commission (27 October 2015) 
The SFRI Working Group 4, in charge of designing the FRR process, organized a workshop with 
stakeholders within the Commission interested about forward-looking rapid response. The objective 
was to co-create an FRR tool with them, in order to engage them in the process and to have 
information on what would be most useful to them.  
The workshop was designed to be interactive, and the attendees were divided into two groups to 
go through a mock FRR process each focusing on a distinct topic: 'The future of the food processing 
industry' and 'Future of automotive systems/testing automobiles’. 
The workshop confirmed the need for decision-makers to benefit from a FRR that can provide quick 
answers to various issues.  
It also allowed for a collective design of the best way to provide value through FRR. Several key 
issues were raised: 
 The first specification of a rapid-response request should be the intended end-goal of the 
request. What are the targeted outcomes and impacts?   
 The RR mechanism should be dynamic and flexible and adjust itself to the target audience and 
the type of question. 
 The data flow of the FRR can be either top-down (request from the Commission) or bottom-up 
(initiative from the experts).  
 Motivating the experts is a key aspect of an effective network and of success in data collection.  
 The timescales of FRR could be flexible and flow from 10-14 days in the short term to a longer 
scale of a few months. 
 Validation and quality control of the data need to be ensured. 
In conclusion, the question of the sustainability of the FRR after the SFRI mandate was raised: How 
will this mechanism continue to be operated and by whom?  
4. Guiding principles towards an effective FRR for DG RTD  
The section below outlines a number of guiding principles to frame the feasibility and quality 
of the FRR offer. They draw from recent pilot experiments conducted with the SFRI group, as well 
as literature reviews and evaluations of advisory groups and platforms set up to assist in FP7 and 
H2020 preparation and implementation. 
4.1 Process flexibility  
Because FRR responds to EC demands as they emerge, it has to ensure high flexibility. Therefore a 
range of possibilities in terms of timing, the origins of the request, output format, and network 
nature and management can be offered.  
4.1.1 Flexibility in timing 
The timeframe to provide a response is defined on an ad hoc basis, based on the particular context 
of each request.   
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Based on the pilots, it is advisable that a minimum of 10 days is allowed for providing a response. 
This provides sufficient time for convening experts and gathering input, a minimum delay of 10 
days is required. Timelines can vary up to several months, depending on the magnitude and nature 
of the request and the flexibility of the client. 
Although the timeframe can be short, it does not necessarily have to be on the go. When there is 
the possibility of anticipating a request for urgent response, preparatory arrangements can be put 
in place. For example, experts can be asked well in advance to make themselves available 
to dedicate one month to collecting the latest information. This means that pre-call notice of 
a rapid response request would be issued in advance, e.g. six months ago, while the actual rapid 
response occurs later.  
4.1.2 Flexibility in output format 
As outlined in section 1 above, the role of FRR is to provide highly contextualized framing and 
validation of questions raised for R&I priorities.  
Validation and framing may take diverse shapes, depending on what brings the highest added 
value. Here are three possible types of cases:  
- Case 1:  A revised question could be a deliverable per se. The request may be issued as one 
or several questions, which the rapid response service reframes so as to include surprising 
insights, contextualisation, literature review, and other inputs.    
- Case 2: Layers of responses may be considered for different audiences: one level with one 
question or one graph, another level with 10 pages, a third level with 100 pages… 
- Case 3: A list of relevant information or creative suggestions (e.g. weak signals, unnoted 
historical perspectives, or out-of-the-box ideas) can be useful. 
The means used to collect expert input should reflect the nature of the output needed. Software 
tools such as decision-support, crowdsourcing, survey, or gaming tools may be useful to facilitate 
rapid collection of large amounts of data or opinions. For more in-depth knowledge, expert writing 
may be the best option. 
Whatever its form, the output needs to be concrete and policy-oriented, i.e. linked to policy 
and political realities. 
4.1.3 Origins of the request  
The Request is the demand that is formulated for the experts to answer. Requests may originate:  
 'Top-down' from the EC: The main goal of the FRR in this case is to provide timely input to 
emerging R&I demands that the EC has identified. 
 'Bottom-up' from the experts: Because of their field work, experts may be aware of incoming 
crises or opportunities which the Commission may not. Therefore, experts may start an FRR to 
raise attention about such topics, without waiting for a formal EC rapid response request. 
4.1.4 Flexibility in response mechanisms   
Depending on the nature of the request, the response mechanisms may need to take different 
forms: 
 The official network set up specifically for the FRR (in our case, the SFRI group) receives 
the request first, and assesses if it is fit to provide appropriate framing and validation or if 
it needs further input.  
 For some broad requests or, alternatively, very topic-specific requests, the core FRR group 
may not be in a position to provide a definitive and in-depth response but rather 
recommends how this can be obtained. Thus they can call upon external contributions. 
Ultimately, with practice, this may lead to the constitution of further expert circles that are 
more distant to the core FRR yet can be mobilized when needed.  
 Different types of experts may also be involved: academics, entrepreneurs, innovators, 
inventors, civil society representatives, activists. 
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Management of the expert network may also take varying forms: 
 Collective call: some issues require wide group reflection to sift through complexity or source 
for data outside the network. In these cases, the request may generate a call to all network 
members for input.  
 Individual call: for other topics, in-depth expertise in particular areas may be required. The 
request may then lead to a call to a smaller number of specific individuals within the network to 
respond.  
4.2 Context & formulation of the FRR request 
4.2.1 Context of the request  
Contextualization of the rapid response request is the key value of a FRR.  
It is important that the client provides an overview of the context within which the rapid 
response request emerged. Context includes two levels: 
 The origin of the request: Who initiated the request? For what purpose?  
 The destination of the output: Who is the audience? How will it be used?   
Context specification also enables Member State experts to take European specificities into 
account, at the geographic scale and logical level. As Dan Andrée explained, inputs to European 
consultations can be 'too detailed' while 'very few inputs address aspects such as European Added 
Value, creating critical mass, tackling fragmentation etc.'9 
4.2.2 Request formulation 
The appropriate formulation of a request is an important step in the process, as it influences both 
the quality of the output and the motivation of experts. 
In order to ensure that rapid responses are as close as possible to the specific demand, regular 
iterations between experts and the Commission are necessary. This is part of the feedback 
process of the workflow outlined below. Iterations concern at first the request formulation per se, 
so that it can activate appropriate responses and tacit knowledge among experts. Then, iterations 
address the content of the responses. 
Given the time constraint, the formulation of the questions should make sure to be aimed 
at eliciting the greatest value from the experts. This requires thinking beforehand about the 
expected input. What value are the experts expected to bring to the issue at hand? What input 
cannot be collected without these experts?  
Clarifying the terms used and for what purpose is also important to avoid raising questions among 
experts that cost time and efficiency.   
4.3 Quality review 
The rapid response offer requires a balance between quality and urgency. Yet, given the networked 
nature of the process and the difference in requests, overarching quality standards are not 
relevant. Quality needs vary depending on the destination and the urgency of the request. 
However, it may be useful to define 'basic' quality standards in order to both ensure the legitimacy 
of the process, as well as provide guarantees to experts. Such standards may eventually be 
defined through a 'minimum viable quality' threshold. 
                                                 
9  Dan Andrée (Swedish Ministry for Education and Research). 'Priority-setting in the European Research 
Framework Programmes.' VINNOVA (Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems): 2009. (p. 
35) 
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4.4 Workflow organization 
A task force is required as an intermediary point-of-contact between the EC and the 
expert network, in order to collect and synthesize answers and to interact with the EC along the 
process. 
In practice, this task force takes the form of a team of two to six people responsible for 
choosing the best option among a range of possibilities (see 'Process Flexibility' part above), hands 
in hands with the Commission. This includes: 
 Receiving the EC request and qualifying its characteristics, often during a first meeting with the 
EC 
 Choosing which experts to convene within the core FRR group 
 Contacting those experts and inviting them to respond 
 Together with the experts, outlining a workplan to organize collection of information and 
collective work 
 Coordinating the input of the network while checking in with the EC  
 Synthesizing the input  
 Coordinating with the EC over the final output 
 Following up with the expert network to communicate how the rapid response was used.  
Frequent feedback between the task force and the EC along the RR project is essential, 
even in a short timeframe. This helps prevent the expert group from going in the wrong direction. 
It also allows the EC to provide additional updates or requests during the course of the project. 
 
Fig. 1.Workflow for a Rapid Response Mechanism as used for SFRI’s pilot experiment in Summer 
2015.  
4.5 Links with existing expert structures preparing research programmes 
Many forward-looking activities have been conducted  within EU policy-making bodies and Member 
States. Different units work at preparing research programmes. The FRR should work in 
collaboration with these groups. This can take several forms: 
 Validated questions could be provided to Advisory Groups and other expert groups as a tool for 
calibration of their activities. 
 18 
 The FRR could then be seen as a tool to navigate between active research groups, be they 
internal or external, and political or procedural needs coming from EC officials. 
 European foresight networks, such as the Foresight Correspondents, and foresight units in 
different EU policy-making bodies, should be called upon when needed. 
4.6 Supporting structures: network governance & management 
Convening a group of experts to provide robust, synthetic input in a very short timeframe is a 
challenging exercise, albeit a valuable one. Some of the challenges posed include expert availability 
and motivation on short notice, the depth and quality of input that can be provided, and the 
required individual and collective working modes. 
However, methods and good practices do exist to mobilize a network of knowledge providers (in 
our case 'foresight producers') in a way that is relevant and timely. 
4.6.1 Triggering and coordinating input from the expert network  
One of the most challenging parts of the process that emerged during SFRI's pilot 
experimentations is the coordination work of the Task Force. How to motivate the network 
members to deliver very high value added within a tight time constraint? Our pilot 
experience has shown that even when the network has been set up specifically for an FRR, the 
short timeframe still poses a coordination challenge. 
In order to facilitate the delivery of input, it is important to qualify the Request in order to 
characterize what will be required from the experts. Such qualification can be made formally 
(through a template) or informally but in any case it should include: 
 Presentation & Roles of the task force  
 The formal request for input + Context information 
 Definition of the nature of the input needed from experts:  
- Question reframing 
- Literature resources  
- Specific data and/or links between data that reveal interesting convergences 
- Fresh ideas: policy ideas or more general visions  
 Timeframe   
 Type of expertise needed  
 Suggestion of a working method (to be realigned with the experts once committed) 
Assessing individual experts' skills and preferences should also be used to facilitate rapid 
coordination for high-value output. One possibility may be to collect data from individual members 
susceptible of working on an FRR about how they prefer to work, including their main foresight and 
data-collection skills, their expertise areas, the resources they master, and their preferred way of 
communication for collective work. 
When in-depth collective reflection is needed, a working culture with appropriate 
collective intelligence methods should ensure effective collaboration. Collective intelligence 
and network management are not natural, particularly in the EU context which has been said to 
suffer from a general 'weakness of the culture of cooperation across sectors and categories of 
actors.'10 The quality of the bonds formed within the expert group (including the task force) and 
collective intelligence mechanisms can be used to create the appropriate working mode to produce 
                                                 
10  Dan Andrée (Swedish Ministry for Education and Research). 'Priority-setting in the European Research 
Framework Programmes.' VINNOVA (Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems): 2009. (p. 
38) 
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a rapid yet relevant output in limited time. This includes face-to-face bonding, knowledge 
exchange, responsibility/accountability mechanisms, and motivation. 
4.6.2 Expert motivation and compensation 
Rapid response requires finding ways to incentivize and motivate the experts to work under 
tight time constraints. Compensation is only one part of the issue. The relevance and importance of 
their contribution within the context of the request, as well as the formulation of the request, are 
an important way to attract experts, as seen above. EFFLA pointed out in its Policy Brief 11 that 
'the DG RTD is not currently able to let contracts within any reasonable timescale. This needs to be 
fixed as part of creating a foresight culture.'11 
4.6.3 Expert responsibility 
Because high value-added comes in close relationship with political decisions, experts may voice 
concerns over the responsibility associated with their input. The liability issues that emerge in 
scientific advice are not applicable here given the more qualitative nature of the input. However, 
basic guarantees need to be given to experts. 
4.6.4 Beyond the SFRI Expert Group 
SFRI has acted as a pilot group for forward-looking rapid response. With the project coming to an 
end in Autumn 2016, it is important to consider what will happen beyond the lifetime of the SFRI 
expert group. On what network could an FRR mechanism rely?  
Different foresight and expert networks exist within the EC, and one of the working groups within 
SFRI was tasked with reflecting in particular on 'a flexible and informal European network of 
foresight experts for research, science and innovation policy to address the Commission's need for 
strategic intelligence and sense-making.' An FRR mechanism could be based on one or parts of 
these networks, with dedicated working processes. 
A network of foresight experts does not mean a network of experts for every issue at stake. More 
than specific in-depth expertise, the promise of a foresight network is its unique knowledge, 
experience and attitude about embedding emergent, sometimes contested knowledge into public 
deliberation, participation and politics.  
 
  
                                                 
11  EFFLA Policy Brief 11, p. 4. 
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Background Paper 2 
Rapid-Response on 'The use of foresight in scientific 
advice' 
1. Introduction 
In this quick response we provide the European Commission (DG RTD) with a first analysis and 
response to the draft paper of July 15th on “The use of foresight in scientific advice”, based on 
written remarks made by the members of SFRI.  We propose, considering the relevance of the 
paper, that SFRI will contribute with a more detailed response to the further debates on this matter 
in September. We immediately installed a working group and asked directly all SFRI members to 
give a first response to the questions concerning the concept paper of DG RTD/A6. This resulted in 
several, sometimes detailed, responses in a very short period of time.  Building on these inputs, 
the working group prepared this response, which is simultaneously presented to DG RTD/A6 and all 
the members of SFRI. After a discussion on a draft of this paper with RTD we took up the 
suggestion to ask the members of SFRI to come up with examples which, very specifically, 
illustrate the relationship between foresight projects and scientific advice. This extra inquiry gave 
some delay in the delivery of the report. 
2. Foresight 
In order to answer the question how foresight can contribute to scientific advice in the EU and in 
the Member States we want to shed light on some essential characteristics, which frame the 
relationship between foresight and scientific advice. Scientific advice comes in many different 
forms, and it serves a broad variety of goals. Foresight is not of use in all these regards, but – due 
to its specific characteristics – is pertinent to some types of scientific advice. 
We want to emphasise the following characteristics of foresight:  
 the action-oriented nature of foresight  
 its participatory character through involving a variety of experts and stakeholders 
 foresight explores never one but always several futures and preferably in an open deliberative 
process 
 there is a particular relationship between foresight, planning and design, which goes beyond 
scientific deductive reasoning as such 
 foresight is from the very beginning systematically and methodologically connected with 
meanings, values, interests and pluralistic, comprehensive views in society. 
Normally, scientific advice is expected to present the current scientific state of the art. It is 
therefore just one of the building blocks for an exploration of possible futures through interaction 
amongst citizens, experts and stakeholders, as common in foresight. The purpose of foresight is to 
create a process in society, amongst stakeholders, politicians and policy-makers, and to confront 
them with well-underpinned and possible (multiple) futures in a pluralistic society. The foresight 
process itself is as much important as the written reports entailing conclusions and 
recommendations. 
Of course, the toolbox for foresight contains instruments, which are also used in some types of 
scientific advice. In fact, foresight takes the best possible scientific understanding of the present – 
and the path leading to the present, that is, the near past – as its starting point. Similarly, 
regulatory processes and permanent advisory bodies to some extent lean on participatory 
procedures to improve the quality of their work by extending the knowledge pool, on which they 
draw. Most of the examples our members refer to, deal with this kind of activities or to separate 
foresight procedures which had a broad direct effect on policymakers, on societal actors and on 
political decision making. 
Foresight is institutionalised in very different ways in the Member States.  Although specific and 
independent research organisations, with a central mission of future analyses, exist in some 
countries, this is not a very widespread model. Other independent organisations, which rely heavily 
on the foresight toolbox, are Parliamentary Technology Assessment institutes. Ministerial 
departments and their research institutes, especially in the field of health, infrastructure/ planning, 
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science, innovation and agriculture, organise sometimes regularly, sometimes infrequently 
foresight activities as do their institutes dealing with regulatory affairs. 
Against this backdrop, it is not the function of foresight to deliver sound scientific evidence or 
sound scientific reasoning to underpin one specific position in policy and politics, but rather it 
investigates possible future perspectives (multiple future states) of both a normative and an 
exploratory nature, and it does so by involving a range of stakeholders. 
In describing the contribution of foresight to scientific advice we better take a broader scope and 
consider how horizon scanning and prospective analyses can be taken into account in some form of 
'enlightened' and future-oriented advice to policy-making. 
3. Scientific advice 
We propose to focus on formal scientific advice, which means that the advice practice is embedded 
in governmental institutional arrangements, procedures and processes. 
We consider the division, referred to in the draft paper, between Committees, CSA’s and 
Academies not as a fruitful representation of the major arrangements in the EU and the Member 
States.  We want to emphasise that the position (function) of CSA exists in just a few Member 
States and that the role of Academies in scientific advice is not prominent.  Most strategic issues in 
Member States are covered by specialised bodies rather than by general-purpose advisory bodies.  
If Academies are involved, they cover predominantly scientific advice on strategic issues in science 
policy, and even though there may be a tendency to strengthen the position of scientists in 
evidence-based policy-making processes, it is questionable whether the Academies can justifiable 
claim to speak for the diverse entirety of scientific branches and streams 
Moreover, scientific advice is provided through many other types of channels than these three. 
They range from dedicated bodies with a clear mandate to advise governmental bodies to research 
organisations and individual researchers responding to specific requests for advice through 
scientific studies and evaluations. The bulk of scientific advice is coming from specialised councils, 
specialised committees and specialised institutes.  Much more attention should be given to the  
research institutes which are specialised for regulatory affairs and specific policy areas, which have 
a formal advisory function in, to our knowledge, every member state, for instance in the fields of 
environment, nature management, infrastructure, public health, economics, societal and 
demographical developments, foreign affairs, defence, forensic and public order issues. 
We also want to draw attention to the hybridisation of scientific advice. Many councils and 
committees are populated not only by academic scientists but by all kind of experts coming from 
R&D departments of companies, NGOs, the judiciary, inspections and so on. Hybridisation we find 
also in terms of organisational forms with bodies like TA institutes, think tanks and commercial 
expert consultancy organisations playing an increasingly important role. Clearly, experts working 
for these types of organisations do not belong to the scientific communities of the academia. These 
bodies are equipped for performing investigations and studies and for delivering well-grounded 
advice in a formally ordered setting, very often on politically hot issues. 
We therefore suggest taking a much broader notion of scientific advice as the starting point for 
achieving a better understanding of the relationship of foresight and scientific advice. Neither 
conceptually, nor empirically in light of practices in Member States, it is justified to restrict 
scientific advice to committees, CSAs and Academies. If we want to explore the landscape of 
scientific advice, our suggestion is to take a broad, impartial scope and take very little for granted. 
3.1 The relationship between foresight and scientific advice 
The major contributions foresight can deliver to scientific advice are: 
1) Trust building concerning those policy issues, which have a highly conflicting character and are 
surrounded by uncertainty. Especially in those cases where there is no political consensus on 
aims and thus scientific advice on the proportionality of aims and means is not the proper 
question. Foresight establishes a dynamic connection among stakeholders, policy-makers and 
politicians on values, interests and disruptive societal change, which makes it possible to 
deliberate on multiple futures embedded in alternative value sets and interests in a transparent 
and systematic way. 
2) Exploring future trends and early warning signals, as well as confronting stakeholders with 
future disruptive change, multiple futures and problem definitions in a strategic and policy 
design context. 
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3) Framing problem definitions and thus supporting the formal advice practice. This is particularly 
important with regard to framings that may substantially change in the future and which should 
thus not be taken for granted. In other words, foresight can help scrutinise problem framings 
from a future-oriented perspective. 
4) Contributing to, and advising on, long-term planning activities of government and other bodies. 
This refers in particular to the planning and implementation stage of government policy. 
Examples of the way FS contributes directly and in a well organised manner to scientific advice 
bodies are not prominent, and this has a lot to do with the nature of foresight. The impact of a 
foresight procedure is first and for all awareness amongst media, stakeholders and politicians and 
it gives later on rise to very often a manifold of studies, debates and parliamentary hearings 
amongst experts. What starts as a first step to awareness of future developments appears later on 
to contain an agenda for many stakeholders for taking up new steps in an (international) 
knowledge landscape. Taking this into consideration we mention the areas where foresight can 
contribute more directly to scientific advice 
1. Foresight procedures on emerging scientific and technological developments, initiated by 
government or coming from other bodies, which frame the issues at stake and which are 
followed up by a scientific advice procedure through one of the specialised advisory bodies. 
Here cooperation with scientific advice bodies could be strengthened. 
2. Research institutes, for instance on health and environment, which organise foresight 
procedures followed up by a formal advice. Every now and then a subsequent round of advice 
is asked from another specialised body. So the state institute for public health organises a 
foresight and comes up with a frame. The government subsequently asks another body, for 
instance a health council to advice on specific questions derived from that foresight. The 
Rathenau Instituut for example reported after a TA/Foresight procedure about synthetic biology 
and directly afterwards the ministry of education, science and culture asked a specific piece of 
scientific advice of the Dutch Royal Academy of Arts and Science. 
3. Foresight procedures organised by science policy organisations like academies or university 
organisations e.g. on the future of universities, which are subsequently connected with advice 
to the government.12 
3.2 Analysis of scientific advice landscape in the EU and the Member States 
The members of the FRSI gave suggestions and comments on the inventory in the draft paper. We 
think that an internet survey needs completion by other means in order to get a representative and 
informative picture. To illustrate the need for other actions we refer to the text about The 
Netherlands, which lacks important scientific advisory bodies, as well as the very important so-
called planning institutes and other institutes for regulatory sciences. As for science and innovation 
policy it also fails mentioning important advisory bodies. The role of foresight, however, is most 
prominent in these planning institutes, the institutes for regulatory sciences, some well-equipped 
councils and in hybrid organisations. 
4. Key points 
1) A broad(er) understanding of scientific advice is important to understand the contribution of 
foresight to scientific advice. 
2) A foresight process is different from a scientific project in a very fundamental way, in particular 
in being future- and action-oriented, participatory and value-related. (Foresight, of course, 
among others sources of knowledge, relies on the results of scientific projects and uses several 
scientific methods.)  
                                                 
12  The extra inquiry amongst the members revealed some nice examples of foresight which had a strong 
impact on policy making and political decision making. An example which might be a model for the 
Commission is the FP7 foresight on manufacturing technologies which later on was followed by High level 
expert groups who tailored visions and came up with advice. We already referred to the synthetic biology 
case in The Netherlands where a Technology Assessment was followed up by a formal advice delivered by 
the Dutch Academy of arts and sciences, we refer to Flanders  where a foresight resulted in long standing 
priority setting in research programming, in the UK where a foresight on flood and coastal protection 
resulted in a concrete governmental action program and to the Czech Republic where a foresight procedure 
also resulted in an action program on research activities. In most of these cases however the impact was 
directly without scientific advice by a third party. 
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3) Commonly, a foresight process might give rise to subsequent scientific advice by specialised 
bodies, every now and then more than once on different issues, which are identified by the 
foresight process. 
4) The relationship between foresight and scientific advice cannot, therefore, be regarded as the 
former simply feeding into the latter. Due to the inherent future-orientation, scientific input 
rather feeds into foresight and afterwards these results frame new scientific advice procedures. 
The major benefit of foresight for scientific advice is embedding advice in a context of 
pluralistic world views, stakeholder participation and open planning by building and exploring 
multiple future states and problem definitions in situations of radical change.  
5) If these general points of departure are accepted, the SFRI EG offers to deepen its work on 
better conceptualising and empirically underpinning the relationship between foresight and 
scientific advice. 
DG Research and Innovation is advised to complement the current survey by other means in order 
to make it possible to define the role of foresight in relation to much more specified scientific 
advice practices. 
 
 
 24 
Background Paper 3 
Rapid-Response on 'Security aspects in future R&I 
policy' 
 
Key recommendations 
 The changing security landscape calls for a change in perspective from technological fixes 
or other security responses, towards a perspective that aims at embedding security deeply 
in society, in order to address the root causes of security challenges - the notion of 
'societal security' can be used more effectively to denote this change in perspective. 
Specifically European policy responses could address the full range of security dimensions, 
including economic and societal dimensions in a coherent, integrated way, focusing on 
opportunities inherent to societal security and social innovation. 
 Insights from the ongoing security programme in Horizon 2020 indicate that the current 
setup for strategic programming is not flexible enough to meet the dynamic nature of the 
security challenge. Sudden crises and emergence of new threats, risks and opportunities 
require an enabling framework which is more conducive to changes in research themes 
and approaches. A further complicating aspect to be factored in is the need to anticipate 
the types of innovative products and processes which ongoing security research gives rise 
to and how to ensure effective take-up. The current setup is too rigid to cope with these 
needs and requires a rethinking. 
 The long-term shift in the security landscape indicates that FP9 in particular needs to 
shape up to new, more effective ways of addressing the security challenge. The inter-
connectedness of security threats, risks and opportunities highlight the need for a 
comprehensive joined-up policy approach, to address converging security themes, and to 
bridge the gap between different areas of research and related policy. Factoring in 
security externalities and ways of prioritizing these is a key policy concern. The early 
detection of emerging security threats, risks and opportunities is critical and requires 
state-of-the-art and secure infrastructures integrating and manipulating multiple datasets.  
 Horizon 2020/FP9 needs to make space for piloting more bottom-up approaches and 
thereby tackle more deep-rooted causes of security risks. The opportunities for societal 
regeneration and revival of trust in state institutions and practices is key in the drive to 
developing more secure societies. The discussion of threats, risks and opportunities 
highlights the need for developing a good balance between reactive and proactive 
approaches to the security challenge. Investing in security innovation projects highlights 
the potential of this area for the economy and society, through the development of new 
economic and business models as well as helping to project a more positive outlook 
among communities. These types of social innovation projects in the security area, 
especially those involving local communities and young people, could prove highly 
effective in countering the challenge. There are examples of ongoing initiatives at local 
level which could be supported through top-up funding and used for replicability to other 
localities throughout Europe. There are opportunities here to link to the smart cities and 
circular economy initiatives underway in H2020 as well as the smart specialization drive 
by DG Regio using structural funds. In this respect a combination of demand and supply 
side approaches could be adapted. There also needs to be more effective means for 
incentivizing the use of relevant results of existing initiatives as well as completed and 
ongoing FP projects. 
 The design of security research and innovation programmes can be rendered more 
effective by being aware of and factoring in different time frames. Our current response to 
security in Horizon 2020 focuses primarily on addressing our perception of current threats, 
risks and opportunities. This may result in a rather narrow set of priorities which reduces 
the robustness of the approach. The forward look at the security landscape indicates a 
complexity of trends and drivers and there are indications of emerging scenarios which go 
beyond mere extrapolation of current trends and drivers over time. There is a need to 
better structure the response to these challenges by distinguishing between current, short 
to medium-term and long-term security concerns and needs. Different approaches are 
needed to ensure a more comprehensive and time differentiated approach. 
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In summary, in Horizon 2020 (H2020) and FP9, security requires a dedicated approach as 
follows: 
 It is recommended that a comprehensive, joined up approach to security is developed due 
to the interconnectedness of threats and risks and the opportunities inherent to societal 
security. 
 The planning and programming cycle needs to be more flexible, dynamic and anticipatory, 
allowing quick shifts to address new and emerging threats, risks and opportunities.   
 This calls for more participatory processes involving end users in co-design of security 
solutions and sufficient space for piloting bottom-up approaches involving communities, 
local groups and young people.  
 A strong emphasis on risk- and threat-identification systems with early detection and 
prevention is needed. 
 The focus on effective end products is of particular importance in this strategic priority 
sector and could be incentivized through different measures including top-up funds for 
high quality replicable solutions as well as ongoing local community initiatives.   
1. Introduction 
The main objective of this pilot rapid response is to provide recommendations for future R&I 
policy responses in the area of security. The following questions have been addressed: 
 Is security more effectively addressed in the next Framework Programme (FP) as a self-
standing theme (challenge) or as a cross-cutting issue affecting all R&I priorities? Or 
both?  
 Does security require supply-side vs demand-side R&I policy responses (depending on 
whether the emphasis is on risks, threats or opportunities)? And what is the importance 
and shape of risk- and threat-identification systems? 
 Is it a technical R&D question or a question of perception of citizens and behaviour? What 
is the role of foresight in addressing this issue? 
The following approach has been followed: 
 To extract key trends and drivers of the future security landscape drawing on ongoing and 
completed projects (EU funded FORCE project FOResight Coordination for Europe) 
 To reflect on the challenge of addressing different perspectives and understandings of the 
notion of security as an area of research, as a policy imperative and from the individual 
and  societal perspective   
 To develop an overview of the context and dynamics of the new and changing security 
landscape and how this will impact on EU research and innovation policy 
 To trace links between threats, risks, opportunities and to focus on policy responses for 
societal security 
 To outline a set of structured policy responses in the short, medium and long-term 
2. The changing security landscape – a new paradigm? 
Security is a manifold, complex and controversial area - including social, political, as well as 
economic and cultural challenges – drawing on several areas of science, from ICT, 
mathematics, physics and engineering to life sciences and socio-economic sciences and 
humanities.   
Security refers to actions and measures for safeguarding the integrity and functioning of 
socio-technological practices and the (technological) systems involved there. Security can be 
understood as (i) preventing harm to citizens and the environment and providing for the 
safety of citizens and the environment; and as (ii) ensuring the well-functioning of the state. 
Considering these aspects the range of security challenges currently extends to: 
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 Natural disasters such as earthquakes, climate and extreme weather events, flood, 
hunger, disease outbreaks etc., which disintegrate or render obsolete or ineffective 
current systems, processes and practices at local, national, regional and international 
level for addressing these challenges. 
 Intended hostile attacks in order to destroy the integrity of a state or group of states, and 
to undermine state sovereignty, political stability and democracy and the system of 
governance. 
 Socio-technological practices which are in decline and are likely to collapse, entailing 
major risks for the functioning of society and economy; including the financial system, 
unproductive research practices, fossil energy systems etc. 
 New and upcoming socio-technical systems and practices which raise new security 
challenges and call for a rethinking of traditional policy responses, for instance cyber-
security, non-lethal weapons for public order, drones for intelligence and war weaponry, 
health care and new vaccination programs, molecular biology on infectious diseases or 
brain function, social engineering etc. The role of technology assessment and foresight is 
particularly important in this area. 
 Misuse of practices (for example intelligence practices, ICT etc.) by external actors 
(political opponents, dissidents, powerful economic players outside the country), internal 
actors or government. Snowden and NSA are good examples of the blurred interface 
between use and misuse and the governance challenge this presents. 
 The single and increasingly collective knock-on effects of the security challenges outlined 
above are having serious and lasting impacts on society and societal security. The result is 
an increasingly disintegrated, angry and agonistic society where distrust is cultivated and 
radical change comes forward in the field of human rights, nationalism, anti-globalism, the 
rule of law, representation in democracy, religious fights, migration, demography and 
what have you more. 
 The knock-on effects of geopolitical distortions, ongoing disruption of global markets, 
financial and economic instability and resource shortages, highlight the fragili ty of the 
global economic system and individual livelihood and quality of life. 
The security landscape reflects a high level of change and complexity and it is on a steep 
pathway of further change in the future. The urgency and policy relevance of security 
nowadays is expected to increase and become explosive mostly through the knock-on effects 
of the totality and conflation of the challenges outlined above. The legitimacy of the state and 
its institutional arrangements are at stake, including the legitimacy relating to welfare, safety, 
justice and public order.  The magnitude and scale of the security challenge has reached 
unprecedented levels in recent months due to the confluence of a number of destabilizing 
factors which are exposing serious vulnerabilities in societal security. The onset of climate 
change has become more evident as extreme weather events are on a sharp increase. The 
conflict in the Middle East and the Mediterranean spring has led to mass migration into 
Europe, creating local tensions and pressures and sparking extreme political reactions. This 
has escalated further in recent months with the ongoing imminent threat of terrorist attacks 
in Europe using a dangerous combination of tactics including mass violence, cyber-attacks, 
lone wolf attacks and the threat of bio warfare. This fast changing high risk security landscape 
calls for new approaches in designing policy responses. A new kind of flexibility is needed and 
solutions which are holistic and tackle the root causes of the challenge systematically. 
The new paradigm reflects the need for a new emphasis in security R&I policy on social 
innovation rather than technological fixes. Whereas R&I policy was in the past predominantly 
conducted based on industrial policy rationales, the re-positioning of security as a societal 
challenge requires a tighter embedding of European R&I policy in the security field. In other 
words, R&I policy rationales have to be tightly embedded in security policy rationales. There 
is a need for different types of research infrastructures to address more volatile security 
threats. The current approach of planning two- or even seven-year programmes is too 
constraining for addressing effectively a highly dynamic challenge. This requires that the 
planning and programming of security research is flexible, responsive to change and forward-
looking. 
The question is how can foresight contribute in describing a new paradigm for research and 
innovation policy to address this emerging and fast changing security landscape? The next 
section explores what can be expected in the future security landscape and the nature of the 
security challenge faced. 
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3. Structural features of the new security landscape in flux 
The emerging security landscape has a number of alarming new features as distinct from the 
old landscape and is on a trajectory to embrace further change as current trends and drivers 
merge /confront each other. Threats and risks have become more prevalent, imminent and 
interconnected. The table below is an attempt to map and distinguish between different 
elements of the security challenge (terrorist attacks, cyber-attacks, climate change, 
migration), since each requires dedicated policy response(s). However, what is clear from 
recent security incidents is that the real concern relates to the way that these features are 
becoming more inter-connected and spiraling out of control. This is due to the fact that, as 
discussed earlier, a security incident/breach has multiple knock-on effects on societal 
security, revealing and amplifying existing vulnerabilities and fueling further instability and 
insecurity. There is also a concern that these vulnerabilities, including community tensions, 
are being deliberately exploited together, in a tactical way, by those responsible for 
perpetrating these attacks. 
Current vulnerabilities in societal security have indeed become more apparent in the emerging 
security landscape, as terrorist attacks exploit poor migrant communities in Europe and mass 
migration, and combine the use of new technologies, cyber-attacks and social media to target 
critical infrastructures. The security challenge faced is thus complex and embedded in our 
society and calls for innovative approaches for developing effective solutions to a range of 
threats and risks in totality.  
Table 1: Comparing the current and future security landscape  
Current and Emerging Security Landscape Future Security Landscape  
 
1. Terrorist attacks (new level of sophistication, 
scale and imminence)  
- Sudden and increased incidence of 
coordinated cross-border hostile attacks on 
critical infrastructure and soft targets in the 
West and ongoing prevalent threat of further 
attacks (links to  local communities, returned 
fighters, criminals)  
- Staging of multiple location attacks   
- Lone wolf attacks and guerilla tactics – 
stabbings, suicide bombers 
More of the same? An extrapolation and 
conflation of current trends and drivers? 
What could change in 30 years from now? 
 
Use of big data and profiling to apprehend 
potential terrorists even before any 
suspicious behaviour - civil liberties and trust 
challenge 
 
2. Cyber-attacks (new level of sophistication, 
scale and imminence) 
- Growth of new technologies and internet of 
things is creating new access points for 
hackers to target. All online devices are a 
target.  
- Change in the scale and quality of cyber-
attacks: increase in terms of countries and 
industries targeted and they are more finely 
targeted to hit weakest link. Increased 
attacks on industrial control systems and 
increased business disruption 
- Increased involvement of governments  
- The capability of cybercriminals equals and 
often exceeds that of some nation states and 
they exploit different national legal 
frameworks  
 
Enhanced cyber economic, military, financial 
insecurity -  risks for corporate and 
government assets  
Economic espionage 
Governments become more intrusive to keep 
check on security breaches 
Increased infrastructure attacks expected 
due to  
increasing connectivity of operational 
technology 
systems, increased remote monitoring and 
diagnostics, legacy infrastructure, and more 
prevalent ICS malware. 
Internet enabled smart devices at risk and 
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malware apps  
Arms race could kill off a technology 
trajectory seen to be vulnerable after mass 
failure e.g. contactless or smart phone  
 
3. Climate change-extreme weather-(flooding-
drought) -water shortages nexus. Biodiversity-
Pests-Farming-food-health allergies. Cause of 
conflicts. Migration. New diseases in different 
regions because of climate change. 
Climate change induced massive migration- 
impact on health-tourism – increased 
violence – new spread of diseases 
 
Climate change – the power balance could 
shift even more to the North with geopolitical 
consequences (e.g. Siberia) or could become 
attractive to China and create potential for 
conflicts 
 
4.Prolonged chronic economic and financial 
crises- zero-growth economy- increased 
inequalities – robots replace humans 
Disruption in economic and financial 
structures/shifting ownership/ resource 
constraints 
D0-It-Yourself economy 
 Shared economy 
5.Mass displacement of people and disconnection 
- migrants, refugees,  
- criminals/terrorists 
- rural-urban-city, centre/periphery 
closed communities 
Entrenched Nomad culture - constantly on 
the move/opportunism  
6.Crisis of systems (pension, health, labour, 
social) 
Work-life imbalance-higher proportion of self-
employed, informal economy, contract-based 
work, retirement/pensions crisis, 
automation/unemployment  
Large-scale automation-machines in control  
Jobs change - portfolio careers more 
common 
 
7.Health crises – pandemics, rise of mental 
health diseases, growth of antimicrobial 
resistance, bio-terrorism   
Epidemics, but advanced gene technology etc 
may make medicine even more about access 
than capability to cure 
 
8.Religious and political extremism Possible post religion reaction against 
government in countries where religion 
based government has failed, e.g. Iran 
 
The key questions are - based on the complex dynamics of threats, risks and societal impacts 
outlined above - what fundamental structural change is the new security landscape posing, 
and what does it mean for the way we can address security issues. 
 The main structural features which can be identified, relate to: 
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 The incidence of security events carries a low level of probability but there is a high and 
imminent risk of such events (e.g. lone wolf attacks) worldwide which needs to be 
addressed.  
 The global geopolitical scenario is fraught with permanent and persistent threats which 
were already present during the Cold War, but are re-emerging now. 
 Security events do not happen in a vacuum but in an increasingly borderless, 
interconnected political, economic and social environment, with domino effects as a 
consequence of globalization and ICT. 
 The geographical scale of threats has become an important factor as borders have become 
more porous and multi-location coordinated attacks are becoming more frequent. 
 The acceleration in the emergence of new threats, in particular hybrid threats, is leading 
to a general proliferation of threats.  
The implications of this shift to a new security landscape include: 
 Instability in systems at all levels 
 Inability to anticipate long-term impacts  
 Loss of public confidence and difficult to restore trust in governance system and services   
 The economic costs and drop in revenue  
 The growing burden on the military and police institutions  
 Increased vulnerability of migrants, refugees and displaced persons  
 Growing tensions escalating to conflict in mixed race/religion communities  
 Borderless security concerns and threats 
 Threat to European way of life and the EU 'project' 
How will these structural changes feature in the future security landscape?  
The features of the future security landscape as outlined above are still rather sketchy and 
are mainly based on an extrapolation, intensification and conflation of current and emerging 
trends and drivers. However it is envisaged that the future security landscape will entail more 
coordinated and combined use of different means for manipulating and exploiting 
marginalized and vulnerable groups and countries and related infrastructures. The response to 
such attacks (potential and real) needs to be equally coordinated, across a range of policy 
domains. The next section outlines a number of key trends and drivers which are shaping the 
future security landscape drawn from various forward-looking studies. 
4. Forward Look at the security landscape 
The section identifies the main trends and drivers of the future security landscape. Each topic 
is briefly explained followed by several supporting foresight results from previous security 
foresight projects. These results are based on content taken from project's FORCE IDSS1. 
Each topic briefly described supporting result from recent security projects such as trend, 
scenario, threat, risk, wildcard, etc.   
I. The Future of work and social unrest among the younger generations  
This is a topic which has already been debated recently in many forums relating to the 
significant mega trend of human workers replacement by robots and AI. If this trend will 
continue the results (mass unemployment) could be disastrous. There are several possible 
scenarios that can be developed here taking into account the differing characteristics of 
                                                 
1  http://www.force-europe.eu/en/  
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younger generations, possible changes in the economic system including several possible 
solutions, such as the basic income idea. 
References: 
- Scenario: Large-scale automation of work (Global Strategic Trends 2045, 2014): 
'Potentially, machines could carry out all manufacturing and agricultural tasks; repair 
themselves; as well as clean, cook and tidy. However, many people may initially 
struggle to achieve a sense of purpose and social status without work, with possible 
rises in cases of depression.'  
- Wildcard: Shift from materialistic to post-materialistic value worlds (Global Europe 
2050, 2012): 'Many of the younger generation show critics against the economic 
growth and they will follow post materialistic values.' 
- Recommendation: Shifting ownership (Deep Shift Technology Tipping Points and 
Societal Impact, 2015): 'People are now more concerned with paying for access than 
with ownership, which has deep consequences for individuals, business, society and 
the economy. In a society where short-term and zero-hour contracts are increasing, 
this could lead to an agile but fragile workforce.' 
- Think millennials have it tough? For 'Generation K', life is even harsher (The Guardian, 
19 March 20162): 'Their feelings about government are similarly negative. Only one in 
10 of this generation says they trust the government to do the right thing. This is  half 
the percentage of millennials who feel this way. Generation K doesn’t feel that 
politicians care about ordinary people, and believes that the rules of the game are 
rigged.' 
II. Escalation of threats/attacks in current security landscape combined 
with other threats such as climate change (leading to drought and water 
shortage) and migration 
Climate change and migration are in themselves not new topics to the security sector. In 
recent years, however, it has become more apparent that migration is strongly impacted by 
climate change, and that the results of more rapid climate change are already noticeable. 
Future scenarios could envision significant increase in migrants due to drastic climate change, 
lack of employment, epidemic, etc. 
References: 
Driver and trend: Migration trends to 2045 (Global Strategic Trends 2045, 2014): 'Migration is  
- likely to increase, with people moving within, and outside, their country of origin to 
seek work or to escape the effects of climate change.' 
- Scenario: Multiple messes (FORESEC, 2009): 'Armed conflicts and mass migration in 
EU's wider neighborhood, caused by environmental degradation and struggle for 
resources - Violent radicalization within the EU in immigrant populations and social 
groups hit hard by the weak economy.'  
- Wildcard: Catastrophic climate change (Global Strategic Trends 2045, 2014): 'Severe 
food shortages could lead to sudden mass migration of populations across national 
borders, triggering widespread social unrest.' 
- How Climate Change is Driving Migration (World Economic Forum, 10 December 
20153): "Four principal pathways through which environmental change affects 
movements of people: longer term drying trends; rising sea levels and glacier melt; 
increased frequency and magnitude of weather-related natural hazards; and 
competition over scarce natural resources."  
                                                 
2  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/mar/19/think-millennials-have-it-tough-for-generation-k-life-is-
even-harsher 
3  https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/12/how-climate-change-is-driving-migration  
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III. Decentralization induced by new technologies   
Decentralization may have a positive impact on societal security as the last result in the 
following list shows. There are several trends and technologies that support decentralization, 
such as the blockchain, peer-to-peer economy and the sharing economy. These driving forces 
can be more effectively addressed as part of a societal security policy.   
References: 
- Technology: Bitcoin and the blockchain (Deep Shift Technology Tipping Points and 
Societal Impact, 2015): 'Blockchain, a way of keeping track of trusted transactions in 
a distributed fashion. Disintermediation of financial institutions, as new services and 
value exchanges are created directly on the blockchain - An explosion in tradable 
assets, as all kinds of value exchange can be hosted on the blockchain.' 
- Technology: The sharing economy (Deep Shift Technology Tipping Points and Societal 
Impact, 2015): 'Better environmental outcomes (less production and fewer assets 
required) - More personal services available - Increased ability to live off cash flow 
(with less need for savings to be able to afford use of assets) - Better asset utilization 
- Less opportunity for long-term abuse of trust because of direct and public feedback 
loops.' 
- Driver, trend: Peer-to-Peer economy (Foresight and Optimization in Horizon 2020, 
2014): 'Do-it-yourself technologies such as 3D printing and replicators will boost the 
peer-to-peer economy and sharing economy further. Furthermore, people are likely to 
start using personal currencies to pay for their peer-to-peers transactions, giving rise 
to distributed currencies based on peer-to-peer reputational mechanisms.' 
- Toward alternative decentralized infrastructures (DEV '15, 20154): 'This paper 
proposes a potential way to increase infrastructure resilience by supporting the 
creation of alternative, decentralized infrastructures (ADIs) composed of small-scale, 
heterogeneous systems and processes.' 
IV. Complexity introduced by the impacts of combining hyper-connectivity 
and technologies such as AI, IoT and drones 
Hyper-connectivity may cause severe damages to society when IoT is fully deployed because 
it introduces complexities that are not completely understood today. It is a fertile ground for 
hackers and terrorists. Foresight methods in complex situations need to be upgraded since 
cause and effect relationships are not always clear. 
References: 
- Technology: The Internet of and for Things (Deep Shift Technology Tipping Points and 
Societal Impact, 2015): 'Consequences of a potential Digital Pearl Harbor (i.e. digital 
hackers or terrorists paralysing infrastructure, leading to no food, fuel and power for 
weeks).' 
- Threat: Internet of Things (IoT) (Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community, 2016):  'In the future, intelligence services might use the ioT for 
identification, surveillance, monitoring, location tracking, and targeting for 
recruitment, or to gain access to networks or user credentials.' 
- Threat: Artificial Intelligence (AI) (Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 
Community, 2016): 'Implications of broader AI deployment include increased 
vulnerability to cyber-attack, difficulty in ascertaining attribution, facilitation of 
advances in foreign weapon and intelligence systems, the risk of accidents and related 
liability issues, and unemployment.' 
- Wildcard: Terrorists or a mistake cause a major bioattack over the next few decades 
(Techcast): 'Altering something as fundamental as the DNA code also may pose 
unintended side effects in ecosystems and humans. Worse, it can be deliberately 
misused to do harm.' 
                                                 
4  http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2830648 
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- Weak signal: Robot Swarm Intelligence (iKNOW, 2011): 'Enhanced research on robot 
swarm intelligence might soon allow robots to communicate and build a system. 
Cooperation is organized, selfdynamic, and selfcontained by intelligent robots. Such 
capabilities are already demonstrated in certain military R&D.' 
V. Quantum computing & cryptography  
The NSA has recently warned that quantum computers will neutralize current best encryption 
practices - this indeed is a paradigm shift. 
References: 
- Threat: Quantum computing makes encryption impossible (Global Strategic Trends 
2045, 2014): 'Quantum computing could make all codes 'crackable' and genuine 
encryption impossible, as a quantum computer could theoretically try every possible 
combination of codes simultaneously to unlock a system.' 
- Will Quantum computers threaten modern cryptography? (Tripwire, September 14, 
20155): 'The strength of the current cryptographic algorithms rely on complex 
mathematical problems, such as integer factorization and elliptic curve discrete 
logarithm problem. These problems can be solved using large-scale quantum 
computers and therefore can easily crack conventional algorithms.' 
VI. Growing inequality and the shift from pure capitalism towards new 
economic systems 
The growing income inequality and the rising share of the top 1 % income earners is already a 
well- known fact. This is a volatile situation if ignored. Some recent studies claim that this is a 
result of the current economic systems. Future scenarios could envisage the 'end of capitalism 
and the beginning of postcapitalism…'. 
References: 
- Scenario: The end of capitalism has begun (The Guardian, 17 July 20156): 'As with the 
end of feudalism 500 years ago, capitalism’s replacement by postcapitalism will be 
accelerated by external shocks and shaped by the emergence of a new kind of human 
being. And it has started.'  
- Recommendation: Mitigating inequality in the European Union (ESPAS, 2014): 
'Growing inequalities will increasingly affect the European Union's cohesion and 
undermine its economic strength. So far, the European Union has not succeeded in 
reintegrating the low-skilled workers and other social groups most affected by 
globalization.'  
VII. New Geopolitical Order with implications on science 
VIII. Completely 'free' world without borders and a world government 
Every person is able to live where he or she wants. A world government exists. People commit 
to this government because it is directly elected and based on trust. Everything is 
transparent, security events and incidences are directly communicated to the police. Nothing 
is hidden anymore. Companies, even multinationals pay world taxes which are used to pay a 
'police force'. Armies are forbidden. 
References:  
- Tucker, Patrick. Naked Future: What Happens in a World That Anticipates Your Every 
Move ?                                      
                                                 
5  http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/featured/will-quantum-computers-threaten-modern-
cryptography/   
6  http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jul/17/postcapitalism-end-of-capitalism-begun  
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- Eggars, Dave. The circle (novel of our time)                                                                                                                   
- UN Sustainable Development Goals with first global regulatory character…  
IX. Chaotic diffusion of new ideas in social networks 
The diffusion of information in social media is difficult to predict although there are already 
many studies attempting to do that. The danger of such a situation is that some ideas may 
spread very fast causing unwanted effects as the following items suggest.    
References: 
- Wildcards: Empowered Internet users take the political power from the old political 
parties (iKNOW, 2011): 'Empowered internet users form new types of social 
movements that utilise the wisdom of crowds and flash social media. Finally they form 
strong political groups that demand direct power to vast number of societal issues.' 
-  Driver: E-action and the future of democracy (Global Europe 2050, 2012):                                                           
'Global e-action groups and virtual protests are already with us, and will thrive in the 
future. This would not necessarily changing anything - although at least in the recent 
wave of popular revolts in the Maghreb and Mashreq countries social networks on 
Internet played a key role.' 
- A new kind of weather: social media now play a key role in collective action (The 
Economist, March 26th 20167): 'The spread of information on social media is typically 
“spiky”, with some posts suddenly becoming extremely popular whereas others never 
take off, regardless of the topic. Politics in the age of social media is better described 
by chaos theory than by conventional social science.'   
X. Stress and mental disorders cause strange behaviour in masses 
- People can be convinced to join IS/brown movement in Germany/… because people 
are not able to listen, anymore. Direct attacks in the public because of stress. 
XI. Different demographic changes – explosion of population numbers 
versus aging and shrinking societies 
Unprecedented youth bulges and demographic changes which lead to instability in certain 
regions and instabilities even in societies that seem to be very stable, e.g. masses of younger 
and middle-age people invade countries that are already shrinking, in an uncontrolled way. 
Adaptation and integration is impossible. Borders are ignored. 
Having explored different aspects of the future security landscape, the next section 
distinguishes between current threats and risks and vulnerabilities and how these impact on 
societal resilience. 
                                                 
7  http://www.economist.com/news/special-report/21695192-social-media-now-play-key-role-collective-
action-new-kind-weather  
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Background Paper 4 
Forward-looking activities and strategic programming: 
a practical guide for designing the next Framework 
Programme 
Authors: Attila Havas (editor), Jennifer Cassingena-Harper, Augusta Maria Paci, Ahti Salo, Matthias 
Weber 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 The main purpose and the intended users of the guide 
Day-to-day decisions guided by long-term, strategic thinking tend to lead to more targeted 
(ideally also more favourable) outcomes than ad hoc ones. This principle has influenced the 
‘strategic turn’ in science, technology and innovation (STI) policies over the past ten years. It 
applies a fortiori to those decisions that seek to promote research, technological development 
and innovation (RTDI) activities as many of these might have major long-term consequences 
and quite a few of them take considerable time to bear fruits. 
There are various approaches to forward-looking activities (FLA) and a number of handbooks 
present and explain the available methods. This Guide is aimed at assisting the design and 
implementation of future RTDI Framework Programme(s) (FP) of the European Union. It 
provides guidance to policy-shapers1 and policy-makers to (i) navigate in a complex world 
characterised by inherently complex challenges; and (ii) understand how various types of FLA 
can be of help in this navigation and steering task. 
It explicates the qualitative differences between main types of future challenges EU policies 
are facing, each requiring a different approach (and set of methods): 
 Inertia: how to recognise and address lock-in to vested interests, which could be 
manifested in various ways, e.g. lock-in to outdated industries, technologies, modes of 
work? How to capitalise on emerging opportunities? How to create awareness of the need 
for change? A more general type of inertia can be described by the 'boiling frog' 
metaphor: how to identify slow developments that suddenly turn into rapid changes with 
huge impacts (e.g. climate change)? 
 Crisis: how to handle a crisis in the short- to medium-term with rapid responses? How to 
manage the knock-on effects of a crisis, for example a security crisis leading to political, 
economic and social crises? How to handle an enduring crisis? 
 Transition: how to govern a paradigm shift and prepare for challenges that are arising in 
the longer term via exploring multiple futures, mobilising stakeholders, devising a shared 
vision, that is, working towards building a consensus on a favourable future and the path 
advancing in that direction? 
This Guide focuses on the main tasks of preparing an RTDI FP: where to put our money, and 
why? As for 'where to put our money', the usual thinking is to identify thematic RTDI 
priorities. Besides that, this Guide also highlights the importance and added value of relying 
on strategic intelligence when making decisions on large-scale research infrastructures and 
stresses the need to think strategically about possible new RTDI practices and structural 
requirements for successful RTDI activities. 
It provides guidance as to how various FLA approaches can contribute to achieving the above 
tasks. Its primary users, therefore, are: 
 EC DG Research and Innovation (R&I) staff, with a special emphasis on the Foresight unit, 
the foresight correspondents’ network, as well as the strategy and evaluation units;  
 other EC DGs in charge of policy domains relevant in view of the supposed mission-
oriented character of the next RTDI FP. 
                                                 
1  Policy-shapers are mainly those civil servants – occasionally in co-operation with external experts – who 
provide advice to policy-makers. 
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The Guide is also intended to provide useful background reading for those experts and other 
stakeholders who participate in the various 'modules' of forward-looking activities to be 
conducted when designing and implementing the next RTDI FP. 
1.2 Various approaches to the future 
There are several quantitative and qualitative methods used for forward-looking activities, 
including forecasting – based on trend analysis and the identification of major drivers via 
STEEPV or PESTLE2 –, simulation, Delphi surveys, horizon scanning, SWOT analysis, as well as 
building a vision, a single normative future,3 a fully-fledged scenario,4 or multiple futures and 
fully-fledged scenarios. 
These methods can be used in various ways and settings: (i) either for pure academic 
purposes or as decision-preparatory tools; (ii) during participatory processes or in smaller, 
usually shorter, projects, only involving experts; (iii) some of them are suitable for 
considering multiple futures, while others try to predict a single future; and (iv) FLA projects 
can focus on S&T developments or take a broader, systemic view.5 
A specific report by the SFRI Expert Group on the so-called 'Rapid Response Mechanism' 
discusses in detail a certain type of expert-based method to provide policy advice (see 
Background paper 1). 
Foresight is a distinctive approach compared to other types of forward-looking activities: it 
not only facilitates thinking about and debating the future, but also helps shaping the future. 
It can also have a structuring effect by bringing together different communities of practice, 
for different or combined purposes: to explore areas of consensus and disagreement, issues of 
transparency and trust, as well as means of creating policy synergies and orchestration. 
A given foresight process relies on a bespoke set of tools and methods to identify and assess 
in a systematic and transparent way those societal, technological, economic, environmental 
and policy factors and trends that are likely to affect competitiveness, wealth creation and 
quality of life. Foresight processes are (i) action-oriented (as opposed to pure academic 
analyses); (ii) participatory (by involving researchers, business people, policy-makers and 
various representatives of citizen groups, NGOs, as opposed to projects only relying on 
experts); and (iii) consider multiple futures (as opposed to a single future).  
Foresight is practiced in many domains and at different levels from sectoral, local, regional, to 
national ones, and occasionally for world regions, too. Foresight programmes can – and 
indeed, should – take many different forms, varying in their specific aims, thematic coverage, 
geographic scope, focus, methods and time horizons. 
A separate SFRI report elaborates on a frame devised specifically for selecting RTDI FP 
priorities in an inclusive, bottom-up way (see Background paper 6). 
This Guide covers both foresight processes (participatory FLA) and expert-based FLA projects 
and considers which approach is more suitable for a certain task during the various planning 
and implementation phases of RTDI FPs. 
 
                                                 
2  STEEPV stands for social, technological, economic, environmental, political, and value-driven issues or 
factors, while PESTLE is a shorthand for political, economic, social [socio-cultural], technological, legal, and 
environmental issues or factors. 
3  A 'future' is a detailed description of a particular situation (outcome of important developments with its 
major features and interrelationships) in the future. While a 'vision' is usually kept fairly short (just 2-3 
sentences) and mainly used for uniting and mobilising people to accomplish what is stated in a vision, a 
'future' is more detailed, analytical, and neutral. From a different angle, a vision is normative, while a 
future is descriptive (a tool for exploration). 
4  A fully-fledged scenario or path scenario contains a future, as well as the path leading to that future, that 
is, the major decisions and steps to be taken to reach that particular future. 
5  A more detailed explanation on the distinction between S&T vs. systemic views, illustrated with real-life 
examples, is offered in the Annex to this paper. 
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1.3 Why to use FLA when devising the next Framework Programme? 
Unless FLA is strongly embedded in the decision-making systems, there is a rather high 
likelihood that early warnings on the coming threats are ignored, or weak signals of emerging 
opportunities are overlooked. Indeed, the 2008-2009 global financial and economic crisis hit 
hard the entire world, and particularly so the European Union. In spite of abundant analyses 
pointing to several factors piling up to threaten overall security (especially influx of refugees 
due to failed states, civil wars and other conflicts, climate, water, and food safety, as well as 
societal and cultural tensions) the EU has not been well-prepared to weather these threats. 
Most foresight processes go beyond exploring possible futures; they also contribute to 
building consensus on a desirable future that can be summarised in a shared vision. These 
visions and – associated to them – more operational roadmaps can be powerful instruments to 
assemble key players in a certain domain around a shared agenda to shape the future by 
following a desired direction. Uncertainty about the ambitions of major actors can be reduced 
substantially, and thus investment decisions can be made in a less ‘alien’ environment. 
Moreover, once participants arrive at a shared vision, they can expect that all of them would 
take steps to achieve that chosen future, and thus in essence align their future actions to the 
jointly identified favourable future. 
Transparent, systematic decision-preparatory processes can also reduce the influence of 
vested interests, and thus diminish the chances that public money is misappropriated, and the 
overall decision-making process is captured, by a small group of strong players. 
Neither foresight processes nor other types of FLA projects offer 'ready-to-implement' 
solutions. Multiple futures, shared visions and roadmaps need to be interpreted by decision-
makers and translated into various types of decisions, e.g. regulations, structural changes, 
and support actions. This 'translation' is a separate, and non-trivial, task, to be performed by 
experienced experts. It could be useful to organise this 'translation' as an iterative process 
with some of the major contributors of a particular FLA project. 
1.4 Foresight and scientific advice 
Scientific advice is assumed to present the current state of scientific knowledge. It is 
therefore just one of the building blocks for an exploration of possible futures through 
interaction amongst citizens, experts and stakeholders – and having these interactions in the 
centre is a distinctive feature of foresight processes. Thus, the foresight process itself is as 
much important as the written reports entailing analyses, futures, a shared vision, roadmaps 
and recommendations. 
A foresight process is fundamentally different from a scientific project: it is future- and action-
oriented, participatory and considers values explicitly. Apart from others sources of 
knowledge, foresight processes rely on the results of scientific projects and use appropriate 
scientific methods. In turn, a foresight process may give rise to subsequent scientific advice 
by specialised bodies on different issues, identified by the foresight process. 
1.5 How to use this guide? 
The Guide proposes suitable methods from the 'toolbox' of prospective analyses with 
comments on their relevance in view of the various tasks required to devise and implement 
the next RTDI FP. Yet, it is neither meant to be a collection of ground-breaking new FLA 
methods, nor a blueprint for the 'one and only' FLA approach. It is designed as a navigation 
tool to help exploring the potential of various FLA approaches for policy-making purposes. 
2. Approaches to strategic programming in RTDI FPs 
2.1 What FLA methods can be used to underpin the planning tasks of the 
next FP and its implementation: pros and cons 
This section follows a functional approach: it (a) identifies those tasks and steps during the 
planning and implementation processes of the next FP when foresight and other types of FLA 
seem to be relevant, leaning on the 'four-phase model' suggested by EFFLA (Figure 1), and 
(b) discusses the main features of those foresight and other FLA approaches that can support 
the completion of a given task during the planning and implementation of the next FP. The 
main pros and cons of these approaches and tools are also highlighted. 
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The EFFLA has argued that 'while there are numerous forward-looking activities at EU and 
Member State levels, these activities are uncoordinated and their results have a very limited 
impact on the actual preparation of policies and policy measures' (EFFLA Policy Brief No. 2). 
This observation is further elaborated against the backdrop of a four-phase model of a future 
EU strategic process. 
Figure 1: Elements of a future EU strategic process 
 
Source: How to design a European foresight process that contributes to a European challenge 
driven R&I strategy process, EFLA Policy Brief N° 2 
While there are several forward-looking methods available to underpin the first phase of 
Strategic Intelligence, the crucial sense-making phase largely lacks any systematic 
underpinning by forward-looking tools. These first two phases are also rather informal in 
nature, while the latter two phases obey to highly formalised decision-making procedures 
between the Commission, Council and Parliament, involving also formal consultation processes 
with other stakeholders. These, however, could also benefit from a more regular use of 
forward-looking methods. 
The remainder of this section presents the relevant approaches and methods for the 'I 
Strategic intelligence' and 'II Sense-making' phases, on the hand (these two phases are the 
major steps in the overall design of the next FP), and those for the 'IV Implementation' 
phase, on the other (understood as planning the work programmes and selecting the 
implementation tools of the next FP). 'Foresight-inspired assessment methods' (or other forms 
of ex-ante impact assessment) assisting 'III Selecting priorities' are also discussed. 
I 'Strategic intelligence' phase 
In this phase, future developments are explored and assessed, using a broad range of tools 
and methods that are often difficult to reconcile with each other in terms of underlying 
assumptions and form of results. At the same time, this diversity of strategic intelligence 
findings mirrors the diversity of perspectives on the future. They are thus a rich source to 
draw upon, and the relevant methods can be categorised as follows: 
 System analysis at different levels, capturing the current situation and recent changes at 
different levels of aggregation (sectors, regions, countries, the EU as a whole, etc.), using 
a broad range of statistical, economic, econometric, scientometric and qualitative 
methods, underpinned by appropriate data. 
 Horizon scanning of new and emerging developments (in an automated or semi-
automated way, or by people; see Cuhls et al., 2015). 
 Analysis of driving forces for various innovation ecosystems that are relevant when 
designing the next FP (e.g. using PESTLE, STEEPV, SWOT or similar frameworks). 
 Trend analysis for the context of the next FP (e.g. exploring major trends outside the EU 
that would give rise to those challenges and opportunities that should be addressed by FP 
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policy tools [i.e. research projects, networking activities at various levels, international 
co-operation and exchange programmes, etc.). 
 Exploration of the interaction of different trends and driving forces, either by way of 
qualitative scenario techniques or quantitative simulation models. This may include 
forecasting future developments of relevance to the context for the next FP (e.g. 
demographic trends or climate change). 
 Assessment tools (e.g. Delphi survey, TA, Future Surveys) to assess the significance or 
timeframe of emerging trends and developments. 
 Different workshop formats (e.g. Future Workshops) to make tacit knowledge of persons 
(experts, laymen) explicit. The most often used tools include creativity methods together 
with methods to open up futures thinking (Cuhls and Daheim (eds), 2017). 
II 'Sense-making' phase 
The sense-making phase is crucial as its main objective is to draw the diversity of insights 
from the 'Strategic intelligence' phase together around a specific issue or task (such as 
developing a new RTDI Framework Programme). While many individual inputs from the 
'Strategic intelligence' phase are already available, it is a major task to integrate these 
building blocks into a common framework. In 2015, an EC expert group coined the notion of 
'concurrent design foresight' as a framework to capitalise on this broad range of forward-
looking activities across Commission Services (Köhler et al., 2015). The appropriate methods 
used at this stage include: 
 SWOT-type analyses to relate different trends and driving forces to the current situation 
of a given organisation and its strategic ambitions; i.e. here the European Commission’s 
next FP. 
 Conceptualized and moderated workshop formats to assess and discuss EU matters 
directly relevant to FP issues. 
 Building and exploring multiple futures, and positioning the future role of an 
organisation and its actions in those futures. 
 Devising a so-called path scenario specifying the steps needed to reach a desired future 
(or a set of path scenarios leading to different futures, if such an approach has benefits 
for the policy-making processes). 
This second phase should end up with clear indications as to the way ahead, the goals to be 
pursued and the pathways to realise them. 
III 'Decision-making/Selection of priorities' 
The selection of priorities does not start in this phase, given that it is already an integral, but 
somewhat implicit, element of the sense-making phase. However, this third phase moves from 
implicit and informal priority setting to the stage of formal decision-making. In recent years, 
impact assessment has acquired an important role in this phase to underpin decisions. The 
following methods support the selection of priorities: 
 Development of options for action along the path scenario, taking into account the 
Commission's own ambitions, as well as the possible roles of other key actors related to 
RTDI activities. This element is particularly important to anticipate possible confl icts and/ 
or synergies between the actions to be taken by different agents along the paths. Options 
for action may also be assessed against the backdrop of different futures and path 
scenarios in order to identify robust and flexible options in view of high uncertainty of how 
the future may unfold. 
 Scenario-based impact assessment would give the current 'standard' policy impact 
assessment practices a more systematic and longer-term forward-looking twist. 
Combining foresight methods and impact assessment could be of relevance as a means of 
interaction and communication between the Commission, the Parliament and the Council, 
i.e. the main bodies involved in formal decision-making. 
 Defining a set of criteria, applying them to the issues under discussion and according to 
the criteria, facilitated discussions and selections can contribute to priority setting. 
 At the end of this phase stands the legal decision about the Framework Programme. 
This is a fundamental decision about main directions to follow and instruments to be 
applied. Further priority setting actually takes place at lower levels of abstraction, and 
often in the course of the implementation of the Framework Programme. The identification 
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of options and scenario-based impact assessment are the methodological approaches to 
be pursued also at these levels. 
IV 'Implementation' phase 
In this phase (a) the time horizon is much shorter; (b) there is no need to identify and 
explore multiple futures; and (c) probably a lower degree of participation is required. 
However, as part of a multi-year research programme, there is a continuous need for 
adaptation in terms of specifying strategic and annual work programmes. Thus, an expert-
driven approach, focussed on strategic programming, and probably supported by a set of 
quantitative techniques, seems to be more relevant in this phase. As this adaptation and 
specification task is an essential part of the European Commission's work, the relevant tools 
should be identified jointly with those EC staff members (e.g. the foresight correspondents) 
who have been involved in planning FP strategic and work programmes. In essence, the same 
methods could be applied here as in phases 1 and 2, but taking into account the more limited 
room for manoeuver and the more targeted nature of the tasks to be performed.  
Finally, it should be stressed that a particular tool can be used in different ways, depending 
on (a) the issues tackled by the tool, (b) the experts/ participants involved, and (c) the 
interpretation of the results, especially the major observations and policy conclusions 
obtained by using a certain method, especially when a set of foresight and other FLA tools are 
mobilised,6 together with other strategy- or policy-preparatory tools. In other words, there is 
no strict, one-to-one match between a certain tool and a given task. 
2.2 FLA on research infrastructures 
Research infrastructures are very important investments in the RTDI landscape, with 
significant and long-term impacts in terms of enabling research, measurement and testing 
activities, as well as training scientists and engineers, thus conditioning future trajectories of 
S&T-type knowledge generation. Typically, RIs provide either the basis for conducting major 
experimental, measurement and testing activities (e.g. testing materials, imaging), or crucial 
and standardised research material (e.g. information from databases, biobank and –models, 
etc.). Depending on the nature of the services provided, research infrastructures can be 
organised in different ways: apart from traditional large-scale and centralised facilities, 
distributed, multi-site infrastructures also exist. The latter model is quite common, for 
instance, for virtual databases. 
This Guide is only concerned with RIs of EU-level relevance. Most of these are also key 
instruments in bilateral and multilateral S&T co-operations, occasionally involving partners 
beyond the EU, too. 
2.2.1 Why foresight for preparing RI investment decisions? 
Decisions on building new RIs and upgrading existing ones pose complex challenges, involving 
large-scale investments. There is a wide range of stakeholders, with their different, and 
sometimes even conflicting, interests; while a lot is at stake in terms of future S&T 
capabilities, with their consequences on socially, environmentally, and economically 
sustainable development. Strategic choices must be made, with significant immediate 
financial repercussions, and potentially huge long-term implications. The constraints are 
severe, the opinions might significantly differ, and no evidence exists in a strict sense. For 
these reasons a participatory process, that is, foresight seem to be more appropriate to 
prepare these decisions as opposed to a project drawing exclusively on experts. 
Typically, suggestions to upgrade existing research infrastructure and build new RIs 
significantly exceed available funds. It is thus necessary to thoroughly compare different 
options as part of setting STI policy priorities. Foresight processes can assist making these 
decisions in several ways by providing forward-looking ex-ante impact assessment. 
Apart from this portfolio perspective, foresight can also be useful at the level of individual 
research infrastructures in order to provide the basis for long-term strategic planning (e.g. 
in the form of multiple scenarios). It is necessary to anticipate the mode(s) of use(s), the 
type and needs of users ('external' researchers, businesses, 'citizen scientists', patient 
                                                 
6  Some tools ‘naturally’ lean on other ones, e.g. scientometrics and patent analyses can provide important 
inputs for PESTLE, STEEPV, SWOT and trend analyses. That also means that the results of these and other 
quantitative tools should be interpreted and assessed by those who conduct these analyses. 
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groups, NGOs, …), the operational requirements of RIs, but also the skills and knowledge 
required to operate an RI (together with non-negligible repercussions in terms of funding for 
continuous re-training of staff), which are all likely to change in the future. Foresight can help 
looking into these issues. 
This 'foresight-inspired' ex-ante impact assessment requires a reasonably solid knowledge of 
the future dynamics of the research and innovation domains concerned. On these grounds, 
foresight can (i) reduce technological, economic or social uncertainties by identifying multiple 
futures and various policy options; (ii) make better informed decisions by bringing together 
different communities of practice with their complementary knowledge and experience; and 
(iii) obtain public support by improving transparency. 
For EU-level research infrastructures in particular, there are also important STI policy issues 
that could be tackled by drawing on foresight: 
 There are strong scientific arguments to build new RIs and/or upgrade existing ones, but 
the costs of these investments can be astronomical, and thus not all these proposals can 
be implemented. Choices need to be made about the location of research infrastructures, 
raising issues of competition between Member States. Informed choices are to be made, 
through a transparent process, taking into account multiple criteria. 
 The financial decisions and STI policy priorities of the countries that jointly invest in, and 
then operate, major international RIs need to be aligned (often at a rather extensive time 
horizon); appropriate governance structures are to be set up, preserving open access 
based on well-designed and transparent criteria; and political negotiations on site 
selection should be concluded. Therefore, a transparent process, taking into account 
multiple criteria is needed to underpin these decisions, too. 
 Given the importance of RIs – in terms of scientific achievements, socio-economic 
impacts, and funding requirements – several types of important stakeholders need to be 
involved when strategic decisions are to be made on RIs. Beyond scientists and managers 
of RIs, and policy-makers, these include users and potential users, as well as citizens in 
many cases. 
2.2.2 Emerging developments to be taken into account when planning RI investment 
decisions 
Foresight for research infrastructures should not be a regarded as a one-off activity. The role 
of, and opportunities for, RIs need to be regularly revisited in line with evolving user needs 
(which can be termed as 'demand pull') and new S&T opportunities ('supply push'). This 
requires a proper, thorough dialogue and understanding between the co-producers and users 
of knowledge, including businesses, policy-makers, and researchers working for publicly 
financed research organisations (including universities), as well as the representatives of the 
civil society. 
From the demand side, for instance, new directions in RTDI activities might require RI with 
significantly enhanced or brand new capabilities, in order to analyse scientific phenomena 
much faster, with higher precision (perhaps even using smaller quantities of samples) or at a 
qualitatively different level (e.g. in physics: atomic vs. sub-atomic levels; in life sciences: 
organs, tissues, cells; in vivo imaging as opposed to 'dead' tissues or cells), process and store 
larger amounts of data, cater for new modelling approaches (in all fields of science), or collect 
data in extreme circumstances (outer space, deep explorations, extreme weather 
conditions, …). 
Other new requirements for research infrastructures are expected to arise from changing RTDI 
practices, which may alter the role and model for research infrastructures in quite 
fundamental ways. If, as we can currently observe, new digital technologies enable a broader 
range of actors to contribute to research endeavours, RIs need to be much more open and 
less exclusive than in the past. Similarly, RIs may need to cater for more distributed RTDI 
practices in the digital era.7 In view of the need to tackle grand challenges, a new request is 
likely to arise: RIs will need to provide tools to enable upscaling in interaction with users (e.g. 
Innovation Labs or demonstration platforms in security research). 
                                                 
7  See, for instance, the futures prepared in the Research and Innovation Futures 2030 RIF project 
(http://www.rif2030.eu), especially the 'Open Research Platforms' or the individualistic 'Researchers' 
Choice' futures, both suggesting a growing demand for a novel generation of RI to pilot new solutions. 
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Similarly, on the supply side, new scientific and technological achievements could open up 
new avenues for RTDI activities (qualitatively better imaging, observation and measurement 
of previously undetected phenomena, new biological models,…). 
Anticipating these and other emerging or future developments is crucial keeping the scientific, 
organisational and operational conditions of RI in the European Union at a level that is in tune 
with the advancement of the content and practices of scientific enquiry. 
2.2.3 Implications for foresight methods 
There is a significant overlap between conducting foresight to identify major research themes 
and that to deal with RI issues, as RIs should serve research on vital themes, but important 
differences, too, e.g. modes to develop, operate and manage RIs. 
 The overall foresight approach and methods suitable for RI will differ depending on the 
type of RI, as well as the type of policy issue/ challenge they are supposed to address. 
 Given the costs and the far-reaching consequences of RIs, a systemic FLA is more suitable 
than a narrow S&T approach (with the exception of specific planning tasks). Further, given 
the likely changes concerning the role of RIs, a foresight process is likely to be more 
appropriate, involving allthe interested stakeholder, compared to an expert-based project, 
relying only on the usual suspects of large PROs. In brief, transparency is a crucial in 
these decision-preparatory processes. 
A JPI model seems to be suitable also for RIs, because it foresees two levels at which 
foresight is brought into the planning cycle: i) decisions about RIs in the first place (portfolio 
level); and ii) decisions about the strategic research agendas of individual RIs.  
 At the first level, that is, portfolios of RIs, the four phases of the EFFLA model apply as 
well  
- Strategic intelligence to identify major needs for RIs 
- Sense-making to provide the basis for informed decisions, by relating possible RI 
options to potential uses, scientific opportunities, etc. 
- Decision-making as a formal process 
- Implementation of decisions. 
 At a second level of individual research agendas, RIs pose more continuous need for 
foresight, but in essence the four phases still apply 
- Revisiting changing requirements and new S&I opportunities, strategic intelligence 
is needed in order to provide the necessary background knowledge on future and 
emerging developments in S&T as well as on potential uses 
- Sense-making would relate this knowledge to the further strategic orientation; and 
thus close interaction with users is needed 
- Decision-making as a formal process 
- Implementation of decisions. 
 
2.3 FLA on RTDI practices and structural requirements for successful RTDI 
activities 
There is a broad array of alternative FLA approaches, which differ in terms of (i) their 
purpose, scope, and objectives; (ii) units of analysis; (iii) methods for capturing and 
communicating future-oriented information; and (iv) ways of engaging experts and other 
stakeholders as active participants. The relevance and suitability of these approaches depends 
on how RTDI processes create impact in different application domains. For instance, in the 
development of new transportation systems, these impacts are not sudden as they are shaped 
by regulation and enabled through significant infrastructure investments, while in other 
domains (such as mobile gaming), the pace of change may be much faster due to fewer 
constraints on the diffusion of (technological, organisational, marketing, financial  and 
business model) innovations. 
Whatever the case, the impacts of RTDI activities are shaped not only by advances in S&T: 
rather, these impacts are contingent on the emergence and evolution of the broader techno-
economic systems, in which new knowledge and ideas are exploited. In consequence, 
especially in domains, in which such systemic interdependencies are strong, it is pertinent to 
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broaden the scope of FLA with the aim of fostering a better understanding of how desired 
development paths of the innovation ecosystem can be best promoted. 
There are many dimensions along which the scope of the FLA activities can be broadened from 
a comparatively narrow S&T focus. These include changes in the legal framework and 
regulation; the possibility of subsidies and other economic incentives that favour some 
technological options over others; the use of public procurement policies as a vehicle for 
fostering innovation; the viability and acceptability of alternative business models; shifting 
consumer preferences; advances in standardisation; protection of intellectual property rights; 
and shifting societal needs or a focus on quality of life for citizens, among others. More often 
than not, these dimensions are interdependent. For instance, rapid advances in ICT and the 
increasing digitalisation have provoked transformative and disruptive changes in many 
industrial and service sectors, based on the abilities of building, linking and analysing big data 
sets. These abilities build not only on advances in areas such as machine learning and 
computational algorithms, but also on much improved access to data, often enabled by 
regulations that foster openness in the collection, dissemination and utilisation of data.  
The need for FLA projects with an explicit focus on these systemic aspects is illustrated by 
some recently heightened characteristics of innovation processes. 
'Open' and other modes of RTDI activities: The strong involvement of multiple 
stakeholder groups (both as users and producers of new solutions) is becoming increasingly 
important, as illustrated by the rapidly growing sharing and platform economy, which has 
manifested itself in exceptionally fast and transformative changes. Indeed, the platform 
ecosystems established by companies like AirBnB and Uber have captured significant markets 
from incumbent service providers. These disruptive changes in ecosystems can occur very 
quickly if the underpinning technologies, chosen business models, and prevailing regulatory 
framework conditions enable strong network effects, which make the emerging ecosystem 
even more attractive. Even here, it is important to recognise that the chances of building a 
successful ecosystem still depend on the regulatory framework conditions, suggesting that 
FLA should not be restricted to the 'mere' S&T content of instruments such as RTDI 
programmes. Rather, these activities should explore to what extent changes in regulation or 
other actions may be called for and inform policy-shapers and policy-makers accordingly. 
From the viewpoint of companies that seek to build such ecosystems, it may be vital to 
pursue exceptionally rapid and even explosive growth, recognising that otherwise there is a 
chance that rivalling approaches gain first-mover advantages that cannot be erased later on. 
For policy-makers – both at EU and national levels – it is an important opportunity to position 
themselves among the 'facilitators' or brokers in the system. 
Thus, an increasingly important activity in seeking to boost the performance of innovation 
ecosystems may be that of identifying and articulating problems which can be tackled by 
combining different competences systemically from various disciplines (e.g., the US DARPA 
programme). At best, the articulation of such problems may serve as a fertile ground for an 
ex ante analysis of the conditions in the presence of which such problems can be solved (and, 
if not, such an analysis may suggest avenues for how these conditions should be adapted and 
adjusted to provide a more fertile ground for innovation). Even public procurement may have 
a renewed role, partly because the rapid attainment of strong network effects can be decisive 
for business successes. Specifically, if RTDI programmes, combined with other policy 
instruments such as public procurement, contribute to the creation of new businesses, which 
benefit from network effects, these businesses are likely to achieve a stronger position in 
conquering markets more globally. 
Business-academia collaboration: A defining property of systemic innovations is that they 
constitute novel solutions, which have been built by orchestrating collaboration among many 
participants who typically represent several communities, most notably businesses, research 
institutes and universities. Often, these solutions are based on proprietary RTDI results, which 
provide a source of enduring competitive advantages (e.g., Apple's iOS).  When pursuing such 
solutions within RTDI instruments such as the FPs, the very identification and characterisation 
of such overarching problems (e.g., 'grand challenges') can suggest useful 'units of analysis', 
around which FLA can be structured in order to give shape for alternative solutions. Here, 
there may be an inherent tension between the pressures to provide solutions quickly and the 
relatively long delays in having outcomes and impacts of instruments such as the FP. Hence, 
it may be fruitful to analyse such problems especially in view of what advances in generic core 
S&T competences are needed, apart from possible 'architectural' innovations which can arise 
by combining existing competences through novel business models (e.g., platforms à la 
Uber). 
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Policy governance structures and practices might also need to be reconsidered partly in 
response to the needs and opportunities of emerging innovation ecosystems, and partly to 
enable them as active co-shapers of these systemic changes. 
The recognition of the systemic nature of ecosystem evolution has important implications for 
the design and implementation of FLA projects/ foresight processes: 
 Inclusiveness of participants: By design, the FLA project should be sufficiently inclusive to 
ensure that the relevant sources of expertise are possessed by the set of experts and 
other stakeholders who are engaged as participants. Thus, depending on the context, the 
pool of participants can become quite large, particularly when there are many interfaces 
to underpinning technologies and application domains and when S&T advances from one 
discipline may need to be contrasted with rivalling ones from different disciplines. In other 
words, in these cases a foresight process seems to be the appropriate type of FLA. 
 Attention to communication support and structuring of networks: Extending the set of 
participants requires extra efforts and astute methods to maintain effective 
communication. Moreover, all participants should acquire sufficient general knowledge of 
the topics covered by a particular FLA project. That also means participatory processes 
can be important in raising the participants’ awareness of how the innovation ecosystem 
can be expected to evolve. Against this backdrop, a foresight process need not be seen as 
an activity, which merely ‘collects’ factual statements about the relevant S&T trends and 
developments: rather, it can help participants understand ecosystem level issues and 
allow them to better navigate amidst such issues. There can be important process benefits 
as well, for instance through the creation of new networks, and the extension, reshaping 
and strengthening of existing ones. Thus, one of the very functions of foresight in these 
cases is its contribution to generating and shaping networks. 
 Awareness of and tolerance for uncertainties: The growing number of interdependencies 
and associated uncertainties at the ecosystem level implies that it is harder to ‘get it 
right’, because these uncertainties, when taken together, may give rise to unexpected 
developments that shift odds either in favour of, or against, some technological options. 
In particular, instead of seeking to portray multiple futures erroneously as if one of them 
would actually materialise, it is pertinent to raise the participants’ awareness of these 
uncertainties and to explore how various options would be affected by such uncertainties. 
In seeking to foster such awareness, precedence should be given to compelling 
representations, which are tangible and visual enough to capture the participants’ 
imagination. 
 Problem-focused experimentation: In many cases, users are one of the richest sources of 
ideas for transformative innovations. It is telling that many industrial companies have 
enjoyed important successes by organising intensive 'hackathon' like events that have 
allowed them to tap into creative potential of in-house and external developers. Indeed, 
this mode of development suggests that the well-established mode of running large-scale 
RTDI projects is increasingly being complemented by intensive, more 'ad hoc', activities, 
in which existing core competences are leveraged competitively by multi-disciplinary 
teams in order to experiment with new solutions. 
 Speed, adaptability and flexibility: The pace of adopting innovations has speeded up, and 
hence the rate of adoption has become an increasingly important determinant of success. 
Accordingly, the phases of research, technology development, and commercialisation need 
to be pursued partly in parallel and even contemporaneously, with the aim of expediting 
the process and ensuring that the results will reach the markets as quickly as possible. 
This trend has another important implication. Innovations resulting from RTDI activities 
will have to compete with rivalling offerings that are developed more quickly than before, 
and hence it is necessary to offer enough flexibility to ensure that existing development 
paths can be adjusted in response to changes in this competition. This, in turn, suggests 
that instead of organising FLA infrequently and on a broad scale it may be necessary to 
invest in pursuing FLA more frequently or even on a continuous basis, possibly with a 
somewhat narrower and more contextual focus,8 with the remit of ensuring that the STI 
policy instruments themselves have the forward-looking and horizon-scanning activities to 
support sense-making. 
                                                 
8  The current round of the British foresight programme is a point in case. 
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3. Designing an FLA project to underpin the design and 
implementation of the next FP 
This section outlines the process, which underpins the design and implementation of the next 
FP. It identifies critical factors to be taken into consideration in the design and running of FLA 
projects. It is not meant to provide an ‘ideal’ blueprint for FLA projects because there is no 
such thing: an actual FLA project should be co-designed by the 'clients' – who pay for the 
project and intend to use its results, in this particular case the EC services – and FLA 
practitioners. 
The effectiveness of any forward-looking activity is highly dependent on the careful scoping of 
the exercise through co-design with the main users of the results to identify the purpose, the 
right level of ambition, as well as the extent of consultation and consensus and the timing. 
These are all required to ensure that the project/process delivers the outputs that are needed. 
Step 1: Address users' needs through a joint 'scoping' 
Purpose, level of ambition and expectations 
The very first decision to be made is to agree on the main purpose of an FLA project to 
underpin the next FP. Key questions to address include: 
 Is there a need to amend, revise or completely overhaul the current concept formulation 
and strategic design of H2020 to make it relevant in the emerging context? 
 Is the currently identified set of economic, societal and environmental challenges relevant 
to consider when planning the next FP? Is there a need consider new ones? 
 Is there a need to explore a completely different approach in addressing a particular 
economic, societal or environmental challenge? 
 Are all the relevant actors at each level involved in the design of an FP? 
 Have the pros and cons of expert-based and participative approaches been considered 
thoroughly and systematically? 
 What should be the balance between top-down and bottom-up initiatives (inclusive 
approach)? 
 Is the programme sufficiently flexible to address the dynamic nature of the current 
challenges? Is a new timeline required? 
Based on the agreed purpose(s), the dimensions of the exercise need to be further specified: 
 What is the level of ambition, what is the scope? Is the FLA meant to address the overall 
concept and design of FP or is it to be focused on a particular challenge or sub-challenge? 
 What is the level of analysis: single level vs. multi-level? A trivial example for the latter 
approach: FLA on the evolution of the EU and other world regions; the operation and 
performance of ERA (what type of ERA would 'fit' into what type of EU?), the main 
objectives and tools of the next FP (what type of FP would be congruent with what type of 
EU and ERA?). 
 How radical is our remit/agenda: a paradigm shift vs. some moderate improvements on 
the current practices and structures (a modified 'business as usual')? 
 What is the unit of analysis: RTDI activities (in a broad sense); a given economic sector or 
technology domain; a societal or environmental issue? 
 Is it mainly focused on setting thematic priorities, modernising research infrastructure, or 
reshaping innovation systems (structures, rules of the game, and RTDI practices)? 
 Is there a gap in horizontal, vertical and multi-level policy co-ordination? Do we need to 
reconsider who does what and how we work together? 
These factors will determine the design and implementation of a given FLA project. The 
exercise could be structured to take into account the current status, which needs to be 
addressed and the four phases, discussed in Section 2.1, taking into account the planning, 
implementation, and operational tasks. Tables 1-3 outline how the approach and methods can 
be tailored to address the current status by distinguishing between different levels of FLA: is 
the project addressing the Framework Programme as a whole or is it addressing a specific 
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societal challenge or sub-challenge?9 A combination of levels is also possible and this will add 
to the complexity of the exercise. 
It is likely to be rather difficult to ascertain the current state of play – in other words, what 
sort of approach would be needed: fostering a major transition; overcoming inertia; or 
handling a crisis – at the start, and hence this may be clarified as an important task of 
scoping. Once that decision is made, the tools can be tailored accordingly for each of the four 
phases of strategic planning. Some notional examples are given for Phase 1 for each ideal 
type, that is, transition, inertia and crisis in Tables 1-3. 
Table 1: Selective use of foresight methods: the next FP as a whole 
Approach 
(why to 
launch FLA) 
Phase 1 
Strategic 
intelligence 
Phase 2 
Sense-making 
Phase 3 
Priority-setting 
Phase 4 
Implementation 
Transition Scanning at a 
systemic level, 
strategic change 
in similar 
programmes 
Exploring different 
visions for 
achieving 
transition; 
creating different 
transition 
scenarios; 
clarifying the 
implications for 
the FP 
Structured 
discussions with 
policy makers and 
experts in 
transition 
management 
Defining transition 
pathways at a 
systemic level 
Inertia Scanning for 
alternative 
sources of 
intelligence, weak 
signals of change, 
different 
perspectives and 
approaches to 
business as usual 
Exploring 
alternative visions 
and disruption 
scenarios 
Trend analysis and 
trend breaks  
Structured 
discussions with 
policy makers, 
those resisting 
change, and 
‘agents 
provocateurs’ 
Defining disruption 
pathways at a 
systemic level 
Crisis  Monitoring and 
foresighting, 
analysing the 
system, scanning 
Exploring visions 
moving beyond 
coping 
mechanisms; in-
depth studies; 
considering 
potential 
breakthroughs 
Structured 
discussions with 
policy makers and 
experts in crisis 
management 
Defining crisis 
management 
pathways at a 
systemic level 
Source: Own compilation 
                                                 
9  Challenges and sub-challenges are best defined when designing/ conducting an actual FLA project: what is 
perceived as a relevant societal, economic, or environmental challenge, and how to 'decompose' it into 
sub-challenges, that can be tackled operationally? 
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Table 2: Selective use of foresight methods at the level of a certain societal, 
economic or environmental challenge 
Approach 
(why to 
launch FLA) 
Phase 1 
Strategic 
intelligence 
Phase 2 
Sense-making 
Phase 3 
Priority-setting 
Phase 4 
Implementation 
Transition Scanning for 
relevant 
intelligence 
relating to the 
particular 
challenge, and 
challenge 
undergoing 
transition 
Exploring 
alternative 
transition 
scenarios for the 
challenge and for 
managing the 
transition  
Structured 
discussions with 
policy makers, 
domain experts 
and experts in 
transition 
management  
Defining transition 
pathways for the 
particular 
challenge and/or 
redefining the 
challenge 
Inertia Scanning for 
alternative sources 
of intelligence, 
weak signals of 
change, different 
perspectives and 
approaches 
Exploring 
disruption 
scenarios for the 
challenge, trend 
breaks in the 
challenge 
Structured 
discussions with 
policy makers, 
domain experts 
and those 
resisting change, 
and change agents 
Defining disruption 
pathways at the 
challenge level 
Crisis  Keeping on-going 
watch on 
developments in 
the challenge 
which is in crisis, 
scanning 
Exploring 
scenarios for crisis 
management 
within the 
challenge 
Structured 
discussions with 
policy makers, 
domain experts 
and experts in 
crisis management 
Defining crisis 
management 
pathways at the 
challenge level; 
redefining the 
challenge 
Source: Own compilation 
Table 3: Selective use of foresight methods at the level of 'a given sub-challenge' 
Approach 
(why to 
launch FLA) 
Phase 1 
Strategic 
intelligence 
Phase 2 
Sense-making 
Phase 3 
Priority-setting 
Phase 4 
Implementation 
Transition Scanning for 
relevant 
intelligence 
relating to the 
given sub-
challenge and 
related sub-
challenges/ 
undergoing 
transition 
Exploring 
multiple 
transition 
scenarios for the 
sub-challenge 
and related sub-
challenges 
Structured 
discussions with 
policy-makers, 
domain experts 
and experts in 
transition 
management 
Defining 
transition 
pathways for the 
sub-challenge 
and/or redefining 
the sub-
challenges 
Inertia Scanning for 
alternative sources 
of intelligence, 
weak signals of 
change, different 
perspectives and 
approaches 
Exploring 
disruption 
scenarios for the 
sub-challenge 
and related sub-
challenges 
Structured 
discussions with 
policy-makers, 
domain experts, 
those resisting 
change, and 
change agents 
Defining 
disruption 
pathways at the 
sub-challenge 
level 
Crisis  Keeping on-going 
watch on 
developments in 
the sector 
Exploring 
scenarios for 
crisis 
management 
within the sub-
challenge  
Structured 
discussions with 
policy-makers, 
domain experts 
and experts in 
crisis 
management 
Defining crisis 
management 
pathways at the 
sub-challenge 
level and related 
sub-challenges 
Source: Own compilation 
In moving from the design of an FLA project to conduct it, it is important to identify the 
success factors in light of the expected outputs, outcomes and impacts. Success factors (pre-
conditions) include access to appropriate resources: high quality ingredients, that is, a 
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tailored set of tools and methods fit for purpose (Step 2); a team of 'chefs and assistants' 
combining expertise in the approach and methods selected and in the domain (Step 3); and a 
systematic approach for operationalising the exercise and ensuring it meets targeted outputs 
and impacts (Step 4). 
Step 2: Selection of approach, methods, and tools 
Instead of pretending that it is possible to give relevant answers to all conceivable types of 
cases, the most important questions are listed below, which need to be asked when planning 
an actual FLA project. 
 In case a participatory approach is chosen, what methods, channels are suitable for the 
dialogues to be conducted during a foresight process (to reap process benefits and 
improve the quality of the analysis)? 
 In case an expert-based approach is chosen, what methods are suitable for that type of 
FLA project? 
 In either case, what level of methodological sophistication is appropriate by taking into 
account the 
- amount of time needed to use a certain method properly; 
- requirements from the participants and users in terms of skills and experience to 
use a certain method; 
- the need to hire facilitators, methodological experts, rapporteurs when using 
certain methods? 
  What are the pre-conditions to use a certain method in an appropriate (thorough, 
rigorous) way? 
Step 3: Recruiting the team and selecting experts and/or participants 
The main purpose and orientation of the chosen type of FLA project (Rapid-Response-
Mechanisms, expert-based or participatory process) gives a clear indication what sort of 
experts and/ or participants need to be selected. For example, when inertia is a key concern, 
it is necessary to involve experts and/ or other participants who provide relevant new – 
possibly heterodox – perspectives and ways of thinking. 
It is also crucial to consider at the outset: 
 what is expected from the participants; 
 what methods are the most appropriate to collect nominations (e.g. nominations by 
stakeholder groups, including policy-making bodies, chambers of commerce and other 
business associations, professional associations, NGOs and CSOs; co-nomination by a set 
of initially selected participants; open calls); 
 how to select from the pool of nominated participants; 
 what methods and incentives are needed to make the participants active contributors? 
Step 4: Planning the operational aspects 
A detailed, but flexible project plan also needs to be devised, covering the following major 
aspects 
 budgeting, timing, and milestones of the given FLA project; 
 communication strategy 
- methods, means and channels to be used inside the EC, for politicians and other 
decision-makers at different levels of governance, various communities of practice, 
media, citizens, …) 
- clearly, and expert-based FLA project requires a different kind of communication 
strategy than a foresight process 
 methods and resources needed for monitoring, self-evaluation and/or external evaluation 
of the project. 
These aspects need to be adapted and tailored to each of the three types of cases outlined 
above, that is, inertia, transition and crisis. 
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Finally, the division of labour among the EC services (especially DG R&I and other policy DGs) 
on the one hand, and external FLA practitioners, on the other, will also depend on the main 
objectives and type of the chosen FLA. 
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Annex 
Benefits of foresight when planning the next FP 
Foresight explores different possible futures. Thinking in terms of multiple futures is a 
necessary pre-condition for devising strategies to cope with unpredictable developments. 
In a complex world, phenomena cannot be understood in an isolated manner, but must be 
seen in context, taking into account a range of different viewpoints. Foresight, given its 
participatory nature, and assisted by relevant methods, is a means to incorporate different 
perspectives when exploring possible futures and bring to the fore a range of relevant 
influences and impacts of the issue in question. 
Beyond the systemic perspective developed and applied, the process itself can have systemic 
impacts: due to intense dialogues, existing networks of major actors are likely to be 
strengthened, new ones are created, a future-oriented way of thinking is reinforced, and the 
novel, participatory methods also re-shape the overall decision-making culture in the affected 
policy governance sub-systems, especially in the domains of education, industrial, and 
innovation policies. 
Policy-making organisations tend to be organised along the lines of rigidly demarcated policy 
domains. This applies to sectoral policy fields, but even more so to science, technology and 
innovation policy, where organisational structures can hardly follow the fast-changing patterns 
of newly emerging fields. In such an environment it is very difficult to find a proper place for 
cross-cutting research domains or new modes of delimiting them (e.g. shifting from S&T-led 
to societal challenges-driven research and innovation projects). Foresight processes have the 
potential to change not only the framing of policy issues, but also to induce organisational 
innovations. That would be particularly relevant at regional and national levels, but could be 
applicable for the EC, too. 
Foresight usually aims at identifying future issues that often cut across established areas of 
policy interest. By way of involving participants from different policy domains that are likely to 
be affected by these novel developments, a dialogue can be initiated across the boundaries of 
these fields; a dialogue that contributes to creating a shared perception of emerging 
challenges, and complementary, if not joint, strategies to address them. Policy co-ordination 
can be fostered both horizontally (i.e. across policy domains, or between parliament and 
government) and vertically (i.e. between ministries and executive agencies). 
Different approaches to the same theme: Technology vs. systemic focus  
FLA projects can focus on building strategic visions to guide technological development 
efforts. For example, the UK foresight project on 'Exploiting the Electromagnetic Spectrum' 
(EEMS), completed in 2004, identified four rapidly developing areas of this specific S&T 
domain, which should represent major economic activity for the coming 10-20 years and the 
UK can commercially exploit these results in an economically significant way: all-optical data 
handling; manufacturing with light; electromagnetics in the near field; and non-intrusive 
imaging. An action plan had been devised for each area by its own group, composed of people 
from business, academia, user communities, government and other agencies. A five-year 
review has established that the EEMS project had been largely successful in identifying S&T 
areas that would be important for businesses, and these were still relevant after five years. 
Many of the actions following the project had encouraged discussion of the importance of the 
four identified S&T areas, although the review has found it difficult to quantify the 
implications of these activities. 
The series of Delphi surveys conducted in South Korea every 5 years since 1993 also focus on 
technology developments. 
Other FLA projects aim at building visions for manufacturing by taking a systemic view. 'The 
Future of Manufacturing: A new era of opportunity and challenge for the UK', a foresight 
project completed in 2013, for example, considered several factors shaping the key future 
characteristics of manufacturing by looking out to 2050. These include new business models, 
e.g. the 'servitisation' of manufacturing; closer relationships with, and faster response to the 
needs of, customers; and extended value chains; major market trends and opportunities, 
'onshoring' of production back to the UK, and the increasing share of foreign ownership. The 
likely impacts of five pervasive and six secondary technologies are also spelt out, as well as 
the features of future factories; environmental trends; and skills requirements. Several types 
of financial gaps are also identified. The report thoroughly explores the policy implications of 
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all these factors and trends. It stresses the need to take an integrated view of value creation 
in manufacturing; follow a more targeted approach to supporting manufacturing based on 
systemic understanding of STI and industrial policies; and enhance government capability in 
evaluating and co-ordinating policy over the long term. The 2-year project has been a major 
effort: it has produced 37 background reports, and besides mobilising the major UK 
stakeholders it also involved some 300 industry and academic experts, business leaders and 
other stakeholders, from 25 countries, via organising workshops on three continents and 
using other means of consultations. 
The most recent rounds of the Japanese national foresight programmes have shifted from an 
exclusive technological focus to a broader approach, considering e.g. market, health, 
environmental, skills and ownership issues, too, when presenting a plan for the 'Revitalisation 
of the Japanese Industry'. 
The US National Academy of Engineering also published a major report in 2015 taking a broad 
view of manufacturing: 'Making Value for America: Embracing the Future of Manufacturing, 
Technology, and Work'. Unlike the UK foresight process, it is based on a work of a smaller 
group of experts: a committee established by the NAE, staff members and contributions by 
other individuals. 
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Background Paper 5 
Outline for an effective foresight network in support of 
EU research and innovation policy 
Authors: Enric Bas (editor), Natalie Dian, Blaž Golob, Michal Pazour, Jurgita Petrauskiene, Ahti 
Salo, Jan Staman, Luis Valadares Tavares 
 
1. Mandate 
At the beginning of 2015 the SFRI-Strategic Foresight for Research and Innovation experts group 
has been created by the European Commission. One of the mandates given to SFRI is “to develop 
the outline for an effective foresight network (incl. horizon scanning) for the EC”, which is taken by 
Working Group 3. This specific mandate is, in our understanding, interconnected with the other 
mandates addressing bottom-up and participatory foresight (WG5), rapid response mechanisms 
(WG4) and foresight guidelines for strategic programming (WG1 +WG2). 
The connection with WG1 and WG2: An effective foresight network should be able to actively and 
sustainable generate and transfer knowledge (concepts, methods, skills, etc.) useful for the 
strategic programming of Research and Innovation. That is to say: generating and transferring 
knowledge to support medium and long term decision making.  
The connection with WG4: An effective foresight network should be able to provide rapid responses 
to challenges (derived from contingent events, weak signals, trends) to be addressed in the short 
term but with a high strategic impact. That is to say: generating and transferring knowledge to 
support short term decision making concerning strategic issues. 
The connection with WG5: An effective foresight network should be able to integrate participatory 
processes to actively involve stakeholders in the identification of Research and Innovation priorities 
while supporting policy-making. That is to say: doing all this within a framework of reference based 
on a bigger and more continuous connection with citizens and the social and economic fabric.  
According with this background, we understand the following fundamentals for the new foresight 
network: 
1. This is an explicit mandate from our client, the European Commission, asking us to set up the 
conceptual basis for a proper design of a new foresight network asked that will be effective, which 
means helpful to support decision making (through shaping relevant questions to decipher the 
challenges coming, and providing proper answers to manage them) in a changing and complex 
environment.  
2. The design of this new foresight network, in order to be effective, should provide an operative 
framework able to generate both long term (proactive) and short term (contingent) knowledge-
based support to decision making concerning strategic issues by, respectively, generating a 
foresight culture and delivering rapid responses when demanded. And this should be done through 
integrating participatory processes (bottom-up) in order to be more emphatic with societal needs 
and expectations. 
3. Consequently, the new foresight network should be understood more as a professional 
intelligence unit linked to the EC – even open, flexible and independent – than as a conventional 
academic/research network (based on concrete temporary research projects or spontaneous 
involvement on voluntary basis). It should be a sustainable framework able both to provide 
concrete solutions to on-demand requirements concerning strategic issues, and to generate a 
foresight culture in the European area. 
2. Summary 
Networking plays a key role in change management dynamics (creating opportunities, leading with 
challenges, etc.) that is induced by Foresight as strategic tool for decision making. A Commission 
report of 2002 stated that 'intelligence-gathering and networking methods have to evolve'1 while 
mentioning the need of a more participatory approach for a greater democratisation and legitimacy 
                                                 
1 Keenan,M and Miles,I (2002) A Practical Guide to Regional Foresight – version 2 Brussels, EC, DG Research. 
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in political process: a bigger empathy coming from the European Commission, an institution 
traditionally set in public opinion as technocratic and far distant from citizens.  
As stated in that report, decision-makers have to live with the fact that knowledge is distributed 
widely. More importantly, we could add that knowledge is diverse – and changing – but so are 
priorities and sensibilities. Assuming this would imply a change in the shaping of the challenges to 
be addressed by Foresight, moving from top-down to a bottom-up perspective: going for a more 
integrative and stakeholder-oriented model, which would probably lead to a more empathic model 
of policy-making. 
In this sense, a more participatory Foresight and 'human centred' has been demanded to be built 
on the basis of the stakeholder´s user experience and expectancies2, as the only way of connecting 
Foresight with the real needs of the social fabric and consequently contributing to the stimulation of 
social Innovation and Foresight Culture within both individuals and organizations. 
Based on the fundamentals (see above) we are proposing an operational framework for a new 
European foresight network to improve the efficiency of foresight in the strategic management of 
change – the Strategic foresight European Network for knowledge Transfer, INnovation 
and Effective decision making with Long term impacts (SENTINEL) is an intelligence 
complex system proposed as tentative design for the new foresight network demanded. 
The mission of SENTINEL is to provide the EC and other potential stakeholders of the European 
area (national, regional or local governments; companies; NGO's) with a system of vigilance to 
generate and evaluate future-oriented information and knowledge. Also it is to provide analysis, 
assessment and support in decision-making regarding strategic issues. This intelligence system is 
created and supported by the EC as an external/independent advisory group. At the same time, it 
is the tool the EC use to spread the Foresight Culture in the European area: a tool the EC makes 
available for the whole organizations in Europe. 
This system has three different parts: the CORE GROUP, the THINK TANKS and the POOL. 
The CORE GROUP is a small group of 10-15 professional futurists (researchers or practitioners) 
working full time (or in a continuous way: 1-3 years) for SENTINEL as experts/advisors. They 
contribute to the system with expertise and knowledge in the concrete area of Foresight. This 
group is formally constituted as experts group by the EC, who is providing a budget for it. The 
group is stable –'solid' – but renewable periodically. 
The THINK TANKS are ad-hoc small groups of 5-10 experts working for a short period of time 
(from 1 week to 1 year) in the concrete challenge provided by the client (EC or any other 
organization of the POOL). Their task can be related either with consulting work (rapid response 
mechanism, strategic thinking…) or training (in-company or open). So they are temporary and 
contingent; 'semi-solid'. They are created on-demand by the CORE GROUP, which is picking up 
them from the POOL. 
The POOL is the virtual space (managed through an on-line platform) where a network of 
networks is framed. This POOL is built on the basis of previously existing networks: from the whole 
scientific networks (no matter the knowledge area) operating in ERA to other foresight networks 
(WFS, WFSF, EFN, etc.), to companies and governments; mainly EC. This is just a place to be for 
those –individuals and organizations- demanding foresight solutions (making questions) and those 
providing expertise and knowledge (delivering answers). 
Such a system would not necessarily provide answers about all kind of contingent challenges, but 
would support future R&I policy development by getting factual, systemic based, value-sensitive 
and temporal information to underpin policy responses and actions based on foresight intelligence.  
In order to set up the network we suggest the following steps: 
1. To elaborate a shortlist with the 50 top futurists, the most influential people working in the 
European Area. It should include both researchers (theorists, methodologists, academics) and 
practitioners (consultants, managers, civil servants) with a continuous and relevant demonstrated 
career of at least 5 to 10 years in Foresight. This 'relevance' should be measured in terms of 
                                                 
2 Bas, E., Guillo,M. (2015) Participatory Foresight for Social Innovation. FLUX-3D Method (Forward Looking User 
Experience), Technological Forecasting and Social Change, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.techfore.2015.06.016. 
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meritocratic and objective criteria, and based both on the cumulate and potential impact of their 
work in Foresight. This shortlist of individuals should be the seed for articulating the Core Group. 
2. To elaborate a shortlist of the top 100+ organizations currently producing future oriented 
information and committed with Foresight –as main activity- in the European Area, both in the 
public and private sectors. It should include institutional agencies, consulting companies, research 
institutes, foundations and/or existing professional networks explicitly connected with the 
production and analysis of futures knowledge. The prior efforts done for mapping Foresight in the 
European Area should be taken as basis while being properly updated. This shortlist of 
organizations would be the part of the ecosystem (POOL) sustainable providing those individuals to 
be addressed as CG members and/or to the contingent specific Think Tanks (TT), and/or 
contributing with sustainable knowledge generation regarding Foresight (methods and expertise) to 
the network. 
3. To elaborate a list of the European Area's top 100+ organizations – both public and private - 
demanding future oriented information and/or interested in Foresight as a tool for supporting 
decision making and/or strategic management. Those organizations already using some kind of 
Foresight, either generated in-company or hired to an external consultancy, should be considered. 
And also those other organizations not using it still, but showing some kind of interest in Foresight 
culture and/or potentially interested due to its activity strategic nature. This list should be 
inclusive: institutional agencies/units from EU governments-any level (EC, national, regional, 
local), private companies-any sector, foundations, NGOs, etcetera should be represented. This 
shortlist of organizations would be the part of the ecosystem (POOL) were the network should be 
rooted: the organizational critical mass supporting and financing the whole network through 
providing specific projects and challenges. 
4. To create/access a 360 degrees wide database of experts operating in the European Area, 
working top level in all areas concerning science, technology, innovation and management. This 
should be done on the basis of the already existing professional networks of excellence (e.g. the 
Horizon 2020 experts program), so maybe creating it would not be needed but only accessing –
when needed- the available information. This database would be a tangential part of the ecosystem 
(POOL) but essential in terms of human capital and specific knowledge generation: the experts 
addressed to be part of every specific TT should be picked up from this database according with the 
particularities of the challenge provided by the demanding organization and the specifications and 
needs provided by the CG. 
5. To create a comprehensive database of existing Foresight Networks operating at global level, 
including both the traditional and more integrative ones (WFS, WFSF, etc.) and the more recent 
and specialized professional outstanding networks. Additionally, formal/informal links for improving 
cooperation/interconnection among networks and integrating the new European Foresight Network 
within the 'global foresight fabric' would be fair. This should be the 'window to the world' of this 
new European Foresight Network: the way for making possible systematically accessing knowledge 
– both data and individuals - at global level when needed. 
6. To create a virtual framework, a 'recipe' to put all the pieces within: the CG (set of top futurists 
leading the network project), the POOL: the Organizations (both those producing and demanding 
Foresight knowledge), and also the access to this wide database of experts and other existing 
Foresight networks at global level. This virtual framework could be a new one, or just an updated 
version of an existing one (e.g. EFP - the European Foresight Platform). Then, articulating the 
proper way of creating synergies among them, either applying to public calls and/or private 
contracts and initiatives. This virtual framework will provide an accessible and holistic view of the 
aforementioned ecosystem, and –at the same time would shape the network in an operative way.  
7. Needless to mention that the natural environment to develop such a framework would be the 
European Commission, which is the only public institution in Europe able to facilitate, promote and 
assure the sustainability of this independent consultant excellence-based huge network. So, there 
should be some kind of formal link with the EC as main potential user and leading inspirer of this 
network.  
3. The new European Foresight Network in context 
Some institutional initiatives have been taken since the early 2000s to shape a futures community 
in the European area in order to develop a kind of framework at European level to promote the use 
of Foresight (and Futures Studies in general) under systematic and scientific-based parameters, as 
a key strategic tool for orienting decision-making processes (mainly regarding research and 
innovation) within both public and private organizations in order to improve their efficiency and 
competitiveness in a global context. A context featured by continuous change, increasing 
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complexity and uncertainty. A context where having a solid knowledge-based future approach is 
needed for reaching resilient socioeconomic development and welfare.  
At least nine official prior projects/network programmes related with the European Commission 
should be considered here as a reference to be considered: EFP-Enlargement Futures Project  
(JRC/IPTS 2001), ESTO Network (JRC/IPTS, 2002), EFMN-European Foresight Monitoring Network 
(FP6, 2004-2008), the FOR-LEARN (FP6, 2005-2008), the EFP-European Foresight Platform (FP7, 
2009-2012), ERAWATCH (JRC/IPTS, 2010-today) and RIM Plus (2010-today). Regarding global 
networking, two of these nine projects have tried to share futures knowledge and building bridges 
with other geographic and socio-cultural contexts: SELFRULE-Strategic European and Latin 
American Foresight for Research and University Learning Exchange (ALFA Programme, 2004-2007) 
and IFA-International Foresight Academy (Marie Curie FP7, 2012-2015). 
Finally at least three outstanding private initiatives should be also considered: the European 
Futurists Conference Lucerne (2004-2012), which was a cutting-edge platform sponsored by 
business companies with relevant outcomes (e.g. inspired the European Journal of Futures 
Research and the FU-Berlin MA in Futures Studies), the Foresight Europe Network (FEN) that was 
created at UNESCO site on 24th of October 2014 by European Nodes of the Millennium project 
(EUMPI) and the European Regional Foresight College (ERFC).   
Now, SFRI has the mandate of the Commission to develop the outline for a new 'effective' 
European foresight network; a collective brain articulated on the basis of a real community. In our 
opinion, this should be –because of the explicit request for effectiveness that we understand as a 
demand to 'connect with the Zeitgeist' - to design a network flexible enough to adapt itself to the 
flexible and complex and changing nature of these times we are living in, and those to come. A 
definitive initiative to consolidate Foresight within the policy-making routines of the Commission 
itself, but also to shape a solid, resilient, creative, integrative, globally connected and productive 
futures community in the European area. 
At the time of shaping the new European foresight network we should take into account the unused 
extremely changing and complex nature of current Zeitgeist which could be defined as 'Liquid 
Times'3: as suggested, we are living in a historical time of radical transformations induced by 
exponential technology development where most of the structures and institutions traditionally 
framing contemporary world (politics, security, economy, demographics, education, social life and 
culture, etc.) are getting 'dissolved'. A time where dealing with emerging challenges will demand 
new approaches, coming from both organizations and individuals: more emphatic, open and 
flexible, and consequently more effective. 
Effectiveness refers to doing the right things: it constantly measures if the actual output meets the 
desired output, so it focuses in achieving the goal and involves thinking long term4. So, this new 
community should become a 'liquid' -rapid, adaptive, flexible and empathic mechanism to provide 
strategic information for policy-making and strategic management in a changing and complex 
environment.  Additionally this community should be able to create, articulate and promote a sort 
of 'Foresight Culture' in the European area, oriented to support systematic innovation and based on 
the extensive use of foresight within European organizations and society, in the coming years and 
–mainly- through the next Framework Programme. 
4. Shaping the new European Foresight Network 
If we roughly define a Network as a 'collective brain for a shared purpose', having an explicit 
mandate to develop the outline for a new 'effective' European foresight network, this challenge 
demands, apart from a description of the proposal (the WHAT: what it should be at conceptual 
level), an exact definition of the seminal purpose inspiring the new European foresight network 
(the WHY: Mission, Vision and Values) as a first step to create a working community (the WHO: 
People in it and Institutional arrangements) and to design an operational framework of reference 
(the HOW: Articulation, Structure, Resiliency, Working Mode, Budget, Conditions, Communication) 
as well as to define the expected schedule (the WHEN: Time Frame) and the physical site, if any 
(WHERE: Administrative Location). Let's deconstruct all these points according with the mandate of 
reaching effectiveness: 
                                                 
3 Bauman, Zygmunt (2007), Liquid Times: Living in an Age of Uncertainty, Wiley.  
4 Sudit, Ephraim (1996) , Effectiveness, Quality and Efficiency: A Management Oriented Approach, Springer.  
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What 
The mandate itself (to develop an outline for a new 'effective' European foresight network implicitly 
demands from SFRI to learn from prior initiatives mentioned before, paying attention to what 
should be improved-if any. This implies to rethink how a European foresight network should be 
designed as a whole (and this affects the operative structure, the financing and the linkages with 
other existing networks on Science and Technology, among others) in order to reach effectiveness. 
We are proposing a Strategic foresight European Network for knowledge Transfer, INnovation and 
Effective decision making with Long term impacts (SENTINEL) as a tentative design of a complex 
intelligence system.  
This new network should be 'liquid' somehow: even slightly structured, it should be flexible, 
adaptive, shaped in accordance with the concrete and contingent demands and challenges in 
society determined by social change (which obviously includes the whole social system: economy, 
ecosystem, technology, security, culture, politics). The network may be shaped as a community, 
driven by a central group linked to the Commission (it would be desirable to have an in-company 
assessing group formed by people familiar and sensitive with Foresight). A multilevel (country, 
region, local) platform where a selected group of researchers, policy-makers and business 
managers working with Foresight in different areas should merge looking for synergies, but also 
acting as a kind of social brain. A body able to jointly produce –not just share- knowledge and 
relevant information in an open, flexible, continuous and sustainable way: resiliency in the long 
term should be a main goal to be covered 
In a few words, SENTINEL should work as an open innovation ecosystem: a dynamic, informal and 
flexible international network/community of thinkers, researchers managers and users of Foresight 
knowledge. SENTINEL will provide the EC with strategic intelligence and sense-making on various 
issues related to STI policy and, simultaneously, would contribute to creating a 'Foresight Culture' 
based on Innovation, Creativity and Participatory processes within the social fabric in Europe. 
Why 
We understand that the goal for this network would be stimulating a Foresight Culture for research 
and innovation policy development in the European area. This, consequently, means to build the 
basis for a resilient/sustainable network, which should last over a longer period to achieve this 
goal, while being flexible enough to adapt its nature and activities to the future demands without 
losing its effectiveness. 
In order to be successful stimulating Foresight Culture the new network should be built on the 
basis of Empathy: a kind of sensibility with the sign(s) of times and the consequent ability to 
anticipate social change and to identify, understand and approach emerging new challenges in a 
proactive way. This actually may result in a way of building something that raises the 
consciousness and level of Foresight in Europe. 
This would mean trying to be creative while approaching Foresight research and innovation – and 
also networking - without following blind routines based on rigid procedures that can be obsolete, 
inefficient, ineffective or simply inadequate. Reaching empathy would mean, in this context, 
accepting change, understanding complexity, questioning cumulate knowledge, integrating new 
methodologies, and rethinking the way of approaching futures research depending on the operative 
context (cultural, demographic, economic, etc.) in order to provide and/or articulate proper 
(efficient) responses to the challenges to come. 
Who 
SENTINEL is understood, as mentioned above, an open innovation ecosystem where all the 
potential members should merge in a kind of collective brain, a community able to create and 
share useful knowledge for strategic intelligence and decision-making. This entails the concurrence 
of many different actors/stakeholders as members: both individuals (policy makers, academicians, 
researchers, entrepreneurs and citizens) and organizations (public institutions, universities, 
research centres, business firms and NGO's).  
Though SENTINEL is initiated and its constitution co-funded by the EC, institutional setup and 
management of the network is fairly independent and self-governed. The EC plays the key role in 
the initial phase, when the SENTINEL is structured and the Core Group is created. In the later 
stage the EC formulates needs for strategic intelligence and sense-making that are addressed to 
and processed by the Core Group. The EC thus benefits from existing foresight capacity that can 
rapidly and effectively respond to future needs of Europe. 
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Regarding the role of the individuals and organizations involved, the new network should be 
operative, integrative, representative and influential: open but excelling, integrative but selective, 
multidisciplinary but holistic, flexible but resilient, systematic but creative, independent but 
institutionally supported. A network not only devoted with the anticipation of possible futures and 
approaching concrete challenges but also committed with the consolidation of a 'Foresight Culture' 
with all the stakeholders involved. It is important not to assume that our current economic 
paradigm is the only possible economic paradigm or we will only be innovative in the sense of 
reproductive (trying to make changes in the current system) instead of being creative (for example 
proposing simultaneous, multiple systems). 
We understand that the network should work in an integrative way, being emphatic with all the 
stakeholders potentially involved and/or interested in Foresight for research and innovation: public 
institutions, private organizations and civil society. At the same time, reaching empathy would 
imply paying attention to the change processes and complexity shaping the future: this is key to 
understand, foresee and satisfy the needs, demands and expectancies of those stakeholders. 
At least those 3 types of potential members should be considered for SENTINEL: professional 
futurists (individuals) working either in private or public environments, organizations doing 
Foresight as main activity (research institutes, university departments/units, foundations, 
institutional agencies linked to governments-multilevel, consulting companies), and organizations 
demanding Foresight knowledge and/or advisory (information, tools/methods, training, research) 
to improve their strategic management and decision making. The aforementioned individuals and 
organizations would be active part of the POOL of experts and organizations supporting the 
network. A selected group of futurists and representatives of the organizations doing Foresight 
would be in charge of the CORE GROUP (CG), the management team of SENTINEL. This CG should 
be refreshed periodically, e.g. 50% every 2 years. 
Additionally, as a complementary external circle, tangential but key, other existing networks should 
be close to the operative system of SENTINEL. Being linked to other existing Foresight networks 
worldwide would be strongly recommended to reinforce a global vision; accessing to existing 
thematic professional/scientific networks is considered essential for being sure of addressing 
concrete challenges with the needed knowledge. These networks would be somehow linked to the 
POOL for external, contingent, advisory. 
How 
Creating synergies is the key point: the network should aim collaborative efforts of policy makers, 
academicians, researchers, entrepreneurs and citizens – and their organizations – to anticipate 
possible futures, to formulate a shared vision and to approach effectively (and collectively) 
identified challenges. In such an ecosystem new ideas and knowledge emerge from a continuous 
interaction, knowledge exchange and feedback loops among individuals, which influence each 
other. These new ideas are therefore examined and understood within a broad context of possible 
future developments. 
About the activities to be developed, the scanning work (multilevel, multidisciplinary) should be a 
central activity, but also the periodical dissemination of results (conferences, journals, etc.) and 
training alternatives (workshops, etc.) in a structured calendar: continuous interaction and mutual 
learning would be essential for moving from technocracy to empathy, and for the new network to 
be effective in stimulating a Foresight Culture. This functional approach should determine the whole 
articulation and operative processes of the new network. 
In general, several types of outcomes might be expected from the network. First, the network will 
provide response to the EC’s need for strategic intelligence and sense-making (through specific 
Think Tanks). Second, it can provide a response to the societal needs, bottom-up topics identified 
by the network itself (through specific Think Tanks). Third, the network can serve to raise 
awareness about foresight as a tool for strategic policy making (the aforementioned 'Foresight 
Culture'), through running specific Workshops, Courses and Seminars. Fourth, it will contribute to 
create and sharing cutting-edge knowledge and experiences and thus to improving quality of 
Foresight, through running specific Workshops, Courses and Seminars. 
When 
Since most of the SFRI members are experienced in the building and management of Foresight 
networks, as active members, the first steps could be done while SFRI is running, in 2016 (e.g. by 
suggesting a group of outstanding futurists for the Core Group). 
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Further developments would directly depend on three key points: the support of the European 
Commission, the will to participate of all the mentioned stakeholders, and the needed budget to 
drive it all and guarantee the sustainability of this project. 
About funding, two different ways of funding might be envisioned for two different phases of the 
network operation: 
1. Funding of the initial phase (3 – 4 years) 
Funding of the management team (initial Core Group) to set up the network. Funding for piloting 
different tools for stimulating viability and sustainability of the ecosystem (e.g. fees for each EC 
request, co-funding of bottom-up generated inputs to EC’s decision making, co-funding of mutual 
knowledge sharing, annual conferences, label of quality, …). Funding of the SENTINEL website 
2. Funding of the sustainability phase (years 5+) 
Maintenance cost of web based platform and administrative issues. Funding or co-funding of 
different tools that will be verified in the initial stage. Joint funding of bottom-up topics by 
interested members (e.g. as part of their broader projects) 
Where 
Even SENTINEL is understood as based on a Website, operating as a kind of an open social network 
with virtual means, it would be convenient to appoint a concrete physical place. There are two 
main options: a fixed site like Brussels (if SENTINEL is formally linked to an EC unit), or a travelling 
site e.g. the Organization (Foundation, Research Institute, University, etc.) where is based the 
individual leading the Core Group. Since the proposed is refreshing the CG every two years, the 
SENTINEL 'physical site' would be moving periodically. This could be something good both for the 
inner dynamics of the network itself, and for disseminating the 'Foresight Culture' across Europe: 
it's probable the SENTINEL itinerant sites organizing most of the meetings and activities 
(Workshops, Seminars, Courses, Plenary Meetings), which is also good to have a direct interaction 
with different regional realities, actors and potential stakeholders (and research/consultancy 
projects derived). 
5. Going operational: the proposed framework 
We are considering three different entities forming the Foresight Network: the CORE GROUP, the 
THINK TANKS and the POOL, with the following set-up: 
Core Group  
It would work as management team of the whole network. Those representatives (about 15) 
forming the CG should possess an international leadership role, relevant know how and expertise in 
Foresight, no matter what nationality, academic or professional background. The CG should be 
refreshed 50% every 2 years, following similar criteria of excellence followed for the EC experts 
groups. It would be 100% designed by the EC in the 1st phase and 50/50 by the EC and the POOL 
respectively in the following ones, in order to preserve the public interest of this initiative.  
The role#1 of the CG is shaping the challenges to be addressed according to the explicit demands 
or potential interests coming from the POOL, considering the general interest demanded by the EC. 
This means implicitly acting as Scientific Committee when needed, supervising methods and 
procedures. The role#2 of the CG is building (directly picking experts from the extended network 
or making a specific call) and managing the ad-hoc Think Tanks (TT) and/or activities derived from 
the demands of the POOL, addressed previously as challenges. The CG also might design the 
research or activity, manage the whole process, disseminate the results and dissolve every TT 
when its mandate is finished. The role#3 of the CG is leading the network's communication, both 
internal (management of the platform, reporting the POOL and the European Commission 
periodically and/or under demand) and external: social media, agenda-setting, etc. 
Think Tanks 
The TT is a group of experts (in their respective/professional areas, not in Foresight) addressed to 
work jointly and temporarily in solving a pre-defined challenge considered of strategic relevance, in 
the terms and time period considered. The nature and composition of every TT would depend on 
the particularities of every concrete challenge, and will be determined by the CG, acting as 
Scientific Committee, by direct choice and/or specific call for applications. 
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Different types of challenges may be addressed and require different types of urgency, times, 
resources, etc.: VISIONS (normative issues; e.g. visions for Europe 2050), FACTS (short term 
analytics, e.g. Refugees crisis), TRENDS (mid-term analytics; e.g. Aging population) and WEAK 
SIGNALS (long term analytics; e.g. rise of Populism). There can be various TTs working 
simultaneously in different challenges under the supervision of the CG, depending on demand and 
available resources coming from the EC and the POOL. Some of those TTs may be further 
developments the previous work done by pre-existent TTs. 
The main role of a TT is providing information and relevant insights, in a structured way (through a 
research/foresight process defined and managed by the CG) to solve the defined challenge. This 
could mean both to anticipate tentative future scenarios, identifying risks and opportunities, and 
proposing creative solutions in an experimental way. 
The Pool 
It´s a comprehensive group of European individuals and organizations committed with Foresight 
and/or Research and Innovation. The POOL is considered to be the basement of the network. 
Although being member is voluntary, it would be convenient to merge with other existing scientific 
and professional networks, becoming a kind of network of networks. 
The role of the POOL is multiple and key: giving the network the needed credibility and support 
(also Funding) to be legitimated, inspiring the CG to shape the challenges and priorities agenda, 
and becoming the pantry nurturing both the CG and TTs. 
Additionally, the POOL is responsible to assure the social impact of the innovation and foresight 
processes developed by the network. It´s the watchdog working to guarantee that the work done 
fits with the socioeconomic fabric´ expectancies and strategic needs: the guardian of empathy and 
efficiency. 
Embedding SENTINEL in the European R&I governance structure 
In order to strengthen the impact of the foresight activities on the EU R&I policy it is important to 
position SENTINEL in the established R&I governance structure at the European level. This section 
presents a proposal for integrating SENTINEL in the European R&I policy making that is consistent 
with the general scope and shape of the new network. 
 
Political level 
In this proposal the European Research Area and Innovation Committee (ERAC) shall be entrusted 
with the key initiating role with regards to sentinel. ERAC shall give a mandate to Core Group to 
manage the network and to serve as an 'engine' of the SENTINEL. Thanks to this mandate given by 
ERAC the new network will be first, embedded in the EU research and innovation policy making 
process and second, officially linked to R&I governance structures in member states. In addition, 
ERAC 
Member states 
– GOV 
GPC 
SFIC 
DG R&I Unit 
A.6 
EC’s network of 
foresight 
correspondents 
CORE GROUP 
THINK 
TANKS 
POOL 
Political level 
Operational level 
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outputs of the SENTINEL can be efficiently used by the ERAC High Level Group on Joint 
Programming (GPC) and the Strategic Forum for international S&T Cooperation (SFIC). 
Operational level 
The key operational role plays the EC. With regard to SENTINEL the EC shall in the first phase 
nominate members of the Core Group. Members of the CG shall be nominated based on their 
expertise, experiences and esteem in foresight, and their willingness and commitment to stimulate 
foresight culture in the European R&I policy. The EC should also absorb the outcomes coming from 
SENTINEL and together with linking them with the EC’s network of foresight correspondents it 
should contribute to their integration into the policy-making process within the EC. 
Annex 
The new European foresight network in a view: 
WHAT  The Network 
CONCEPT 
 What it should be at conceptual level? 
OPEN COMMUNITY/COLLECTIVE BRAIN OF 
STRATEGIC INTELIGENCE  
WHY Mission 
IDENTITY 
What is the aim inspiring The Network?.  
HELPING TO UNDERSTAND, FORESEE AND DRIVE 
SOCIAL CHANGE BY SUPPORTING A RAPID 
RESPONSE MECHANISM ON STRATEGIC ISSUES AND 
GENERATING INNOVATIVE FORESIGHT 
KNOWLEDGE FOR THE STAKEHOLDERS INVOLVED 
                                              
 Vision 
IMPACT 
What The Network wants to become in the future?.      
OPEN INNOVATION ECOSYSTEM BASED ON 
FORESIGHT CULTURE      
                     
 Values 
PHILOSOPHY 
What is the basement/roots of The Network?.                
EXPERIMENTAL, INFORMAL, FLEXIBLE, 
INTERNATIONAL, MULTIDISCIPLINAR, 
INTEGRATIVE 
               
WHO People in it 
HUMAN 
CAPITAL/KNOWLEDGE 
Who are the potential Members of The Network?  
ORGANIZATIONS (BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE) 
AND INDIVIDUALS COMMITTED WITH TO FUTURE 
ISSUES 
             
 Institutional 
Arrangements 
LEGAL ENTITY 
How embedded/connected and to whom? 
INDEPENDENT WITH A MANAGEMENT CORE (CORE 
GROUP) LINKED TO EC 
 
HOW Articulation 
SHAPE 
Is it a Network, a Think Tank, etc.?     
WIDE NETWORK OF NETWORKS (POOL OF 
EXPERTS) MANAGED BY AN CORE GROUP ON 
FORESIGHT WHERE AD-HOC THINK TANKS ARE 
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FORMED ON THE BASIS OF SPECIFIC NEEDS 
ADRESSED BY THE EC OR THE POOL ITSELF.  
 Structure 
SYSTEM 
Which elements and interactions?     
CORE GROUP  
+AD-HOC THINK TANKS 
+COMPREHENSIVE POOL OF EXPERTS 
 Resiliency 
SUSTAINABILITY 
How to guarantee efficiency in the long term? 
 TRANSPARENCY. VISIBILITY.  COMMUNICATION 
(WEB-BASED PLATFORM?) 
 Working Mode 
OUTPUT 
What production to be delivered?  To whom?                                  
(Assessment/Research/Knowledge Transfer/Education) 
-RESPONSE TO THE EC NEEDS FOR SI?AND SENSE-
MAKING 
-RESPONSE TO SOCIETAL NEEDS IDENTIFYIED BY 
THE NET ITSELF 
-SPREADING/IMPROVING FORESIGHT FOR 
STRATEGIC POLICY MAKING 
-SHARING KNOWLEDGE AND EXPERIENCES 
-SPREADING INNOVATION CULTURE 
 Budget 
FUNDING 
Who is paying The Thing? 
CO-FOUNDING: EC, COUNTRIES, COMPANIES, 
FOUNDATIONS, etc. 
                                                                    
 Conditions 
OPERATIONAL 
Partnerships? Impact Assessment?                                             
Working Modes internalised? 
HORIZONTAL (SET OF PRIORITIES BY THE WHOLE 
ECOSYSTEM) 
TOP-DOWN (PROCESSES MANAGED BY THE CORE 
GROUP) 
BOTTOM-UP (GENERATION OF INFORMATION BY 
SELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE POOL OF 
EXPERTS FORMING THE THINK TANKS) 
 Communication 
CONNECTIONS 
Corporate Image? Media coverage?                                         
Relationships with other units/networks (regional and 
global) 
NETWORK OF NETWORKS. CONNECTED WITH 
OTHER NETWORKS AND ORGANIZATIONS, BOTH 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
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WHEN Time Frame 
CALENDAR 
When doing what?                                                                              
Step by step timing to afford challenges and concrete 
targets 
INITIAL PHASE (STARTING AND CONSOLIDATION): 
3-4 YEARS 
SUSTAINABILITY PHASE (YEARS 5+) 
WHERE Administrative 
Location 
SITE 
Physical place? Fixed or itinerant?  
ITINERANT? BRUSSELS?                                                              
 
The SENTINEL intelligence system, as operative framework proposal for the new European 
foresight network, in a view: 
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Background Paper 6 
A frame for selecting bottom-up topics 
Authors: Kerstin Cuhls (editor), Robby Berloznik, Jennifer Cassingena-Harper, Natalie Dian, Michal 
Pazour, Tal Soffer 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper should contribute to the question how to prepare the next Framework Programmes 
('FP9' and 'FP10'). 
There are still many uncertainties: What might the next Framework Programme look like? What is 
the policy (on research, development and innovation) behind? Is the next programme about 
instruments (e.g. funding) or more about topics? Is it demand-oriented? Or is it science and 
technology push-oriented? Is it similar to H2020 or experimental and new? How much money will 
be available? What does change after a BREXIT? 
Based on these uncertainties, there are two assumptions: There will be a next Framework 
Programme and it is prepared now with a fixed timetable. The very next Framework Programme 
(i.e. 'FP10') is even more unclear and still some new features and instruments can be proposed for 
it. Therefore, we include some free thinking about this, too. The working group therefore took the 
freedom to reflect about the task in a broad way and sees two different time frames: 
1) urgent time frame for the next two years (after 2015) to prepare the next framework 
programme (no. 9 or H2030). 
2) long-term developments that lead to a new way of preparing a Framework Programme beyond 
the next (FP9) Framework Programme. 
Tasks of a bottom-up system are: 
 Generation of novel issues in a bottom-up fashion. 
 Piloting working mode using some bottom-up topics in 2015: 
Regarding the piloting activities it was pointed out that the 'why and 'what' must be clear to 
show the benefit of those pilots. Looking at potential pilots at national level was proposed 
(while keeping in mind the limited geographical scope) as well as reflecting on citizens 
demands. These pilots should also serve to learn how the working methods ('bottom-up'; co-
creation; rapid-response mechanism) of this expert group work.  
It was particularly pointed out that SFRI should produce output that can 'surprise'/'provoke' the 
Commission by, e.g., turning around the assumptions behind the existing priorities, provide 
alternative solutions, and suggest also new methodologies for defining priorities. This output might 
be combined with pertinent questions. In this context, SFRI could also reflect on the conditions 
under which the involvement of citizens into priority-setting and policymaking should be sought. 
This brief provides a preliminary set of guidelines for use in preparing future Framework 
Programmes: 
 
 Developing a frame for selecting bottom-up topics 
 Generating/co-creating novel issues in a bottom-up fashion 
 Piloting working mode on some bottom-up topics 
The brief revisits assumptions behind existing priorities and working modes and proposes new 
approaches/methodologies for defining priorities that aim at enhancing bottom-up approaches, 
including the involvement of citizens. 
The first question we have to ask is: What is 'bottom-up'? 
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BOX 1: 'Bottom-up' approach 
 
The term 'bottom-up' in this brief refers firstly to the deeper participation of a wide set of 
stakeholders from a range of policy and societal levels, representing diverse perspectives, needs 
and interests, in particular under-represented groups and those with limited/no access to policy 
design and shaping. Bottom-up foresight entails the engagement of a whole new range of actors 
for generating foresight knowledge and a new transfer way of this knowledge. The new actors who 
carry this knowledge (still implicitly) are e.g. young entrepreneurs, students, change agents, 
business angels and local activists. Bottom-up can also be referred to the engagement of different 
stakeholders, especially citizens, to raise trust and a sense of solidarity. 
 
Secondly, bottom-up refers to the exploration of a broad range of information sources and scans, 
including alternatives and disruptions based on diverse levels of search for emerging trends and 
drivers. This entails a finer granularity of the future topics when finer, multiple filters are developed 
to serve as a frame for selecting bottom-up topics. 
 
The means for implementing bottom-up foresight (as a systematic view of different actors) that 
people and new sources of information have become more accessible with the spread of social 
media and web-enabled interactive tools. The question is also where the bottom lies. However, the 
challenges of assessing and evaluating the data as well as extracting useful information from this 
mass of data to gain applicable results are big. Even the resources required for a comprehensive 
bottom-up approach are considerable. 
 
2. Rationale 
To date the use of foresight in FP5/6/7 and Horizon 2020 has focused primarily on top-down 
approaches (based on the ideas of high ranks, on request or based on 'experts'), including the use 
of expert groups to rethink a completely sectorial approach, or at programme level to define the 
work programme's specific topics, sometimes at project level in defining strategic research and 
innovation agendas. 
Foresight activity has been encouraged at different levels in this system and to address different 
rationales including providing support for national, regional and local foresight exercises; and the 
organisation of EU level foresight to inform EU policies and promote the harmonisation of member 
state policies. During the accession phase of the EU-12, foresight was used as an instrument of 
transition to support the accession of new Member States with the aim of building R&I intensity, 
capacity and performance. EU-sponsored regional and city foresight addressed local territorial 
concerns as well as cross-border cooperation have had important impacts in influencing policy and 
action at different levels. These actions have resulted generally in increases in national R&I 
spending contributing to new actions and measures, at regional and city level, have enhanced 
governance processes and led to more effective regional and city programmes. 
 
Figure 1: Identified types of transformation (Weber et al 2012, p. 155). 
The EU drive to gear research and innovation to address grand societal challenges reflects a more 
ambitious commitment to bringing about societal transformations by design (Weber et al. 2012; 
Haegeman et al. 2012). In essence, this is a shift towards generating longer-term impacts in 
society, economy and governance processes. The use of foresight to address societal challenges is 
in itself highly challenging for those designing and implementing the exercise, since the process for 
generating such impacts is more complex and risky. 
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Weber et al. (2012) distinguish between four types of transformations or disruptions which 
foresight activity has to contend with in different ways. Figure 1 shows the difference between the 
primarily reactive approach to disruptive events and ongoing processes of transformation and the 
need to use Foresight (in the citation used here broader and thus called FTA) towards more 
deliberate, proactive approaches to transformation. 
The Lund Conference (Lund Revisited. Tackling Societal Challenges)1 in 2015 especially touched 
upon Social Challenges and ended with a revised declaration ‘Europe must speed up solutions to 
tackle grand challenges through alignment, research, global cooperation and achieving impact’. 
3. Change in paradigms 
When society is talked about, society must also be involved in the procedure – regarded as an 
actor. This leads to a new thinking about participation and even democracy in general. But we have 
to go further: 
Survival is the ultimate goal, described in today's terms as sustainability and resilience. In order to 
equitably make this huge change possible, all levels of society need to be involved or the changes 
will be too slow to save lives and traumata. Change on a regional level (EU) will have to be 
addressed not only by all the member countries, but also by all the peoples within those countries. 
Discussions on what sustainability and resilience mean to all citizens of EU countries must begin 
immediately. It involves also science and technology to create an awareness and is more 
democratic in taking into account more and different information as well as information sources. 
Thus, in the long range, we have to consider new paradigms and a new 'mix' of people to address 
it and to think about it, even in Foresight processes. The combination should include age and 
gender aspects such as young people from the 'gamer generation', the second generation of the 
so-called 'digital natives' (Prensky 2007), 'Digital Immigrants' (Prensky 2001) as well as 'wise' and 
experienced persons as in education. The best results can be achieved in mixed groups including 
different fields of expertise. This does not only mean to work in social media surroundings, but 
especially in real life (labs) or working groups. Even here, a lot of social innovation is possible. It 
does not only mean making use of swarm intelligence. 
This needs a culture, education and understanding shift: Paradigm differences can be large from 
jurisdiction to jurisdiction and within jurisdictions. For example, a move from the concept of 
'growth' to sustainability can be difficult for those still trying to reach the same growth standards 
that other countries have already obtained. Identifying paradigm differences can be key to 
providing the scope and range of any scanning process we recommend. These also refer to cultural 
differences between nations and sometimes within nations in the way people look at things and 
behave. For example, the perception of privacy may be affected by cultural differences.  
 
Figure 2: Perception Tree 
                                                 
1 http://www.vr.se/download/18.2f2b4c214fabb87955150ea/1441703705896/lund-revisited-150908.pdf  
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There are a number of different change theories coming from change management backgrounds to 
behavioural sciences. Education or knowledge acquisition, formal or informal, is seen as having a 
large effect especially on systems. A structured scanning system might be seen as a new way to 
inform the whole organization as to the possibilities and their validity for the years 2015-2020 and 
beyond.  
The so-called 'bottom-up' approach needs to be expanded to all those who will be influenced by 
any potential change, that includes the citizens most negatively and positively affected by the 
changes (induced by both humans and nature). Making the kind of change we need at this time in 
human history involves everyone on the perception tree (see Figure 2). Therefore, we need to 
include all levels, beginning with the bottom where the greatest numbers live.  
4. Different application of information & knowledge management 
Thoughts that go back to Greek hegemony can still be found today. In fact, many of them are 
blooming or are preparing to bloom at this writing. In order to understand the world as it is today it 
is important to look around at past precedents, what others are saying about the present and 
implications for the future. Everything from: visions of moving to another planet, to changing our 
approach to this planet, can be considered. We have already discussed the need to get information 
from all the levels of perception we have available to us. Now we need to lay guidelines for what 
we are searching (see Figure 3) 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Types and qualities of Information 
 Using short half-life or long half-life information (the relative lengths of time required for 
information to fall to being half descriptive of any subject or situation) provides a possible basis 
for identifying weak signals (in the sense of Kuusi et al. 2000 or Hiltunen 2008, but also Ansoff 
1975; Curry and Hodgson 2008 or Holopainen and Toivonen 2012). It needs to be compared 
and evaluated over time to verify if a trend is forming or not. Criteria for information sources: 
quality of source, quantity of sources on the same subject. 
 Knowledge, which implies patterns in the past that can have relevance for the future. Major 
changes in, for example, weather, major catastrophe, large societal change can invalidate 
knowledge. 
 Social changes that are related to one another can indicate the adaptation of a social change. 
For example, the view that humankind is dependent upon natural resources and that they must 
be protected is related to animal rights thinking.  
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The current set of H2020 topics is partly set top-down (policies, policy-makers, lobbies, large 
majority groups, majority and mainstream thinking) or derived from former projects or have been 
defined through foresight processes whether through EC exercises or through at project level (JPIs 
e.g.). The proposed frame includes these, especially the not yet exploited topics. 
If a system of information collection, broadly spread throughout the whole EU structure and at all 
levels of perception is set in place it could have a huge impact. Besides the information gathered, a 
system of collection could raise the awareness of the whole organization to the direction needed to 
fulfil EU goals. Even the member countries will benefit from a better understanding of EU decisions, 
the 'why', and budgets that are directed to them. 
A structure behind any potential futures programme challenges and involves identifying our 
assumptions and articulating our values. To understand future possibilities we need to understand 
where we are in the present. The current values of EU decision makers will define the future based 
upon their values unless they are supported in rethinking what possible consequences their values 
will have in the future.  
5. Objectives of a Framework Programme 
In relation to a new paradigm, the next Framework Programmes may have a different objective 
and policy intention: Is it just about funding or more about moderating the funds? Is it important 
to define content or are there other ways of defining content (e.g. by the scientists and researchers 
themselves)? Do the instruments have to be changed? What are new instruments? 
Within the foresight concept lays a general acceptance of systemic thinking. That means that 
objectives will not be a list, but a grouping of interrelated tasks that will need to occur 
simultaneously from bottom-up and top down. Disruptive events and the need for emergency relief 
from them will be grouped with activities identifying chances for the future, designed to be 
transformative. The overall goal of both levels of activity will be directly related to resilience (to be 
able to meet disruptive transformation) and sustainability (which will be met through 
transformation by design).  
How can Foresight intelligence be used for the programme beyond Horizon 2020 mainly 'bottom-
up' and involving 'knowledge stakeholders' such as academics and thought leaders? Who are the 
thought leaders? They can also be people who are knowledgeable on the specific matter but are 
not classified as 'experts' because they do not have high ranking functions in the system? 
Making judgments about if and when bottom-up knowledge will be most useful needs experience. 
As new paradigm thinking becomes more integrated and what was bottom-up knowledge a number 
of years ago becomes generally accepted today, new insights will develop at those layers of society 
most affected by the changes, positive or negative.  
6. Time and the next EU Framework Programme 
Foresight is about the long range. But what does long-term mean? The scope of each foresight 
project must be declared. While this begins as an estimate, there are guidelines that can be 
applied. Since the mandate for this paper is Horizon 2020, and it is written in 2015, there are only 
five active years left for foresight application to prepare the next Framework Programme. Five 
years are a good strategic period for making sure that the goals set prior to 2020 have been 
adequately addressed. It is a time for deciding what is left undone and what new must be added. A 
suggested length for a complete foresight project is 25 years. This leaves room for determining 
possible and desired futures. Each goal will have its own timeline, perhaps under the 25 year mark 
and others over the 25 year mark. It is wise to be as honest as possible as to how long things 
might take. The research and innovation for sustainability and resilience within the whole EU might 
take much longer than the life times of those who are now living or those who are preparing the 
programmes. In that case, we do not speak of goals but of direction and systems creation. 
For example, major development of positive and workable immigration procedures might take five 
years to develop, but dealing with the various causes for migration might take fifty years or more. 
It is wise to realize that all goals cannot be fulfilled within a democratic political mandate of say, 
four years.  
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On the other hand, for the next Framework Programme, there are already a lot of priorities pre-
determined. They have to be considered, too. Thus, we propose to differentiate between the next 
Framework programme (FP9), the next five years – but then to consider a complete paradigm shift 
to adapt to or to prepare for the very next Framework Programme (FP10). 
7. Definition of search field – criteria for selecting Framework 
Programme topics 
7.1 Impact, criteria and indications 
Bottom-up also refers to the process of generating topics as well as the selection process and the 
sources.  
What are the interesting topics, issues, challenges or inputs that are part of a new Framework 
Programme? How can they be 'defined'? Which criteria do they need to fulfil? There are underlying 
values, predefined general policies and requirements they need to fulfil. There are research 
communities and groups, which have developed over time and have opinions and expectations 
regarding the programme’s direction, aims and impacts, and topic orientation. Significant 
investments have been made in certain policy areas, marine, energy, environment based on long-
term policy consultations and discussions. Is our aim to link to these processes, or to bypass them 
and focus on remaining different areas? Are we proposing a frame, which these communities can 
be encouraged to use? 
In defining selection criteria, we may need to identify different levels, e.g. at the higher level, there 
are challenges and targets which have been set – does our frame come in to support cross-
challenge approaches, cross-fertilization of ideas, cross-disciplinary approaches, forming new 
communities? 
They have to be trans-formulated into the selection criteria. Maybe there are also different 
instruments for supporting R&D – the topics have to be chosen accordingly. 
7.2 Messy values behind the criteria 
There are many values and grades of those values and all values are relative. Much is written 
about values2. One way of dealing with values is to find subjects that all cultures must consider. All 
cultures find themselves placed upon the spectrums that have to do with human relationships. For 
example, all cultures have to define what is considered good and bad and the points in-between.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Values having to do with human relationships 
 
                                                 
2 See also the Final Report of a Commission Study: The Impact of Changing Value Systems on EU Research 
and Innovation Policies: Signals, Drivers, Responses, Brussels 2015. 
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When looking at all the spectrums, certain viewpoints begin to show themselves. They form our 
paradigms (more on paradigms see below). Consider a circle including, hierarchy/ strong leader 
decides, similarities important, human nature basically evil, human nature, immutable and doing. 
Now consider a circle including being human nature mutable, human nature basically good, 
differences important and individual decides. Using the extremes, (which is very rarely the 
description of any individual) one can see two different worldviews based upon values. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Values having to do with how we see the world around us 
The two prevailing western and global dominating paradigms can be glimpsed in the chart ‘Values 
having to do with how we see the world around us‘. If a circle is drawn to include mastery over 
nature, past orientation, technique solves all problems, money gives better life, and knowledge; 
one finds a simplified view of one paradigm. If a circle is drawn to include intuition (probably better 
stated as wisdom and experience), love gives better life, increased consciousness solves problems 
and future orientation and subjection to nature; another paradigm can be perceived. Consciousness 
or awareness refers to consideration of more than only technical aspects contributing to a problem. 
Systemic/ holistic relationships do not exclude technique, but give equal value to all the ways we 
experience the natural and human world around us. Keep in mind that these are extremes and 
most behaviour will lie in the middle section of each spectrum, causing the paradigms take on 
more nuanced form. 
8. What does a Framework Programme include? What is searched 
for? 
A Framework Programme on RTDI (Research, Technology Development & Innovation) includes 
foresight tools – and to prepare it needs already first answers to challenges (knowing the demand 
side) and what it can provide (on the supply side). The Framework Programme also needs to be 
adapted to ongoing trends. What is a trend in this context? A trend is long-range and persistent; it 
effects many societal groups, grows slowly and is profound. In the Framework environment, trends 
are a sketch of what is happening in the present and clues to what might influence the future. Not 
to be confused with fads which are in contrast, a fad is short-term, 'in', effects particular societal 
groups, spread quickly and are superficial. 
In addition, it is often talked about megatrends. A megatrend extends over many generations, and 
in cases of weather, megatrends can cover periods prior to human existence. They describe 
complex interactions with many factors and they often represent ways of human existence such as 
in hunting and gathering, agriculture, and industrial societies. The choice of trends for analysis is 
naturally influenced by the author's values. Often trends are explored and structured according to 
the driving fields Technology, Economy, Environment, Politics/Policy, Social and Ethical (called 
STEEP, STEEPV or TEEPSE). 
Wild cards: Here you find signs of new trends from the categories social, technical, ecological, 
economic, political or demographic. Wild cards are potential future events with low likelihood of 
occurrence (at the point in time they are perceived by most people) but with high impact if they 
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occur. Decision makers, in an uncertain world, could challenge their conventional thinking and 
forcing themselves to think 'out of the box'3. 
Weak signals – are 'ambiguous events, often referred to as seeds of change, providing advance 
intelligence or hints about potentially important futures, including Wild Cards, challenges and 
opportunities. Weak Signals lie in the eye of the beholder and are generally influenced by the 
mental frameworks and subjective interpretations of individuals with limited information about 
emerging trends, developments or issues in a particular time and context. Their weakness is 
directly proportional to levels of uncertainty about their interpretations, importance and 
implications in the short-medium-to-long-term. Thus, Weak Signals are unclear observables 
warning us about the possibility of future game changing events.'4  
Trend families: Very often, the chosen trends are members of a trend family. A parent trend, for 
example, collapsing nations, can be related to water availability, war, social and governmental 
collapse etc.   
Geographical trend growth and 'bellwether' geographic sites: There is also an attempt to follow 
the global spread of trends. Some places seem to lead development in one or a variety of areas 
and are looked to as the source of new trends. The Netherlands, in suing its own government may 
be considered a bellwether country for a peaceful, legal method to assure that government keeps 
to its agreements and goals when it comes to the environment. 
But most topics for a new Framework programme and beyond need to be derived from the 
unspecific tacit knowledge that is not yet codified and can only be harvested from the heads of 
people, different persons, not only experts. We observe many new topics more indirectly – not 
directly from surveys but by asking the right questions, combining the right sources, adding 
literature and synthesizing in a way that the core/focus is touching upon something relevant.  
9. General frame of bottom-up selection of topics 
The general frame of bottom-up selection of topics builds up on the framework for a better 
integration of forward looking and strategy activities developed by EFFLA 2012. The EFFLA 
framework consists of four key elements of the strategic process:  
I. Strategic intelligence  
II. Sense-making 
III. Selecting priorities  
IV. Implementation  
Our frame of bottom-up selection of topics elaborates mainly on the first two phases and discusses 
the role and involvement of different stakeholders because they are rather not involved in III and 
IV. Naturally, well-functioning bottom-up principles embedded in the first two phases influence also 
the two latter and more formal phases of the strategic process. Of course, evaluation processes for 
quality control are also necessary. Whereas the quality control in the bottom-up processes takes 
place via criteria and at every step, a full evaluation of implementation success can only be 
performed later, when the process has been finished. 
Figure 6 shows the possibility to gain bottom-up input (knowledge, ideas, and proposals for topics) 
into the next Framework Programme. Maybe the shift towards open input will be more drastic and 
one has to come up with different ways of deriving issues and topics for it.  
In figure 6, there are very different sources for inputs into the selection basis for topics, issues, 
new challenges, existing trends and signals of all kinds. Threats can also be regarded as a frame 
but are not a direct input in foresight (as this is about chances). A pre-selection takes place in open 
but moderated processes (e.g. workshops with clear concepts and involving a variety of people 
with different backgrounds). In order to let a broad range of persons with different values behind, 
                                                 
3  Steinmüller, Karlheinz. 'Thinking Out of the Box. Weak Signals and Wild Cards for European Regions', 
Futura no 2, 2007: 22-29. 
4  See Hiltunen 2009, citation above, and Hiltunen, E., Weak Signals in Organizational Futures Learning. 
http://epub.lib.aalto.fi/pdf/diss/a365.pdf,  14.4.2010. 
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different backgrounds and different opinions take part in the communication; a Delphi survey is 
intended to receive the opinions of these 'experts' on the pre-selected topics. The definition of 
'expert' is broad here (see e.g. Cuhls 2000). 
Workshop(s) 
for selection: 
moderated, 
clear concept
topics, issues, 
new challenges, 
„trends“, signals
Clear Criteria for selection:
• based on values of the EC
• based on current general policies
and requirements of the
EC adapted
• adapt to new instruments?
different sources
national foresights
Horizon Scans from
different sources
data bases of institutions
(e.g.  associations (e.g. 
WFSF, WFS, UNESCO, OECD)
etc.
Delphi as filter and 
refinement for additions
Input next RTDI Programme
Consultation survey: 
open, explorative
Issues derived from
existing Global 
Challenges (WS/ Scans)
4 Workshops for preparation
(e.g. 26/5/2015): 
documentation
FP7 and H2020 
proposals not funded
single interviews with thought
leaders/ scientists/ generalists
Grassroot
topics
Crowdsourcing as sourcessocial media et al.individuals
 
Figure 6: Frame for input process into a new Framework Programme 
Although results from a Delphi survey (with classical 'experts' or a broader range of participants) 
can be examined statistically, the comments, arguments and explanations should be taken into 
account, too (the survey has to be designed accordingly). The analysis of the results needs to take 
into consideration the level of expertise. Thus the recipients can reflect the wisdom of the crowds 
and that of the experts. Not only traditional statistics and rankings should be considered for the 
selection phase, but especially the extremes and non-mainstream topics should be looked at that 
might contain interesting insights for selecting topics. In most Delphi surveys, it is looked for 
consensus or where a consensus can potentially be achieved, or where there are arguments for 
majorities, but also the minority opinion is worthwhile looking at.  
The selection process and sense-making phase after the Delphi analysis gives room for fine-
formulation of research questions that should be selected as candidates for integration into a new 
Framework Programme.  
9.1 Scanning and first selection of topics for RTDI 
According to the figure 6, above, different sources are used for the scanning and the first selection 
of issues and topics from bottom-up. Sources can be: Interviews and open discussions, material 
from grassroots groups, issues deriving from Global challenges that were already addressed but 
never really worked out, workshops of all kinds (e.g. creative ones, mental time travels), 
participatory platforms which involve the citizens such as crowdsourcing and social computing as 
well as databases of events that can be used to generate trends, patterns and activities. (e.g. 
European FuturICT5, The Good Judgement Project where results of volunteer forecasting accuracies 
are measured against actual occurrence of events6). 
 
                                                 
5  See http://www.futurict.eu/  
6  See http://www.goodjudgmentproject.com/  
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In addition, other well-known sources exist: Horizon scanning activities of all kinds, national 
foresight activities, databases and public consultations as well as the workshops that are just 
performed in the EC could be used. For example: the Global Europe 2050 project which adopted a 
full bottom-up process and used a highly participatory approach to scenario building that seeks to 
optimally combine visionary thinking with plausibility7. 
Actors of different social groups can be a source on their own. Just taking their ideas and opinions 
on board (regardless of a specific methodology) can already induce change and motivate these 
participants for action. A broad involvement of different stakeholders as well as formal explicit 
knowledge (internet searches, data bases) is needed here. This so-called Intelligence gathering 
phase is very open and only pre-selects broadly according to the set of criteria mentioned above 
(see section 7) and defined by the Commission as a prerequisite for a Framework Programme. The 
first filter is very open. As an example: also protesting citizens who sue their own government can 
be integrated, the critics and journalists who report on the phenomena, maybe the historians who 
have written about similar situations in earlier times, it could be the experts who were there in the 
challenging situations and experienced it. NGOs play a role in this 'bottom up' approach. Any 
sources that bring one to individuals most affected can be considered valuable.  
9.2 Sense-making 
The topics/issues/challenges that were found have to be adapted to the requirements of a 
European Framework Programme. This can only be done by: 
 First selection via criteria 
 Open discussions and consultations in workshops 
 An open assessment by external experts, here with a Delphi survey (see tender Delphi) 
 A selection according to the Delphi results + further discussions with external experts + 
selection in the EC 
9.3 Paradigms – identify and negotiate 
During the selection, but especially the sense-making phase one has to be aware of the existing 
paradigms. Paradigms allow each individual to frame an understanding of current issues, possible 
consequences and resulting future scenarios and visions (desirable scenarios). Possible, probable, 
desirable and undesirable future views are also influenced by the paradigms from which individuals 
gather and apply foresight intelligence and sense-making information. All scenarios have a different 
basis and different assumptions behind.  
Understanding paradigms helps us to make more informed choices on trends and signs of the 
times. This has to be considered especially when the sense making and adaptation to the needs of 
a Framework Programme is discussed.  
At this point in time we are caught between a weakening, but still dominate paradigm 
characterized by belief in market economics, individual responsibility, linear thinking and 
technology as the answer to most problems. The measurement of success in this paradigm is 
individual power evidenced by monetary accumulation and the monetary worth of possessions. But 
there are already trends showing us that this perception is losing ground (see e.g. German BMBF 
Foresight8 cycle II 2015). 
An upcoming different paradigm is characterized by a systemic approach: Some of the measures of 
success in this paradigm are the health and wellbeing of individuals, plants and animals 
surrounding them. Individuals within this worldview have a strong relation to nature and see the 
links between the health of the planet and their own health. The society or governmental entity, 
put into place by the people have a responsibility to take care of those who are unable to take care 
of themselves. 
 
                                                 
7  Global Europe 2050 (2012); available at https://ec.europa.eu/research/social-sciences/pdf/global-europe-
2050-report_en.pdf  
8  See www.bmbf-foresight.de 
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10. Conclusion 
The current challenges we are facing, namely ongoing, economic, financial and social crises, 
migration, natural and man-made disasters, are becoming more pressing and interconnected and 
require more robust, forward-looking solutions, and a mix of bottom up and top down policy and 
governance responses. In the long term, this entails exploring and introducing paradigm shifts and 
system disruption. 
This requires policy makers to work simultaneously or in parallel on both short term and longer-
term time horizons when undertaking foresight to inform policy. In the short-term, there are a 
number of practical problems which need to be addressed in order to ensure the effective use of 
bottom-up approaches in foresight and policy-making. These include socio-cultural and other 
contextual obstacles as well as constraints in terms of content, resources and competencies. The 
EU Commission can play an important role here in mobilising efforts to improve, on the hand, 
practice by providing the required tools, policy orientation and political championing; and theory, 
on the other, by promoting more research and innovation in this area. 
The longer-term exercises raise more systemic than instrumental concerns and opportunities. 
They allow a major rethinking of current policy approaches, to explore a wider spectrum of 
information sources and scenarios, and the opportunity to bring in more bottom-up inputs and 
approaches. The longer-term exercises can serve as important feeds into the shorter-term 
exercises. 
The longer-term exercises should allow bottom up approaches to be factored into the four main 
phases of strategic intelligence, sense making, selecting priorities and implementation. The tools 
are available for this to happen but often time and resources are constraints. It can also bring in 
provocations and alternative options for actions and activities in a framework programme when 
asking 'what if…?' They also provide an opportunity for the shorter-term exercises to be put into 
perspective, contextualised and to a certain extent evaluated. Especially different search 
instruments and scenario tools allow gaining insights from different perspectives, assumptions and 
people. 
In addition to the outcomes of the bottom-up approaches resulting in the generation of collective 
intelligence across diverse disciplines and cultural contexts, also the process of engaging various 
stakeholders groups and citizens themselves creates an important basis for success of policies 
responding to current complex challenges. The participatory and co-creative bottom up processes 
enable creating common vision and goals, and stimulate joint endeavours to achieve these goals. 
And complexity of current challenges predetermines the need for active involvement of whole 
societies in addressing these challenges. On top of that, closer links between the societal visions, 
needs and concerns on one hand, and research and innovation activities on the other strengthen 
trust of the society in research, which is a prerequisite for sustainable funding of research and 
innovation activities. 
Necessary steps to implement a bottom up approach thus need providing the tools and 
resources, e.g. development of a comprehensive strategic intelligence database; development of 
a toolkit providing guidelines and case studies of bottom-up approaches (local, regional, national, 
European), provision of different online and offline (workshop) fora where societal players discuss 
and debate; or scanning and extracting relevant information as part of sense making, to work out 
what level of change is desired/expected by society and in the long term.  
There is also the necessity for driving more systemic change, e.g. rethinking the way grand 
challenges are being addressed in foresight processes to factor in bottom-up, disruptive 
approaches; transition policies co-designed by key players including citizens. FP research and 
innovation projects to allow experimentation, study and coordination/harmonisation of 'disruption' 
approaches; operative organisation in the system to bring in bottom-up ideas, developments, 
opinions and transforming them into policy language or mainstreaming bottom-up approaches 
through changes in the selection of FP projects. 
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Background Paper 7 
Workshop report 'Rapid Response Mechanism' 
 
1. Background and purpose of the workshop 
The overall objective of the workshop was to support the development of an effective 'rapid 
response' mechanism for the EC. More specifically, this workshop aimed at the co-development 
of a 'rapid response' mechanism (RRM) for strategic programming of research and in support 
of the next Framework Programme with experts (SFRI) and EC officials. 
The workshop format was based on the work of two breakout groups that separately dealt with a 
set of questions that were aimed at facilitating a discussion for conceiving and optimising a RRM.  
Two topics were chosen as working themes for the breakout groups: 'Future of automotive 
systems / testing automobiles' and 'The future of the food processing industry'. 
In relation to the chosen topic the breakout groups were asked to address the following questions: 
Is the rapid response needed and is it useful?  What topics require a rapid response mechanism? 
How did this topic come up?  What are the knowledge needs?  What kind of RRM steps is needed? 
Are the topics on different time perspective or processes? What does rapid mean, 10 to 30 days?  
To these ends, the workshop aimed at addressing three key questions: 
1. The request formulation: How should a request from the EC look like? (context, added 
value of experts, terminology, prioritizing, iterative feedback); 
2. The architecture: How can the expert group develop an answer? (collecting inputs, output 
format, setting up a specific network, collective intelligence methods); 
3. The Impacts: the impacts of the mechanism and its results within the EC.  
The breakout groups were asked focused specifically on the first two questions. The last question 
was tackled in plenary after the end of the breakout sessions.  
2. Discussion 
Group 1: 'The future of the food processing industry' 
1. Request formulation 
The discussion started on the basis of a jointly decided topic: 'The future of the food processing 
industry'. This topic was raised due to a statement that was published by the WHO in mid-October 
2015. It raised an extensive debate among different stakeholders such as the health interest 
groups, food industries etc., on one hand, and a lot of concern among the public on the other hand. 
The discussion was started by asking: is this issue a topic for Rapid Response (RR)? And how it 
could be defined as a question? 
The opinion was that this topic could be a question for RR for two reasons. As the WHO statement 
relates to a wider theme (food importance and health protection), it requires better understanding 
of its consequences from different angles. In addition, it could be relevant in the policy context of 
the COP 21 conference in Paris. Thus, both the proximity of the Paris event and the important 
implications of the topic called for a rapid response.  
The discussion started from the specific topic of eating red meat in general and processed meat 
more specifically, and extended to a more general question on the importance of health food 
ingredients. For years there has been a debate related to the sustainability of food: although a lot 
is known, it is difficult to change habits and opinions among the public regarding food consumption.  
Moreover, there is a consensus that sustainable food relates to other R&D areas than meat, such 
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as 'the protein system approach' which may deal with water provision, insects, legal issues, 
regulatory frameworks... Therefore, there is a need to have a more holistic approach that links 
health, environment and food. 
Process-wise, the following elements were mentioned: 
 It is important to identify who is raising the question and what we want to influence 
and why, before going more in depth into the topic.  
 Knowledge about the decision-making process is important. 
 The added value of a RRM should be defined. 
 The request could be raised both ways: 'top-down', with the EC formulating a request to 
experts, or 'bottom-up', with experts proposing to the EC a rapid-response topic to address.  
2. Architecture 
In order to have a broader view and a more holistic picture about the question, it is recommended 
to involve a variety of experts from different fields, which are relevant to the specific question. 
Access to a broader network of experts would be of great value. For example, in the case of the 
proposed topic, information could be retrieved from experts in the field of health, environment, 
agriculture, economy, or technology. It was also suggested that the experts represent different 
sectors: academia, industry, government, NGOs, the public. 
In a related way, it was suggested to use the experience of the variety of advisory groups (AG) 
who are involved in EC foresight activities. As Advisory Groups are often related to the DG foresight 
correspondents, they may take over a role of forwarding and receiving opinions. This would be 
useful as it was mentioned that a link to strategic programming and agenda-setting would be 
important. 
The discussion also focused on the type of knowledge required for the RR request and answer, 
and what is the added value of foresight in this context. The type of knowledge required 
includes: policy and regulations; scientific knowledge relevant to the topic; technological data; 
societal aspects; knowledge about societal values Knowledge in foresight methodologies would be 
valuable as well, such as scenarios, horizon scanning, short term and longer terms trends, weak 
signals.  
Another important issue was raised which relate to the need of validation of the data and how 
to motivate the experts to be involved and contribute through the networks.  
Conclusions about the process: 
 Having access to a wide network with diverse fields of expertise is important. 
 The required RRM architecture should integrate the top-down and bottom-up 
mechanism. 
 The RRM needs to be connected to the different foresight activities as well as to other 
relevant networks and activities in the EC. 
 The added value of foresight in a RR context should be clearly defined. 
 Quality review and expert motivation should be addressed. 
Group 2: 'Future of automotive systems/testing automobiles' 
1. Request formulation 
The topic was proposed in the wake of the Volkswagen scandal and 'Dieselgate' backlash. 
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The discussion started by defining the scope of the topic, moving from the broader topic 'The future 
of the automotive industry' – or even: 'The future of mobility'– to more focused themes, including 
decarbonisation and alternative technological solutions (to the internal combustion engine). The 
topic finally chosen as the focus for further reflection that could be addressed through RRM was 
testing of automobiles, in terms of equipment and other technological elements of testing, as well 
as regulations and the organisational structures concerning testing. 
At a broader scope, two STI policy scenarios were considered. Scenario 1: continue to invest in 
developing and producing the current internal combustion engines. Scenario 2: stop investing in 
developing and producing the current internal combustion engines and invest instead in alternative 
technical solutions including electric and hybrid engines. 
The consequences of opting for the second scenario include an element of ensuing disruption while 
existing systems and processes are displaced or reconfigured. The introduction of a number of 
changes at different levels will need to be based on informed opinion and robust data and 
intelligence on technological, economic, political and social feasibility. Investment in alternative 
solutions will entail a significant cost in terms of public investment in new infrastructure, resources 
and skills.  There are also risks and mitigation concerns. The motivation for this paradigm shift 
needs to be clear. There are issues relating to the broader vision for the future of the industry and 
how the normative aspects are addressed. 
Conclusions about the process: 
 There is a need to clarify the level of ambition on the part of the RR proposers in 
order to take advantage of windows of opportunity. At the same time, the RR formulation 
needs to ensure that the request is formulated by keeping in mind what is actually feasible to 
provide within the set timeframe and resources available.  
 The narrowing down of the topic to testing of automotive systems highlights the need to focus 
on initially resolving a specific issue/ problem rather than tackling a larger, more 
complex challenge with political, economic and social constraints. This may provide an 
insight into how RRM questions can be co-reformulated by the proposers and the experts, to 
make them manageable and to ensure expectations management.  
2. Architecture 
The type of architecture required for addressing the testing issue is possibly a task force which 
may coordinate a range of experts with different profiles to ensure a holistic approach, 
including regulatory, technical expertise and including representation of key organisations (e.g. 
businesses, policy-making bodies, NGOs). Depending on the topic, this will determine the level and 
type of involvement of civil society needed for the user/consumer perspective and for validation 
purposes.   
The discussion focused on what is selected as relevant knowledge, how to locate this knowledge 
and how to use it. Another key aspect is how to ensure quality control of the content (data inputs 
and outputs) and process.  
 RRM does not operate in a vacuum and needs to take account of on-going foresight or 
anticipatory intelligence exercises completed recently, or are on-going or planned. 
3. Targeted outcomes and impacts  
How should we use the results? 
Discussions focused on three main topics: 
 The target group – who is asking the question and who is receiving and using the answer? 
 77 
The target group is the most important factor in the RRM. It defines the specification of the 
question as well as the type of knowledge which is required. Therefore it was suggested to 
reverse the order of the three questions and place this question first.  
 The layout of the answer 
The results can be displayed in several ways depending on the target audience. For example, 
the high-level decision-makers will be satisfied with a half-page summary and possibly a 
graphical presentation of the results, while others might want to get a more detailed report 
including extensive and deeper analysis. 
 The timescale for the answer 
The timescale dictates a lot of the quality and information. There is a need to connect timescale 
and content level. 10-14 days for an answer could be envisaged to give an overview or precise 
topics (half page), more time might be needed for more complex issues. The timescale could be 
flexible, depending on the needs of the target group and the urgency of the issue.  
In the other breakout group, the issue of urgency was approached in a different way: why and 
how can a topic become urgent and require a Rapid Response? Different scenarios were 
considered: current crisis, pending crisis, weak signals. A current crisis is likely to impose a 
shorter response time, however it is important to structure the rapid response to deliver advice 
in phases, starting initially with an overview of what can be delivered realistically and assuring a 
level of quality control. 
Depending on the complexity and breadth (scope) of the challenge, 10 days may not be enough. 
Different types of Rapid Response requests require different types of responses with a 
different timing. Some may be needed as an input for PR, others to inform the design of new 
legislation or funding programmes. There is a need to clarify the request so that the 
response provided is used for a relevant (adequate) purpose.  
As a general consideration, it was also mentioned that importance should be given to the broader 
consequences and repercussions of the advice given, as it can entail significant policy impacts.   
4. Key messages 
 There is a need for RRM that provides quick answers to various issues. Such a mechanism 
can be effective to decision-makers. 
 RRM mechanism should be dynamic and flexible and adjust itself to the target audience and the 
type of question. It is a rapid and agile mechanism mainly motivated by political triggers. 
 The first question in a RRM should be about the Targeted Outcomes and Impacts. This will 
define all the other aspects, such as type of information, time scale,level of information etc. 
 There is a need to clarify the added value of foresight in the RRM context and its 
difference to science. In this context the impact and benefit of the RRM need to be better 
formulated and clarified. 
 The data flow of the RRM can be top-down and bottom-up, connecting many expert 
groups and other people who can provide information. Motivating the experts is a key aspect of 
an effective network and of success in data collection.  
 The timescales of RRM could be flexible and flow from 10-14 days in the short scale to a 
longer scale of a few months.   
 Validation and quality control of the data need to be formulated in the RRM to ensure sound 
advice for the EC. 
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 Pilot – It is important to test the RRM with a real question. The benefits could be in two 
directions: first, to validate the RRM as a process; second, to raise awareness for the need of 
RRM as a tool for decision-makers.   
 RRM Sustainability – it is important to take into consideration the sustainability of the RRM 
after the SFRI mandate: How will this mechanism continue to be operated and by whom? 
Budget considerations should also be part of it.  
5. Next steps 
The results and conclusions of this successful workshop will be integrated in the final report of the 
SFRI (Autumn 2016). Meanwhile the key messages from the workshop will constitute the main 
building blocks for the further development and testing of the RRM and as such they will be 
presented and discussed at the plenary meeting of the SFRI on 22 December 2015. The 
communication with the EC officials will continue in view of possible new topics for pilot testing of 
the RRM. 
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Background Paper 8 
Workshop report 'Democracy 2.0 - Foresight for better 
R&I policy' 
 
1. Introduction 
The workshop was an interactive mutual learning training session organized by the Commission's 
expert group on 'Strategic Foresight for R&I in Horizon 2020' (SFRI) and Unit RTD.A6 with the 
participation of additional external experts in the areas of participatory approaches in policy 
development, trend analysis, and citizens' empowerment at local level. 
Date and place  
Wednesday, 8 June 2016, 9:00-15:30, in Brussels (ORBN building, Square Frère-Orban 8, room 
5/66, 5th floor) 
Objective of the workshop  
To illustrate foresight processes and tools for programming and policy design in the context of 
'Democracy 2.0'. 
Workshop participants were invited to: 
 explore possible futures for future changes towards a Democracy 2.0 in the next 5-10 years 
and the implications for EU R&I policy and programming; 
 discuss the role of foresight, its inspiration and tools in policy design and programming drawing 
on good practice from different contexts;  
 identify different opportunities/ possibilities of applying bottom-up foresight approaches in the 
preparation of a EU Framework Programme (current and next) and their implications - both in 
terms of the process for identifying priorities, and for embedding the concept and approach in 
the content itself. 
At the end of the workshop participants should have a better understanding of bottom-up foresight 
tools and their combinations, and how to conceptualize and use foresight in deliberative policy 
contexts. 
The workshop1: 
Democracy 2.0 refers to transformations of political systems that involve much more deliberative 
policy-making and public participation in governance. These elements are becoming increasingly 
important for R&I policy. 
The scope of democracy has become more extensive and inclusive in recent years powered by the 
enabling and widespread force of ICTs (internet, ambient intelligence and smart devices). 
Democracy 2.0 thrives in the new enabling environment for stakeholders, allowing them to engage 
more proactively in shaping, implementing and reshaping policies, which affect their well-being and 
daily life. This shift in whole cycle engagement in policy shaping, implementation and review by a 
wide range of stakeholders is happening in real time but currently captures a fraction of the 
stakeholders in parts of the process. There are different perspectives on what Democracy 2.0 is or 
should constitute and these have implications for how prominently such a concept will/should 
feature in public policy design and programming processes. The current understanding of 
Democracy is in flux and some see a 'Democracy 2.0' emerging. 
In the current highly dynamic policy environment where crises fester and emerge with sudden 
impact, anticipating changes to the policy environment itself becomes an important issue. 
                                                 
1  The concept of the workshop is based on the background paper 'A frame for selecting bottom-up topics' 
that was developed by the SFRI expert group. 
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Exploring different possibilities of applying foresight more broadly in a 'Democracy 2.0' will help 
develop anticipation of changes in the policy environment. 
Effective policy design and programming needs to keep up with societal trends, which include 
unease, misunderstanding, tension, discord, disruption, as well as satisfaction with policy decisions 
and programmes, which work. Often such trends emerge as signals in communities that are not 
organized and represented as stakeholders in established policy processes. When developing R&I 
policy it is not only important to listen to the usual lobbies, scientists or policy-makers, but also to 
demand forward-looking perspectives and inputs from those citizens who are the addressees for 
later applications (technologies or products or processes). Both, the actors and the sources in 
foresight need to be broader and taken up bottom-up (instead of asking ready-made questions 
top-down) at a pre-competitive stage. An important part of the workshop is about identifying non-
represented groups and the question of how to engage them through foresight. 
Finally, it is important to develop concepts and tools to strengthen the conditions for effective 
translation of emerging issues and needs perceived by those affected by policy changes, into 
policy. The workshop was based on the assumption of a 'Democracy 2.0' to explore such 
translation concepts and tools. 
In particular, the workshop consisted of the following elements: 
1. Exploring personal definitions of 'Democracy 2.0' – results from a short 'survey' 
2. Short case studies and stories of external experts: four examples of practices and experiences in 
Democracy 2.0 – how to bring new stakeholders into policy processes and planning? 
3. Group work: work out concept/tools for a bottom-up approach for policy design or programming.  
The working groups were assigned the following tasks: 
 Who are the groups in any community or country that appear to be suffering in the current 
system? 
 Who are the groups that are actively protesting some part(s) of the current system? 
 Which projects and programs are designed to move people from victim status to self-help 
status? 
 Who might be the change agents (who may be using everything from violence to peace as 
strategies)? If any group has gone to violence, it means that foresight was passed over and the 
problems were ignored; and the major task was 
 How to design a concept for a process flow how to integrate these different actors from bottom-
up. Describe the 'tools' used. 
4. Summary and discussion of the ideas of the day 
Programme 
9:00 Welcome by the European Commission 
9:10 Introduction: objectives, rationale and workflow  
9:30 Personal definitions of “Democracy 2.0” – results from a short “survey” 
9:45 Short case studies and stories five examples of practices and experiences 
in Democracy 2.0 - key success factors and barriers 
11:00 Coffee break 
11:15 Opening-up the discussion: values and attitudes towards Democracy 
11:30 Group work: work out a concept/tools for a bottom-up approach for 
policy design or programming  
12:30  Lunch break 
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13:30 Prepare presentation in groups 
14:00 Ideas of the day  
15:00 Discussion + flashback 
15:30  End of the meeting  
 
Invited external experts 
Ms Joke Quintens 
(City of Genk, Genk) 
- long standing career in facilitating group processes and 
now is active in local politics  
- long-term experience in bottom-up processes 
- soon to become responsible for city and community 
development in Marseille 
  
Mr Robin Bourgeois 
(GFAR, Rome) 
- futurist and member of World Futures Studies 
Federation working group on empowering local farming 
communities and farmers organisations through foresight 
 
2. Results from a survey on Democracy 2.0 conducted among 
participants  
Prior to the workshop, a limited survey among the participants of the workshop and members of 
SFRI was undertaken. The major aim of the survey was to find out about different understandings 
of Democracy 2.0. The questions asked were: 
1. What is your understanding and perception of democracy 2.0 and its significance for 
governance and policy processes in current policy systems in the next 10-20 years? 
2. What are the main drivers which could impact on the enhanced emergence and embedding of 
democracy 2.0 in policy processes? 
3. In which areas of policy and at what level (international, European, national, regional and local) 
is this most likely? 
4. What roles could democracy 2.0 play in policy co-design in research and innovation now and in 
future? To what extent can these be implemented at European level? 
5. Which concepts, approaches and tools are relevant and could prove effective in exploring the 
role of democracy 2.0 in developing community-driven policies to address societal challenges? 
Cite examples if possible. 
Although only eight people participated, the qualitative analysis produced interesting insights as 
starting points for the discussion: 
1. Even though there is no single definition or understanding of 'Democracy 2.0' participants link 
the term 'Democracy 2.0' mostly to the following characteristics: Involvement of citizens and 
their communities in policy-making processes, social networking, dissolution of existing 
institutions, co-creating of policies, transparency and interconnection via internet. 
2. The following main factors were identified as driving the integration of Democracy 2.0 in policy 
processes: Technology, disillusion with or even mistrust to existing institutional structures, 
crises, sense of urgency, bottom-up initiatives, growing importance of opinions in public debate 
compared to knowledge. 
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3. Democracy 2.0 has potential for being embedded in policy-making in almost all policy areas. 
The most appropriate level for integrating Democracy 2.0 in policy processes is the local and 
regional one. At higher levels (national or supranational) there is the challenge of how to bring 
'big' institutions’ policies closer to citizens. 
4. In R&I, participatory processes may play a more important role in co-creating research 
agendas.  
5. Several concepts and tools have been already developed for more intensive engagement of 
citizens in policy-making (e.g. CIVISTI project, 3D-FLUX, D-CENT) and there are also running 
projects aimed at testing new concepts and tools (e.g. CIMULACT). It is also important to give 
space to local actors and community representatives to develop own appropriate concepts, 
methods and tools. 
3. Contributions from external experts 
Joke Quintens: 
The following lessons can be drawn from the experiences of citizens’ participation in local policies at 
the city level (small city of Genk – 65k inhabitants): 
 Activate collective knowledge by involving the citizens in policy co-creation 
 Work on skills (both civil servants and citizens) rather than tools – people are at the centre of 
the process 
 Set the methods and tools in the context 
 Experiment – JUST DO IT! 
Robin Bourgeois: 
Based on the experiences from grass root foresight initiatives that help involve farmers (farmer 
organisations) in co-creating common future visions of agriculture in specific rural areas in Asia and 
Africa) the following lessons have been highlighted: 
 After giving the right impetus to local farmer organisations, they took over the initiative to 
organise foresight exercises on the future of agriculture in their localities. 
 There were positive experiences with engaging research institutes to do foresight for 
agenda setting that reflects the needs of local people. 
 The experiences have proven that face to face interactions are more valuable than 
hundreds of virtual surveys. 
4. Intermezzo on values 
The understanding of Democracy 2.0 and its practical 'application' are very much based on 
individual values. This session was intended to clarify for every individual person in the room that 
and how the individual values differ. This is important, because generally, we tend to involve 
citizens groups in Foresight or other processes that share similar values with ours, which leads to 
omitting minorities and other groups of citizens with different values. To be able to involve right 
citizens’ communities it is necessary to look outside our value boundaries. 
The participants were asked to estimate their own values on the following images: 
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5. Breakout sessions 
Three breakout groups were tasked to develop a concept of bottom up foresight for the EC, identify 
relevant actors and introduce tools, policies, programmes, skills etc. that can help embed the 
bottom-up approach in future oriented thinking in EC policies (mainly in R&I policy). In the plenary 
session, they reported back: 
Group 1 (moderated by Robby Berloznik) 
This group discussed the question how to promote bottom-up citizens' participation. They found 
that the process of H2020 programming is too complex and complicated for citizens' participation.  
It is very difficult to promote citizen participation due to limitations in how the Horizon 2020 
programme is structured. The Programme is very distributed with PPPs etc. and there is a very 
complicated process to design the work programme and difficult to find entry points. Having citizen 
opinion on a pre-designed programme is not sufficient. One solution is participatory budgeting, 
which is happening in some cities. Cities could be encouraged to join in collaborative initiatives and 
to launch their own programme. 
The EC could also provide support and skills to citizens for formulating their needs. Evaluation and 
selection of these topics could be done through citizen juries. This would work as an evolutionary 
process and would be hard at the beginning with learning curve to improve links between citizen 
and researchers. This would alleviate the decision making procedure and this would require just 
one big decision. 
This could lead to a leverage effect on less advanced regions. There is a need to ensure that whole 
community can be part of this. It is important that no community can monopolize it. The funding 
could go to existing communities or go for a more formal democratic method, mini republics for 
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random groups. The initiators could be mayors. It is important to be careful and not to put money 
first. 
However, an inspiration can be drawn from the participatory budgeting. In line with these 
principles, citizens can be invited to co-design part of the work programmes within the framework 
programmes. Citizens can be involved not only in suggesting topics but also in selecting the priority 
topics that should be addressed by R&I. Citizens' engagement will be an evolutionary process. The 
aim is randomness since completeness is not possible – it is a proxy for representation (the 
Participation paradox). 
The Group thus proposed the launch of a citizen research initiative in FP9. Citizens themselves 
would design the WP. Any group of citizens could submit their needs for research and this would 
result in a citizen designed work programme. 
Group 2 (moderated by Tal Soffer) 
The concept developed by this group is based on the idea of 'Top-down approach for bottom-up 
solutions' and local solutions. That means that policy makers and politicians create a framework 
that empower citizens and utilizes space in between government (top-down) policies and citizens 
initiatives (bottom-up). To be successful it is crucial to build trust between politicians, policy 
makers and citizens. In order to build trust it is important to focus on communication, outreach and 
implementation that takes into account the voice of society. When talking about tools for 
empowering citizens, the focus should be put on education and skills of both policy makers as well 
as citizens. There have been successful experiences with living labs. There already exist actors that 
can facilitate the participatory decision making process like community organisations and centres, 
influencers (schools etc.) and other 'neighbourhoods’ organisations'. 
The discussion focussed on context, scale and the space in between. There is a need for 
empowerment and a system for mediation and trust is needed as well as transparency. In some 
context top-down, decisions are required for bottom–up results. The challenge is how to get 
different groups to work together? This requires communication and coordination, by finding the 
relevant points of contact across Europe such as: neighbourhood managers, influencers (opinion 
leaders) and field workers. That could be done through networking and fieldwork. 
From a policy point of view, implementation is important to build trust and motivation among 
citizens. Citizens need to see that their participation is having an effect. The steps include a 
mapping of skills and tools, where the focus of skills are social skills (based on the fact that future 
generations will be familiar with ICT skills) and being more active citizens, and mapping of spaces 
living labs. Ownership and institutional culture is important. Education and engagement are 
essential for engaging citizens in an effective way as well as the development of the right policies 
and right design to make this work. Other issues that were raised related to the need for 
evaluation, judgment and selection mechanism of ideas, and issues that will be raised by the 
citizens. 
Group 3 (moderated by Natalie Dian) 
This group stated that the participatory approach and process is not suitable for all EC policies and 
selection of most suitable policies is needed. While looking for the most relevant actors in the 
participatory process, it is important to take into account citizens groups that might seem not 
relevant at present but that might be affected by specific policies in the future. In order to obtain 
lay opinion, a mining of media is an option. The group highlighted the fact that increasing skills is 
an important assumption for involving all relevant citizens' opinions and citizens groups. 
The proposal is to set up a systematic framework for emergent risks for the environment. Lay 
knowledge is needed and not just expert judgement. Do they bring valued added for all fields? 
Actors in such a system include those providing expert judgement and representation of citizens. 
How to involve actors, which are not relevant today but important in the future beyond? How to go 
beyond the obvious players? 
The process involves a mapping of the actors and the different strategies from different actors and 
the multipliers to act at the intermediate level. Media monitoring tool - paper vs online media. Do 
we get a better perception of citizens through this tool? Who are the citizens or only those who 
have an opinion?  
There is a need to narrow down and focus on horizontal risks and systemic risks. There is a 
possibility to look at new technologies in a more specific focus and the opportunities arising from 
finding solutions to risks. In terms of top down and bottom up, which citizens should we be 
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listening to? There is a need to have broader representation of views to cover everything. Who is 
citizen 2.0? 
6. Flashback on the question: is it worthwhile working on bottom-
up foresight for Democracy 2.0? 
The following flashback results demonstrate the different opinions at the end of the discussion, 
they are 'originals'. Some questions remain: 
 Survival of EU democracy crisis. Generation identity declaration of war against a pluricultural 
society 
 What can research and innovation contribute to this governance innovation? Technocracy vs 
market Democracy 2 is an attack on technocracy rather than the market 
 There is a need for a process of translation. Are we just accepting trends and fighting them or 
are we focusing on disruptions and changing reality? Values are the biggest game changer. 
Skills. Transparency of processes, inputs into decisions and funding… 
 Opportunities to use Democracy 2.0 we need to be careful to identify those areas – which 
areas? 
 There is a contest of ideas. Pragmatic solutions could be found 
 Prototyping in the field 
 Citizens provide knowledge creativity  
 Who are the citizens? – This is a highly political question. 
 Make a difference between consumers and citizens  
 Taxpayers vs non tax payers  
 Stockholders stakeholders  
 New citizen spaces for action, new types of partnership between emerging new types of actors  
 Astro turfing2 and vested interests in, for example, setting up a coalition of patient rights.  
 Bottom-up citizen-driven instrument science 2.0 public private societal  
 Widen the expertise and involve the democratic sector 
 Possible to bridge the gap but don't know if institutions are ready for it or if we have the skills 
and outreach  
 Very positive as there has been evolution  
 Institutions have to follow as citizens won't disappear  
 E-participation  
 Problem of scale 500 m would be a challenge and involving all the layers researchers have 
hijacked 26 % through ERC 
 A lot of political will is needed to put citizens back in the processes 
 
                                                 
2 Astroturfing is the practice of masking the sponsors of a message or organization (e.g., political, 
advertising, religious or public relations) to make it appear as though it originates from and is supported by 
a grassroots participant(s). It is a practice intended to give the statements or organizations credibility by 
withholding information about the source's financial connection. 
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 Aims, techniques and success criteria ... Improve services, opening more windows and doors, 
ill-advised to throw open all the doors, delivery for citizens and value for money 
 Not an issue of feasibility but our level of commitment to adventure  
 Research agenda, action agenda  
 Not top down approach to promote bottom up - need first the bottom up  
 Organisations becoming obsolete but never die  
 One reality one job 
 Learning by doing  
 From 'management by crisis' to 'management by foresight' 
7. Some final recommendations for the EC 
 Provide space to citizens' initiatives to develop and to engage in policy-making 
 Use existing community organisations to get closer to citizens  
 Work on skills rather than tools - tools have to be selected according to the needs, the 
objectives and the idea 
 Focus on building trust between policy makers and citizens 
 Citizen-centred foresight that will inform the R&I policy is an adventure but it is worth trying! 
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Annex 
Some reflections according to activity levels and goals. 
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Background Paper 9 
Industry 4.0: The new production paradigm and its 
implications for EU policy 
Author: Kristel Van der Elst 
1. Executive summary  
In recent years, there have been signs that manufacturing is entering a new era, sometimes 
referred to as 'industry 4.0', in which the widespread adoption of ICT is blurring the lines between 
the human, machine and virtual worlds. This will have a significant impact on the way goods are 
manufactured, companies do business, economies operate, societies react and markets function, 
and that gives rise to a host of opportunities and risks. 
If industry 4.0 becomes a mainstream, industry-wide reality, it will bring changes to the production 
system and more broadly to the production ecosystem. It will influence who produces, and how, 
where and when that production occurs. 
Industry 4.0 is expected to be a source of significant economic growth in the future, for three main 
reasons: increased demand for enhanced equipment and new data applications; consumer demand 
for a wider variety of increasingly customised products; and the likelihood that production now 
done in low-cost labour countries will be repatriated closer to the point of consumption. 
However, these forecasts are tabled on a number of critical assumptions. For industry 4.0 to 
become a mainstream, industry-wide reality the following elements need to be in place: 
 The underlying technologies need to be sufficiently mature for real-world applicability and 
adaption, they need to be economically viable and socially acceptable  
 Public and private organisations need to dispose of sufficient levels of resources, both financial 
and organisational, to secure the investment required in new technology, R&D activities, 
infrastructure and education 
 Sufficient skilled, educated workers are needed to design, operate and manage production 
systems including software development and data analytics 
 Businesses across manufacturing and high-tech value chains need to be able to access reliable 
digital communication systems and network infrastructure 
 Standards need to exist and be enforced to ensure that the exchange of data between 
machines and systems can take place across national borders and platforms 
 Ownership and access to consumer and industrial data needs to be regulated 
 Intellectual property needs to be protectable across national borders, especially with respect 
to trade and commerce 
Many proponents of industry 4.0 also assume that the system-wide replacement of workers by 
autonomous robots is inevitable, although this is contestable.   
For industry 4.0 to be a driver in Europe's aim to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive 
economic growth, the European institutions have to show foresight by reflecting on what might 
happen and what is needed to accompany this transformation towards a future which is desired 
and beneficial for European society.   
The research agenda of the European Union's Framework Programme should include the following 
reflections, structured around priority policy areas. 
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Enabling the opportunity Managing the challenges 
Competitive markets 
How can policy foster a competitive 
environment for businesses looking to 
leverage the large economic growth 
opportunity that industry 4.0 represents? 
Inclusive economic growth 
How do we ensure there is the right level of 
investment in education and (re-)training in the 
skills required for industry 4.0 to insure there is 
equality of opportunity for citizens to participate 
in the industry 4.0 economy? Where might the 
European social contract fail, and which pieces 
are to be safeguarded?  
Free Trade 
What changes to the trade framework are 
needed to accommodate trade in industry 
4.0 products and services? 
Country level competition – single market 
What fiscal and social security policy needs to 
be developed at EU level to avoid inter-nation 
competition/protectionism? 
Standards 
Which international standard 
communication protocols, data formats 
and interfaces are required to guarantee 
a competitive industry and internal 
market, as well as inclusion in the global 
industry 4.0 economy?  
Digital divide between countries 
What is needed to encourage the deployment of 
the minimal level of digital infrastructure across 
Europe to provide a level playing field and 
inclusion of all European nations? 
Data privacy, ownership, access and 
usage 
What rules on data privacy, ownership, 
access and usage need to be defined to 
stimulate industry 4.0 growth and trust 
among actors?  
Critical / strategic infrastructure 
What is needed to safeguard the industry 4.0 
infrastructure from attacks and who is 
responsible? 
Intellectual property protection 
Are current intellectual property 
protection frameworks suited for the new 
types of products and services that might 
emerge?  Are all actors that will 
contribute appropriately and efficiently 
protected?   
 
Sustainability 
What policies are needed to capitalise on 
industry 4.0 to develop a more 
sustainable and circular economy? 
 
 
The purpose of this paper is to highlight potential emerging challenges related to industry 4.0 that 
are relevant for economic and social policy. The document is a contribution to Horizon 2020, the EU 
Research and Innovation programme.  
The document is not intended to be a fully comprehensive study on all plausible future evolutions 
of industry 4.0 and its implications for all actors. It aims to provide an accessible overview of what 
manufacturing might look like in the future and the implications this may have for policy making. 
The author would like to thank the members of the European Commission Expert Group 'Strategic 
Foresight for R&I Policy in Horizon 2020' (SFRI) for their valuable contributions. 
2. What is industry 4.0? 
In recent years, there have been signs that manufacturing is entering a new era. A technology 
revolution – faster, more widespread and with greater impact than before – has the potential to 
transform production systems globally. Specifically, the widespread adoption of ICT in 
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manufacturing is blurring the lines between human, machine and virtual worlds. The 
digitisation and networking of existing manufacturing processes, both human and machine, is 
enabling a host of opportunities and risks in a new production paradigm.  
This new production paradigm goes by many names, such as the fourth industrial revolution and 
industry 4.0. However, we choose to name it, it is clear that the application of current and future 
technology to production systems, and thus the manufacturing industry, will have a significant 
impact on the way goods are manufactured, companies do business, economies operate, 
societies react and markets function.    
Driving this revolution is the exponential growth of a number of technologies that may not be 
new – many were invented over 20 years ago – but are becoming more widely applicable thanks to 
an increase in computing power and reduction in cost. For example, robotics has existed in one 
form or another for decades but only in recent years have robots become powerful, small and 
cheap enough to be used effectively in real world situations, which require them to work 
independently, make decisions and learn. Many believe that what we are witnessing at present is 
only the start of a vast technology revolution, as many technologies are only just entering an 
exponential rate of growth in their development. 
Ten technologies that are driving Industry 4.0 
Artificial intelligence and collaborative robotics: Autonomous robots will be able to perform 
more complex tasks, make sense of complex data, make decisions and interact with one another, 
as well as with humans, in the factory.  
Additive manufacturing: Better known as 3D printing, additive manufacturing creates objects 
by adding rather than subtracting layers. This method will be widely used to produce customized 
products with complex and lightweight designs.  
Nanotechnology: Nanotechnology creates physical objects by manipulating individual atoms 
and molecules. It will profoundly change how products are manufactured, particularly in the fields 
of metals, engineering and electronics. 
Biotechnology: Biological processes will increasingly be used for industrial purposes, with 
examples including engineered leather and sustainably produced fuel and chemicals.  
Cloud computing: Deploying machine data to a network of remote servers hosted on the 
Internet, and sharing it across sites and company boundaries, will continue to enhance 
productivity and supply chain management.  
Sensor technology: Sensors connected to technology networks will be integrated into machines 
and products to collect a vast amount of data. These data streams will allow companies to 
prevent faults, monitor their supply chains and to provide new services to customers. 
Big data analytics: The collection and analysis of large data sets from machines, production 
systems, suppliers, products and customers will support real-time decision-making, improve 
understanding of customer preferences and make supply chain management more efficient.                 
Simulation: By using real-time data to create a virtual model mirroring the physical factory, 
simulations will enable the optimisation of plant operations and machine settings before physical 
production. 
Augmented reality: Augmented reality technology will provide real-time information to 
manufacturing workers that can be visualised (e.g. repair instructions). This will improve 
decision-making and work procedures in the factory.  
Network and communication technology (industrial Internet of Things): Electronic 
systems that enable communication between individuals, groups and machines through Internet-
based wireless technologies. Machines, systems and workers will be connected through digital 
networks and communicate with each other by exchanging digital information. 
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3. How is manufacturing to change? 
We can already see the first manifestations of industry 4.0 emerging, and the concept’s proponents 
depict a profound transformation of manufacturing in the coming years and decades. If industry 
4.0 becomes a mainstream, industry-wide reality, how might this look? 
3.1 Changes to the production system 
Industry 4.0 will bring four main changes to the production system, each driven by a number of 
technologies that have individual and collective impacts on the manufacturing process.  
3.1.1 Change in production 
Cyber physical production systems (CPPS) are at the heart of the transformation of 
manufacturing. They enable the use of information communication technology to monitor 
and control physical processes, making production more agile. 
Smart sensor technology and extensively integrated data systems enable autonomous 
production management. Resources and products are networked, materials and parts can be 
located anywhere and at any time, production systems react rapidly to changes in demand or 
stock levels and to faults, and produced items can be customer-specific and individualised, 
produced on-demand.  
Changing demands on workers engaged in operational tasks such as production, warehousing, 
logistics and maintenance mean that new skills in efficient working with CPPSs are required.  
Wearable technology – clothing and accessories incorporating computer and advanced electronic 
technologies – might be used to integrate workers themselves as part of CPPSs, with the ability to 
monitor productivity and efficiency of individuals on the factory floor.  
3.1.2 Change in supply chains 
The vertical and horizontal integration of supply chains will be facilitated through 
increasing digital connectivity.  
Entire supply chains will be networked via CPPSs, from inbound logistics through warehousing, 
production, marketing and sales to outbound logistics and downstream services. This creates 
transparency and flexibility across entire supply chains – from purchasing through 
production to sales.  
Customer-specific adaptations can be made not only in the production but also in the 
development, ordering, planning, composition and distribution of products, enabling factors such as 
quality, time, risk, price and environmental sustainability to be handled dynamically, in real time 
and at all stages of the value chain.1 
3.1.3 Change in information 
Vast amounts of data will be collected and transmitted with the increasingly digital 
nature of production systems and supply chains.  
This data will not only provide valuable information about consumers, their preferences, and 
the products they buy, but also influence the life cycle of product manufacturing. 
The data and information that is available at all stages of a product’s life cycle will enable new, 
more flexible processes from modelling to prototypes at the product stage.2 
                                                 
1  Industry 4.0: Challenges and solutions for the digital transformation and use of exponential technologies, 
2015, Deloitte. 
2  Industry 4.0: Challenges and solutions for the digital transformation and use of exponential technologies, 
2015, Deloitte. 
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3.1.4 Change in context 
Changes similar to those in manufacturing will take place in other industries such as energy, 
automotive and infrastructure. These ‘smart’ industries will interact with each other to 
create an industry 4.0 ‘ecosystem’, with future changes in one industry being likely to affect 
others. 
For example, transformation of the mobility sector in the form of autonomous vehicles and 
drone technology will combine with manufacturing to generate more autonomy on the factory 
floor and create more efficient supply chains. Transformation of the energy sector in the form of 
smart electricity grids will enable more efficient use of energy in the production system. Sensor 
technologies combined with critical infrastructure, such as roads, can further heighten the 
efficiency of supply chains. 
3.2 Changes to who produces and how, where and when that production occurs  
The technology-driven transformation of manufacturing and the creation of a new industry 4.0 
ecosystem will impact what will be produced, by who, how, where and when. Five potentially 
fundamental future changes are relevant for policy making. 
3.2.1 How might industry 4.0 change what is produced? 
The transformation of manufacturing processes will allow producers to better respond to the 
increasing demand for customisation to individual or niche needs. This can be both in a push 
model – better data on consumption preferences allows producers to better anticipate preferences 
– and in a pull model, engaging with the customer so he/she expresses preferences and co-
creates. 
There will be an increase in digital product templates for consumers or other businesses to 
build on.3  
More focused market data will support producers and intermediaries to develop products that 
meet market needs.   
Products are also likely to become more digitally equipped with the inclusion of sensors and 
connectivity, and become part of the internet of things. 
An example of what this might look like in real life  
Inspired by visual platforms such as Pinterest and Instagram, consumers would access an online 
tool, upload a 3-D scan of their feet and design their shoes, using digital templates which propose 
designs that can be altered — changing colour, material, heel heights, types of tips, and so on. 
The digital design is sent to a manufacturer – e.g. a local 3D print shop – to be custom-made. 
The shoes that are produced include sensors to trace their delivery, to obtain data on their usage 
and potentially to facilitate the sharing of them. 
 
3.2.2 How might industry 4.0 change who produces? 
There is no consensus around the future of employment in industry 4.0 production 
systems and value chains. Many suggest that many jobs will be created as a result of increased 
demand for high-skilled workers such as mechanical engineers, software developers and data 
analysts. At the same time, it is widely acknowledged that there will be shift away from low-skilled 
jobs that perform simple repetitive tasks, as we see greater automation on the factory floor. 
Consumers will become (co-)creators as they become increasingly apt in engaging in the 
creation or conceptualisation of the products they buy. As manufacturers engage directly with 
consumers, not only will the gap between prototype and product narrow, consumers can become a 
source of funding as producers build communities of supporters around products before making 
them. 
                                                 
3  To Innovate or Die: The Global Economy in 2050, Van der Elst, Huffington Post, 2015; Some examples: 
iOS and Android app platforms, consumers who 'hack' off-the-shelf IKEA furniture (ikeahackers.net), 
Google's Project Ara modular smartphone (https://atap.google.com/ara/). 
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The world of physical manufacturing will open to newcomers, start-ups and SMEs. 
Barriers to entry are to diminish with lower barriers to learning (e.g. skills such as design, 
production, or connecting with experts), lower barriers to infrastructure (e.g. the democratisation 
of tooling equipment to make prototypes) or better access to funding (e.g. crowdfunding, venture 
capital) and lower commercialisation risks (e.g. build-to-order). 
The type of intermediaries will change. Consumer-centred intermediaries will emerge, 
connecting the consumer with a place to serve their needs. Increasingly there will be players 
who leverage personal data to better understand consumers, engage with them and tailor offerings 
to their specific needs and wants – even before they know it themselves. Consumers in the future 
may have one store – a digital platform – serving all their needs: overwhelmed with an increasing 
availability of data, information and options, they might turn to ‘personal shopper’ platforms to 
help sort products for them.  
3.2.3 How might industry 4.0 change how products are produced?  
Under industry 4.0, products will be produced with greater productivity, flexibility, efficiency and 
quality of the manufacturing process, opening the opportunity to be more resource efficient and 
sustainable.  
With better visibility about production demand and transparency about production capacity in 
relation to demand, production system owners will take the opportunity to leverage their assets, 
monetising spare capacity when available. This could spur a shift away from ownership models 
(manufacturer fully owns and utilises factories), towards a sharing model with the leasing of 
unutilised time to maximise efficiency. 
3.2.4 How might industry 4.0 change where products are produced?  
Production is more likely to occur closer to the source of consumption. As production becomes 
less labour-intensive, low-cost labour might no longer be a competitive advantage for a country. 
Combined with the prospects of production from recyclable or synthetic materials and renewable 
local energy, as well as the need to deliver more and faster customized products, this opens up the 
prospects of an increasing relocation of production to the consumption markets.  
3.2.5 How might industry 4.0 change when products are produced?  
Production rates will be closer to actual demand and consumption through digital 
infrastructure that provides access to near-real-time point-of-sale data. Produce-to-order will be 
an increasingly widespread proposition. 
4. What are the critical assumptions behind the industry 4.0 
future? 
Industry 4.0 is predicted to be a source of significant economic growth in the future. According to 
one source, taking Germany as an example, industry 4.0 will contribute an increase in revenues of 
EUR 30 billion per year from demand for enhanced equipment and new data applications, as well as 
consumer demand for a wider variety of increasingly customised products – roughly 1% of 
Germany's GDP. Productivity gains from more efficient processes in industrial manufacturing and 
other industries such as automotive could lead to gains of over EUR 90 billion over five years.4 The 
corresponding GDP gains from industrial growth of this nature are likely to be significant. 
However, these forecasts are tabled on a number of critical assumptions. For industry 4.0 to 
become a mainstream, industry-wide reality the following elements need to be in place: 
 The underlying technologies need to be sufficiently mature for real-world applicability and 
adaption, they need to be economically viable and socially acceptable  
 Public and private organisations need to dispose of sufficient levels of resources, both financial 
and organisational, to secure the investment required in new technology, R&D activities, 
infrastructure and education 
                                                 
4  Industry 4.0, The Future of Productivity and Growth in Manufacturing Industries, 2015, Boston Consulting 
Group. 
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 Sufficient skilled, educated workers are needed to design, operate and manage production 
systems including software development and data analytics 
 Businesses across manufacturing and high-tech value chains need to be able to access reliable 
digital communication systems and network infrastructure 
 Standards need to exist and be enforced to ensure that the exchange of data between 
machines and systems can take place across national borders and platforms 
 Ownership and access to consumer and industrial data needs to be regulated  
 Intellectual property needs to be protectable across national borders, especially with respect 
to trade and commerce  
Many proponents of industry 4.0 also assume that the system-wide replacement of workers by 
autonomous robots is inevitable. The argument that optimisation through technology will always 
economically outweigh human labor is a strong assumption given the cost of labor might diminish 
with ‘competition’ from robots. And new types of work are also likely to emerge, and there is room 
to dispute which effect will be larger. 
5. What are the implications for EU policy? 
How industry 4.0 will manifest itself does not only depend on technology. The European institutions 
have an important role to play in shaping a future that is beneficial for European society. The EU 
has to show foresight by reflecting on what might happen and what is needed to accompany this 
transformation towards a future which aligns with its policy directions. It has to both work on the 
policy elements that enable the opportunities of industry 4.0 to materialise and managing the 
socio-economic challenges.  
The analysis hereunder contains reflections to consider for the research agenda of the European 
Commission’s Framework Programme structured around priority policy areas. This is a contribution 
to Horizon 20205, the EU Research and Innovation programme, and its aim to achieve smart, 
sustainable and inclusive economic growth. 
Enabling the opportunity Managing the challenges 
Competitive markets 
How can policy foster a competitive 
environment for businesses looking to 
leverage the large economic growth 
opportunity that industry 4.0 represents? 
Inclusive economic growth 
How do we ensure there is the right level of 
investment in education and (re-)training in the 
skills required for industry 4.0 to insure there is 
equality of opportunity for citizens to participate 
in the industry 4.0 economy? Where might the 
European social contract fail, and which pieces 
are to be safeguarded?  
Free Trade 
What changes to the trade framework are 
needed to accommodate trade in industry 
4.0 products and services? 
Country level competition – single market 
What fiscal and social security policy needs to 
be developed at EU level to avoid inter-nation 
competition/protectionism? 
Standards 
Which international standard 
communication protocols, data formats 
and interfaces are required to guarantee 
Digital divide between countries 
What is needed to encourage the deployment of 
the minimal level of digital infrastructure across 
Europe to provide a level playing field and 
                                                 
5  'Horizon 2020 is the biggest EU research and innovation programme ever. Almost €80 billion of funding is 
available over seven years (2014 to 2020) – in addition to the private and national public investment that 
this money will attract. Horizon 2020 will help to achieve smart, sustainable and inclusive economic 
growth. The goal is to ensure Europe produces world-class science and technology, removes barriers to 
innovation and makes it easier for the public and private sectors to work together in delivering solutions to 
big challenges facing our society'. http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/news/horizon-2020-
brief-eu-framework-programme-research-innovation  
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a competitive industry and internal 
market, as well as inclusion in the global 
industry 4.0 economy?  
inclusion of all European nations? 
Data privacy, ownership, access and 
usage 
What rules on data privacy, ownership, 
access and usage need to be defined to 
stimulate industry 4.0 growth and trust 
among actors?  
Critical / strategic infrastructure 
What is needed to safeguard the industry 4.0 
infrastructure from attacks and who is 
responsible? 
Intellectual property protection 
Are current intellectual property 
protection frameworks suited for the new 
types of products and services that might 
emerge?  Are all actors that will 
contribute appropriately and efficiently 
protected?   
 
Sustainability 
What policies are needed to capitalise on 
industry 4.0 to develop a more 
sustainable and circular economy? 
 
 
5.1 Enabling the opportunities of industry 4.0 
Industry 4.0 production models hold the potential to spur economic growth. Beyond the forecast 
increased demand for enhanced equipment and new data applications, and consumer demand for a 
wider variety of increasingly customised products, growth prospects stem from the likely trend that 
production now done in low labour countries will be repatriated to Europe.  Indeed, as production 
becomes less labour-intensive, resources become more recyclable or locally produced and demand 
increases to deliver more customized products more quickly, there is the prospect of an increasing 
relocation of production to the consumption markets.  
For Europe to fully benefit from the potential economic growth associated with this global 
transformation, it will need to be an innovator and have related technologies and platforms 
developed on European soil.   
Europe has to establish appropriate standards on industrial data and intellectual property, trade 
frameworks that underlie competitive industry, a deep internal market and inclusion in the global 
industry 4.0 economy. Enabling more sustainable production of goods via industry 4.0 is also an 
opportunity to not miss.  
As such the European Union's Framework Programme is advised to consider the following research 
questions: 
Competitive markets - How can policy foster a competitive environment for businesses 
looking to leverage the large economic growth opportunity that industry 4.0 represents? 
Although industry 4.0 is predicted to open new opportunities in physical manufacturing for 
newcomers, start-ups and SMEs, it will be expensive to upgrade production systems with the 
required technology and equipment. The creation of a competitive market is also closely related to 
data and intellectual property protection frameworks. If larger organisations have more means to 
make sense of the data accumulated through industry 4.0 activities and use their predictive power, 
this could lead to market consolidation and monopolisation – as could the drive to develop industry 
4.0 integrated value chains to protect business secrets (discussed below). To avoid monopolisation, 
create a competitive industry 4.0 market and allow start-ups and SMEs to take part in this evolving 
economy, the creation of a competitive business environment is crucial.  
Free Trade - What changes to the trade framework are needed to accommodate trade in 
industry 4.0 products and services? 
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Technologies, intellectual property, enhanced machinery, data analysis software and customised 
products are likely to become important traded goods. Agreement on the standards under which 
these technologies are regulated, the tariffs that they are traded under, and the relative 
competition between nations will be an important factor. 
Standards - Which international standard communication protocols, data formats and 
interfaces are required to guarantee a competitive industry and internal market, as well 
as inclusion in the global industry 4.0 economy?  
Standards are essential to ensure the exchange of data between machines, systems and software 
within a networked value chain and across borders.  
Data privacy, ownership, access and usage - What rules on data privacy, ownership, 
access and usage need to be defined to stimulate industry 4.0 growth and trust among 
actors?  
Large quantities of industrial data will be generated, collected and shared by new production 
systems and amongst partners in the value chain. This will include information about individual 
consumers, their preferences, and the products they buy. Currently much of this information is 
considered by commercial organisations as being given to them free of charge and rights.  
Consumers might change their position on this and demand legal protection.  
Intellectual property protection - Are current intellectual property protection 
frameworks suited for the new types of products and services that might emerge?  Are 
all actors that will contribute appropriately and efficiently protected?   
The intellectual property associated with the design of smart products and advanced manufacturing 
systems will need adequate protection. Corporations are reluctant to enter networked-based value 
chains (versus integrated ones) for fear of the information (business secrets) that can be mined 
from them, driving consolidated markets. Protection is particularly important for trade within 
Europe with respect to the designs and digital content that can be used to customise products, 
built-on products and services. The co-creating consumer’s rights also need to be further 
investigated. 
Sustainability - What policies are needed to capitalise on industry 4.0 to develop a more 
sustainable and circular economy? 
Industry 4.0 production systems and value chains offer the opportunity to produce products more 
resource-efficiently and in a more sustainable fashion, with the appropriate policies in place. 
5.2 Managing the challenges of industry 4.0 
For industry 4.0 to be a positive force for achieving smart, sustainable and inclusive economic 
growth a number of socio-economic challenges need to be managed.  
Europe has to develop policies managing the transition towards a high skilled economy, job-scarce 
economic growth, the risk of increased protectionism, nation-level inclusiveness and the risks 
inherent to broadening the critical infrastructure of a country. 
As such the European Union's Framework Programme is advised to consider the following research 
questions: 
Inclusive economic growth - How do we ensure there is the right level of investment in 
education and (re-)training in the skills required for industry 4.0 to insure there is 
equality of opportunity for citizens to participate in the industry 4.0 economy? Where 
might the European social contract fail, and which pieces are to be safeguarded?  
Amongst the most spoken-about challenges related to industry 4.0 is the inclusivity of economic 
growth. Automation will reduce the need for human labour in current production systems and value 
chains, while new types of high-skilled jobs will emerge. As such we are likely to face, at least in a 
transition period, both more unemployment and insufficient talent. 
Industry 4.0 production systems imply a significant transition in the type of talent and skills 
required from workers and business actors. The importance of education and (re-)training in high-
skilled occupations such as ICT, technology, R&D and mechatronics is widely accepted. Being 
digitally sophisticated will be a core competency of an employee of the future. 
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Secondly, robotics and human labour will be increasingly economically evaluated against each 
other as organisations optimise their production costs. Amongst the proponents of industry 4.0 
there seems to be an assumption that the system-wide replacement of workers by autonomous 
robots is inevitable, based on the assumption that human labour cost is inevitably more expensive 
than robots.  This is a strong assumption given the cost of labour might diminish with ‘competition’ 
from robots, pushing down hourly rates, and putting strains on social security and healthcare 
provisions for example. The developed world might become a low labor-cost economy were 
workers want to compete against automation. 
Country level competition – single market - What fiscal and social security policy needs 
to be developed at EU level to avoid inter-nation competition/protectionism? 
Economic competition between European countries might increase with industry 4.0 as it creates 
an 'insourcing' of manufacturing from other parts of the world back to Europe, as discussed above.  
To attract these manufacturing businesses, nations might provide attractive fiscal and social 
security systems for businesses. This might lead to a weakening of European cohesion. 
Digital divide between countries - What is needed to encourage the deployment of the 
minimal level of digital infrastructure across Europe to provide a level playing field and 
inclusion of all European nations? 
Access to the necessary digital infrastructure across European countries is a vital requirement to 
ensure that all nations can compete on a level footing, and avoid creating a two-tier system. One 
of the fundamentals of industry 4.0 is digital connectivity between suppliers, manufacturers, 
logistics providers and consumers. Ensuring that all parts of all countries have equal access to 
digital infrastructure will be a significant challenge for policy makers. 
Critical/strategic infrastructure - What is needed to safeguard the industry 4.0 
infrastructure from attacks and who is responsible? 
The increasingly digital nature of manufacturing infrastructure will result in greater vulnerability to 
cyber-threats. The industry 4.0 infrastructure will become more critical and strategic for countries 
and businesses who will look to policy-makers to help provide protection. 
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